Sollecito v. Hollywood Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 83-2371

• Decision Date: 13 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-2371,83-2371
• Parties: Joseph A. SOLLECITO, Appellant, v. HOLLYWOOD LINCOLN MERCURY, INC., and Unemployment Appeals Commission, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 928

450 So.2d 928

Joseph A. SOLLECITO, Appellant, v. HOLLYWOOD LINCOLN MERCURY, INC., and Unemployment Appeals Commission, Appellees.

No. 83-2371.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fourth District.

June 13, 1984.

Joseph A. Sollecito, pro se appellant.

James D. Adams of Quinton, Lummus, Dunwody & Adams, P.A., Miami, for appellee-Hollywood Lincoln Mercury, Inc.

Geri Atkinson-Hazelton, Tallahassee, for appellee-Unemployment Appeals Com'n.

GLICKSTEIN, Judge.

This is an appeal by a claimant from an adverse final order entered by the Unemployment Appeals Commission. We affirm.

Claimant sought employment with Hollywood Lincoln Mercury, Inc., and was hired for the position of parts driver. At the time of hiring, he was told that he would have duties other than picking up and delivering parts, including sweeping shop areas, dusting storage bins, and emptying trash. Claimant worked for less than a month, then complained that he was spending too much time on the housekeeping and that his work area was too hot. The employer offered him the chance to resign, and claimant did so.

Upon his filing for unemployment compensation, the claims examiner found him disqualified for benefits on the basis that he had voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his employer. On appeal, the appeals referee affirmed the examiner's determination, finding that claimant was aware of the other duties when he was hired. The Unemployment Appeals Commission upheld this decision, and claimant now appeals to this court. The issue is whether there is competent, substantial evidence in the record and a reasonable basis in the law to support the findings and conclusions of the appeals referee, adopted by the Unemployment Appeals Commission, that the claimant voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to the employer within the meaning of Section 443.101(1), Florida Statutes (1983).

As appellee notes, administrative agency action and findings will not be disturbed upon appeal where the findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence and the legal conclusions based thereon are accurate. E.g., Perez v. State, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Appeals Commission, 377 So.2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The appeals referee found that claimant was aware at the time of his hiring of the duties, other than parts deliveries, that he would be required to perform. This conclusion was well supported by the testimony in the case, including claimant's own admission. The referee found that claimant's resignation resulted from his decision that these duties were taking too much of his time and that the work area was too hot. Although claimant says that heat "can affect" the health of those having the pulmonary disease to which he was subject, he never claimed that it was affecting his health. To the contrary, he admitted that there was no medical opinion that he would be harming his health by working under the conditions of which he complains. The fact findings are therefore suitably grounded in the evidence.

The legal question is whether an employee's leaving his employment because of his judgment that too much of his time is spent on the wrong activities and because he feels that it is too hot constitute good cause attributable to this employer. While Florida cases have considered neither of these points, the conclusion in other states with similar unemployment compensation statutes has uniformly been that neither is good...