Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club

• Decision Date: 30 March 1973
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 72-701.
• Citation: 359 F. Supp. 41
• Parties: Jean SOLOMON and Ruby Rayford, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The MIAMI WOMAN'S CLUB and the Florida Federation of Women's Clubs, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

359 F. Supp. 41

Jean SOLOMON and Ruby Rayford, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The MIAMI WOMAN'S CLUB and the Florida Federation of Women's Clubs, Defendants.

Civ. No. 72-701.

United States District Court, S. D. Florida, Miami Division.

March 30, 1973.

Jon D. Caminez, Tallahassee, Fla., for plaintiffs.

L. S. Bonsteel of Smathers & Thompson, Miami, Fla., for The Miami Woman's Club.

Doris A. Dudney of Fowler, White, Gillen, Humkey, Kinney & Boggs, P. A., Tampa, Fla., for The Fla. Federation of Women's Clubs.

ROETTGER, District Judge.

This civil rights case presents the all-too familiar pattern of difficult cases made more difficult when both parties act as if the Holy Grail is a permanent possession in their own trophy case. Briefly stated, plaintiffs are black and contend their civil rights have been violated because the Miami Woman's Club would not admit them to membership and the Club insists it is a private organization.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The facts generally have been stipulated to among the parties.

Plaintiffs, Jean Solomon and Ruby Rayford, are black residents of this judicial district. The Miami Woman's Club is a non-profit corporation consisting of women members residing in and around Miami. Both the Miami Woman's Club and the Florida Federation of Women's Clubs, a state-wide organization to which the Miami Club belongs, are named as defendants in this suit.

On April 22, 1972, plaintiff Rayford sent a letter to defendant Miami Woman's Club at the Club's address at 737 North Bayshore Drive requesting a membership application.

Subsequently, by telephone, Mrs. Rayford requested an application blank from an employee of the Club, Mrs. Audrie Wheat, who told Mrs. Rayford she had no authority to give out application forms. When asked how an application form could be obtained, Mrs. Wheat told Mrs. Rayford that application blanks must be received from Club members. Not knowing the names of any members, Mrs. Rayford then asked for a membership list but was refused. After this conversation, Mrs. Rayford visited the Club on two different occasions but was unsuccessful in obtaining an application blank.

Plaintiff Solomon also telephoned the Club and spoke to Mrs. Wheat. Her request for an application blank was likewise refused. Mrs. Solomon visited the Club on two occasions but was not able to speak to anyone.

The Miami Woman's Club was organized in 1900¹ and became federated with the Florida Federation of Women's Clubs in 1903. The property on which the clubhouse sits is owned by the Club and the Club's business is managed by its officers and directors who are elected by the general membership. The Club neither seeks nor receives funds from the public and does not advertise for members. It does not have a license to purvey food or alcoholic beverages.

An applicant for membership in the Miami Woman's Club must be proposed by an active member and endorsed by two others. All three must have been members of the Club for at least two years and have known the applicant for that time. No member of the Club may propose or endorse more than two candidates a year.

The defendant Florida Federation was organized in 1898 and consists solely of women's clubs throughout the State of Florida. It does not receive applications from individuals. Approximately 32,000 members are in the Federation. It leases the land on which its headquarters are located from the City of Lakeland.

The Miami Woman's Club has engaged in various activities since its inception in 1900. For many years, the Club's primary function was to maintain a public library in Dade County but that function ceased when the city of Miami eventually developed its own library system.

The Miami Woman's Club has approximately four hundred members, an initial fee of $25.00 and annual dues of $15.00. No member of the Club receives compensation except reimbursement for some of the expenses incurred by its president in attending meetings of the General and Florida Federations.

At trial, Mrs. Burton, the president of the Miami Woman's Club, testified that the Club would not and could not accept a black person for membership since the articles of incorporation of the Federation limited membership to white women.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standing:

The first question presented is whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge the admission policies of the Miami Woman's Club.

Defendant Club contends that since Mrs. Rayford testified that she had not presented a written application to the Club for membership, she therefore lacked the standing necessary to litigate the membership policies of the Club. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972).

Completion of an application blank for membership is not indispensable to plaintiffs' standing under the facts of this case. The evidence showed that plaintiffs attempted several times to obtain forms but that each time they were unsuccessful. The fact that the person refusing plaintiffs was Mrs. Wheat, an employee, rather than a member of the Club, is immaterial in light of Mrs. Wheat's statement to Mrs. Rayford that application blanks could be obtained only from Club members and that a list of Club members was unavailable. After this statement, further effort on Mrs. Rayford's part would only have been pointless.

Obviously the court will not require plaintiffs to exhaust procedures which would be futile. If the court ruled otherwise, no plaintiff alleging a deprivation of civil liberties could ever obtain standing except with the full cooperation of the defendant.

In this vein, the policy behind the relief afforded under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) is that requirements for standing are to be broadly construed. See, e. g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1961). Under these circumstances, plaintiffs have comfortably cleared a standard of reasonableness for the standing requisite for judicial review.

Merits:

To state a claim under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the elements which must be proven are deprivation of a constitutional right by defendants and the fact that defendants acted under color of law. Smith v. Y. M. C. A. of Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d 634, 647 (5th Cir. 1972).

(a) Deprivation of Rights:

Membership in a private organization may not be secured by suit under the Civil Rights Acts. Sims v. Order of Commercial Travelers of America, 343 F.Supp. 112 (D.C.Mass.1972). Specifically, Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000a provides that the prohibitions against discrimination or segregation in places of public accommodation shall not apply to a private club.

The burden of proof is on the Miami Woman's Club to prove its exempt status under section 2000a. Nesmith v. Y. M. C. A. of Raleigh, N. C., 397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir. 1968).

Courts look at several factors to determine whether a club, in fact, is private or merely a subterfuge to evade the civil rights laws. Among these factors are whether the membership is limited or open-ended, whether the facilities are open to the public, existence of easily articulated admission standards, and whether its funds are derived from public or private sources. Stout v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Bessemer, Ala., 404 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1968); Nesmith v. Y. M. C. A. of Raleigh, N. C., supra, 397 F.2d at 102.

The Miami Woman's Club meets all of the foregoing standards required for the private club exemption. In addition, the evidence indicates it meets all of the tests of a private club set forth in Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F.Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D.Tex.1970). The Club does not accept a new member unless she had been endorsed by an active member and endorsed by two others. This method may be a basis for excluding applicants but it does serve to provide the Club with a way to select or reject applications. Selectivity has often been said to be the essence of a private club and selection by recommendation serves to draw a line of demarcation between admitting the general public and only the select few.

The Miami Woman's Club is a non-profit organization operated solely for the benefit and use of its members. Bell v. Kenwood Golf and Country Club, Inc., 312 F.Supp. 753 (D.C.Md.1970). The fact that the general purpose of the Club is to work for the public good obviously does not deprive the Club of its private status. Necessarily, through its involvement with civic affairs, some publicity has been afforded the Club. But the publicity given to the Club was only incidental to the Club's function of involvement with the community and none of the indirect advertising was designed to increase the patronage of the Club's facilities. Wright v. Cork Club, supra.

Further, while the Miami Woman's Club has never admitted a black woman and while membership in the Florida Federation of Women's Clubs is limited by its Articles of Incorporation, Art. IV, to clubs consisting of white women, it nevertheless does not appear that the Miami Woman's Club was formed for the primary purpose of excluding blacks on account of their race. United States v. Johnson Lake, Inc., 312 F.Supp. 1376 (D.C.Ala.1970).

All factors taken together, the court concludes that the privacy of the Club is not a mere sham to evade the Civil Rights Acts. The Miami Woman's Club is indeed private.

(b) Color of Law:

Plaintiffs readily concede that if the Club is private, the State must have significantly involved itself with the invidious discrimination to afford constitutional protection to plaintiffs. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967).

Plaintiffs argue that the Miami Woman's Club and the Florida Federation are quasi-public in nature and are aided by the municipalities of the State as well as the State itself. This argument is based on several factors: the Federation's lease with the city of Lakeland; the sheer size of the defendant Federation throughout the State of Florida; and the purpose of...