Solomon v. State, 3046
| Decision Date | 10 October 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 3046,3046 |
| Citation | 145 So.2d 492 |
| Parties | Robert SOLOMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jack Champline of Carlton, Champlin & McCown, Tampa, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., Robert R. Crittenden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.
Robert Solomon appeals his conviction of grand larceny. It would serve no good purpose to detail the facts of the case. In essence the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the elements of the offense charged, and he also protests several of the trial court's instructions to the jury. A comprehensive review of the record discloses that these contentions are without merit.
It is urged that insufficient weight was given to the testimony of alibi witnesses. The jury, however, is proper judge as to whether the testimony of alibi witnesses raises a reasonable doubt that the accused could have committed the offense. Grizzard v. State, Fla.App.1962, 139 So.2d 161, 163; Jones v. State, Fla.App.1961, 128 So.2d 754.
Defendant further insists that the evidence as a whole was not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis. Although some of the evidence was circumstantial in nature and there were evidentiary conflicts, there was direct evidence of defendant's possession of the subject property and we are of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the jury was within its prerogative. See Grizzard v. State, supra; Hyman v. State, 1943, 152 Fla. 446, 12 So.2d 437.
It is submitted that the trial court erred in charging the jury that a larcenous intent could be inferred from recent exclusive possession by the defendant. We have examined the entire instruction and find it to be a standard and proper charge on this point. Where possession of stolen property is fairly recent, exclusive and unexplained or unsatisfactorily explained, such circumstances raise a presumption that the possessor was the thief. See Cone v. State, Fla.1953, 69 So.2d 175. Such unexplained possession coupled with management of the stolen property gives rise to an inference or rebuttable presumption of larcenous intent and may be considered by the jury.
With reference to other instructions to the jury these in the main were attacked merely by 'general exception to the instructions * * *'. Cf. Ward v. State, 1936, 123 Fla. 248, 168 So. 397; 2 Fla.Jur., Appeals,...
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Palmer v. State
...that no presumption of guilt could arise against him because he was not in exclusive possession of the stolen goods, Solomon v. State, 145 So.2d 492 (Fla.App.2d, 1962), cert. den. Fla., 155 So.2d 151 (1963), Cone v. State, 69 So.2d 175 (Fla.1954), nor was his possession of the car and its c......
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Bozeman v. State
...a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by the accused, Presley v. State, 63 Fla. 37, 57 So. 605 (1912), and Solomon v. State, 145 So.2d 492 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1962); and that the possession must be Walker merely makes the unexceptional point that multiple people can jointly have exclus......
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Fast v. State
...is affirmed. Affirmed. 1 Flowers v. State, 152 Fla. 649, 12 So.2d 772 (1942); Lee v. State, Fla.App.1963, 153 So.2d 351.2 Solomon v. State, Fla.App.1962, 145 So.2d 492; Grizzard v. State, Fla.App.1962, 139 So.2d 161, 163, 93 A.L.R.2d 300; Jones v. State, Fla.App.1961, 128 So.2d 754.3 Jack v......
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Griffin v. State, LL-187
...a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by the accused, Presley v. State, (1912) 63 Fla. 37, 57 So. 605, and Solomon v. State, 145 So.2d 492 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1962); and that the possession must be exclusive, Cone v. State, 69 So.2d 175 Evidence of possession by Marshall, who was not o......