Somers v. SAIF Corp.

• Citation: 77 Or.App. 259,712 P.2d 179
• Decision Date: 08 January 1986
• Docket Number: No. 82-11066,82-11066
• Parties: In the Matter of the Compensation of Ronald M. Somers, Claimant. Ronald M. SOMERS, Petitioner, v. SAIF CORPORATION, Respondent. WCB; CA A33845.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon

Page 179

712 P.2d 179

77 Or.App. 259

In the Matter of the Compensation of Ronald M. Somers, Claimant.

Ronald M. SOMERS, Petitioner, v. SAIF CORPORATION, Respondent.

WCB No. 82-11066; CA A33845.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted Sept. 16, 1985.

Decided Jan. 8, 1986.

Robert K. Udziela, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on brief was Pozzi, Wilson, Atchison, O'Leary & Conboy, Portland.

John A. Reuling, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen. and James E. Mountain, Jr., Sol. Gen., Salem.

Before GILLETTE, P.J., and VAN HOOMISSEN and YOUNG, JJ.

YOUNG, Judge.

Claimant seeks review of a Workers' Compensation Board order reversing the referee and holding that claimant failed to prove that his myocardial infarction was compensable. On de novo review, we reverse.

Claimant is 48 years old. He has practiced law since 1962. In addition, he serves as municipal judge and a bankruptcy trustee. Before June, 1982, he had no known cardiovascular problems. On the morning of June 24, 1982, he was served with a default order in one of his estimated thirteen to fourteen hundred open case files. Investigation disclosed that the default had been taken approximately one hour before claimant had filed an answer in the case. The other attorney did not notify claimant of his intent to seek a default. Claimant became immediately and acutely upset. He had his secretary "throw" his clients out of the office, and he became consumed with the default matter. Several witnesses related that claimant appeared unusually angry. He testified that he was so upset that he could not remember how to move to set aside a default order. He called another attorney for assistance. He felt that he had "completely lost control" of his practice.

That afternoon, claimant succeeded in setting aside the default. After that court appearance, he visited another attorney, who testified that claimant was very upset and under a great deal of stress. Claimant eventually went back to his office, where, except for a short break, he stayed until 1:00 or 2:00 a.m., working through his files to determine whether the attorney who had taken the default was involved in any of his other cases. He did not sleep well that night.

The next morning, claimant spent two or three hours performing his duties as a municipal judge. Later that morning he discovered that the other attorney had "ex parteed" the trial judge regarding his decision to set aside the default order and that the judge had to ask the attorney to leave his office. Claimant described feeling as though he were in a trash compactor which was closing in on him. During the afternoon, he suffered some gastric distress. He took Gaviscon, which gave him no relief. He did not eat during the day.

At about 6:30 p.m., claimant conducted a wedding in his role as municipal judge. At the reception he ate some food and drank two or more glasses of champagne and talked with a number of friends and clients. On his way home, he stopped to talk with clients that he had "thrown" out of his office the day before. After spending approximately two and one-half hours with them, he arrived home about 11:30 p.m. He immediately went to sleep.

After sleeping for about an hour, he awoke sweating and experiencing severe chest pain, shortness of breath and nausea. He telephoned a doctor and was taken to the hospital, where it was determined that he had suffered the acute myocardial infarction on which the claim is based. SAIF denied the claim. The referee set aside the denial, finding that claimant had proved compensability. The Board reversed.

To establish a compensable heart condition, a claimant must prove that the work activity was both the legal and the medical cause of the condition. Bush v. SAIF, 68 Or.App. 230, 232, 680 P.2d 1010 (1984). Legal causation, in cases of emotional stress, can be established by a showing of chronic emotional stress or an episode of acute stress. Harris v. Farmers' Co-op Creamery, 53 Or.App. 618, 621, 632 P.2d 1299, rev. den. 291 Or. 893, 642 P.2d 309 (1981). The medical causation question is whether the stress was, within reasonable medical probability, a material contributing cause of the infarction. Coday v. Willamette Tug & Barge, 250 Or. 39, 47, 440 P.2d 224 (1968); Adams v. Gilbert Tow Service, 69 Or.App. 318, 321, 684 P.2d 1254 (1984). Medical causation must be established by medical experts. Bush v. SAIF, supra, 68 Or.App. at 232, 680 P.2d 1010.

The parties agree that legal causation is established. As to medical causation, claimant does not argue that chronic work-related stress caused his underlying atherosclerosis. He instead argues that the acute stress suffered on June 24 and 25 precipitated the infarction. The question becomes whether claimant established by a preponderance of the evidence that the acute stress was a material contributing cause of the infarction. We conclude that he did.

Four doctors agree that claimant was at high risk of developing coronary atherosclerosis because of smoking, elevated serum cholesterol, mild exogenous obesity and a family history of heart disease. Only Dr. Hodge, however, was of the opinion that the acute stress was a material contributing cause of claimant's myocardial infarction.

When there is a dispute between medical experts, we give more weight to those medical opinions which are both well-reasoned and based on complete information. See Hammons v. Perini Corp., 43 Or.App. 299, 302, 602 P.2d 1094 (1979); Harris v. Farmer's Co-op Creamery, supra, 53 Or.App. at 625, 632 P.2d 1299. We find that only Hodge's opinion meets both criteria and accordingly give his testimony the greatest weight. We give little weight to the opinion of Dr. Lee, because it is conclusory and because it is based on incomplete facts. Lee's letter, in its entirety, states:

"I received your letter of September 24, 1982 requesting that I review the report of the examination of Mr. Ronald M. Somers by Dr. Wasenmiller. I have reviewed that report.

"It is my opinion that Mr. Somer's work activity was not a significant or material contributing cause of his acute myocardial infarction of June 26, 1982."

Lee fails to explain why he believed that the acute stress was not a material contributing cause of claimant's heart attack. Moreover, there is no indication in the record that Lee was fully informed of the facts about June 24 and 25. Dr. Wasenmiller's report, on which Dr. Lee based his opinion, states only:

"[Claimant] does describe unusual emotional stress occurring two or three days prior to his heart attack, apparently precipitated by a default which had been filed by another attorney practicing in The Dalles, directed against Mr. Somers. Even though this default was later shown to be non-valid, he states that the emotional trauma during that period of time was significant."

Although Dr. Kloster's report is well-reasoned, he had an incomplete factual basis to evaluate the extent of claimant's stress. He did not interview claimant. His evaluation is on the basis of a series of medical reports. The only reference to claimant's stress which we can find in those reports is the above-quoted passage from Wasenmiller's letter. On the basis of the letter's description of claimant's stress, Kloster concluded:

"There is no indication that there was any work-related stress, either physical or emotional,...