Sommerfeld v. Griffith

• Decision Date: 25 November 1927
• Docket Number: No. 26396.,26396.
• Citation: 173 Minn. 51,216 N.W. 311
• Parties: SOMMERFELD v. GRIFFITH et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

216 N.W. 311

173 Minn. 51

SOMMERFELD v. GRIFFITH et al.

No. 26396.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

November 25, 1927.

Appeal from District Court, Yellow Medicine County; Harold Baker, Judge.

Action by Louisa Sommerfeld against C. D. Griffith and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed, without prejudice to an application to the trial court to modify the cancellation of a certain deed.

William Furst, of Minneapolis, for appellants.

Daly & Barnard, of Renville, for respondent.

HOLT, J.

Action to determine adverse claims of defendants to real estate in the possession of plaintiff. Findings in her favor, and appeal by defendants from the judgment.

The evidence developed that in 1900 and 1906 plaintiff acquired the title to four lots in Echo, Minn., and to an adjacent piece of unplatted land of 350 feet by 300 feet in area. Some 16 years ago a dwelling was erected upon the lots which ever since has been the homestead of plaintiff and her family. Her husband F. W. Sommerfeld, had been cashier of the Bank at Echo for over 24 years, when in August, 1924, it was discovered that he had forged paper or bills receivable held by the bank, causing it a loss of more than $32,000. Defendants were officers of the bank and naturally pressed Sommerfeld to make good the loss so far as means within his control would go. And, on August 28, 1924, a deed was procured from plaintiff and her husband to the property above mentioned to defendants as trustees, and solely upon that deed their adverse claim is based. There was no attempt to trace any of the funds of the bank into the purchase or improvement of the property deeded. The court made lengthy findings as to the facts and circumstances under which that deed was obtained, and from which the conclusions were drawn that there was no consideration and that plaintiff's signature was secured by her husband's misrepresentation that the instrument was simply a paper necessary to sign in order to secure fire insurance. We shall first notice the assignments of error challenging certain findings of fact.

There is no evidence contradicting plaintiff's testimony, even inferentially, that she knew nothing of her husband's wrongdoing or had any knowledge of any negotiations between her husband and defendants relating to the transfer of her property. Hence the finding in accordance with her testimony must be sustained. The same must be held as to the finding that her husband obtained her signature to the deed by representing that the instrument was simply a paper needed in effecting insurance on the home. There was no evidence disputing the testimony of both plaintiff and her husband to that effect. The witnesses to the deed and the notary who certified to the acknowledgment were not present when plaintiff signed. In fact, plaintiff testified she did not learn of her husband's wrongdoing, or that the papers she had signed were deeds, until more than two months after August, 1924. The court found that plaintiff remained in possession and has at all times, refused to recognize defendants' rights to the premises. Error is assigned upon the last clause of the finding. True, there is no direct evidence as to such refusal. But it is undisputed that she remained in possession, and there is no evidence that defendants ever demanded possession or sought to assert rights under the deed until the answer herein was interposed. So far as the above assailed findings are upon material facts, they are amply sustained.

In what the court includes in the conclusions of law, error is assigned upon that part which finds that plaintiff is the owner of the premises. That conclusion depends upon the invalidity of the deed to defendants. It cannot be disputed upon the findings and the evidence that the signature of plaintiff was obtained by her husband's fraud and misrepresentation. It is clear that she was not a woman of any business ability. She believed what her husband told her and signed such papers as he desired her signature upon. Her health was poor and her sight failing. Defendants were informed of plaintiff's ownership of the property they sought to acquire and knew that it was the family homestead. She was not present at the negotiations had with her husband, and defendants had no reason to assume that she knew of her husband's wrongdoing. No matter how worthy defendants' motives in seeking to obtain all they could from the wrongdoer to lessen the bank's loss, prudence ought to have suggested that, before accepting a deed from the wife of her property, and that the homestead, they make sure that she executed the deed as her free act with knowledge that it was a deed. They could not rely upon the acknowledgment, if the testimony of the notary, plaintiff's son, is true (and defendants did not contradict him), that he took the acknowledgment without plaintiff being present or appearing before him. This testimony went in without objection. Plaintiff also testifies that she did not appear before the notary to acknowledge the deed. There is no direct finding that in procuring plaintiff's signature to the deed F. W. Sommerfeld was the agent of defendants, but this is necessarily implied from the circumstances. The property defendants sought to procure to apply...