Sonnenblick-Goldman of Miami Corp. v. Feldman

• Decision Date: 25 July 1972
• Docket Number: Nos. 71--1368,SONNENBLICK-GOLDMAN,71--1394,s. 71--1368
• Citation: 266 So.2d 48
• Parties: OF MIAMI CORP., a Florida corporation, and Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp., a New York corporation, Appellants, v. Irving R. FELDMAN, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 48

266 So.2d 48

SONNENBLICK-GOLDMAN OF MIAMI CORP., a Florida corporation, and Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp., a New York corporation, Appellants, v. Irving R. FELDMAN, Appellee.

Nos. 71--1368, 71--1394.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 25, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 1972.

Joe N. Unger, Miami Beach, Paul, Landy, Beiley & Bartel, Miami, for appellants.

Bolles, Goodwin, Ryskamp & Ware, Miami, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C.J., and PEARSON and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellants are Sonnenblick-Goldman of Miami Corp., a Florida corporation, and Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp., a New York corporation. Each has filed an appeal from a final judgment based upon a jury verdict which awarded a judgment to the plaintiff-appellee against both defendants in the amount of $138,000. The appeals have been consolidated for all appellate purposes.

Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp. is a New York corporation licensed by and engaged in the State of New York in the mortgage brokerage business. It earns its primary income by placing construction and longterm loans. In several major cities, it has organized separate corporations for which it has authorized the use of the appellation Sonnenblick-Goldman in the corporate name. Such a corporation was organized in Miami, Florida under the name Sonnenblick-Goldman of Miami Corporation after the plaintiff-appellee was interviewed and hired by an officer of the New York corporation for that purpose. In its advertising, the New York corporation referred to the Miami corporation as the New York corporation's 'branch' office. Through business brought to the New York corporation by the Florida corporation, the New York corporation was able to substantially increase its volume of loans. The New York corporation received a percentage of the business transacted by the Florida corporation.

The appellee sued the two corporations and alleged that he was hired by both corporations to serve in their mortgage brokerage business. The New York corporation filed a motion to dismiss claiming that service upon it was insufficient inasmuch as it was not doing business in the State of Florida. The trial court issued an order denying the motion to quash service of process. Then the New York corporation filed its answer, and the case was tried and judgment was entered for the plaintiff-appellee.

The New York corporation has presented six points for our review, while the Florida corporation has presented but one. The Florida corporation's point is also argued in the New York corporation's briefs. Although we shall consider the argument of both corporations, we will follow the numerical order of the points as presented in the New York corporation's brief.

The first point presented by the New York corporation urges that the trial court erred in failing to grant the New York corporation's motion to dismiss on the ground that it was not doing business in the State of Florida. We think that the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to sustain appellee's allegation that the New York corporation was doing business in the State of Florida. See Richard Bertram & Co. v. American Marine, Ltd., Fla.App.1972, 258 So.2d 335; Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v. Ralph and Reba, Inc., Fla.App.1971, 254 So.2d 49.

The second point urges that the trial court erred in not providing a full evidentiary hearing when the appellant moved to quash service of process. A reading of the record does not indicate that the appellant requested a full evidentiary hearing, and the evidence submitted during trial further emphasized the accuracy of the trial court's ruling on the affidavits and exhibits which were before it when it denied appellant's motion. Richard Bertram & Co. v. American Marine, Ltd., supra.

In its third point, the appellant urges that the trial court erred in refusing to allow a post-trial amendment to the pleadings that would present a new defense. The defense which the appellant wished to present was based on the New York Statute of Frauds, General Obligations Law, § 5--701, subd. 10, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 24--A, which presumably invalidates oral contracts for brokerage commissions. Although the New York statute was...