Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs
| Docket Number | A21A0734,A21A0735,A21A0988 |
| Decision Date | 29 June 2023 |
| Parties | SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS v. HENRY COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS. HUMPHRIES v. NEWTON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS. SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS v. NEWTON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
In Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Board of Commissioners (Sons of Confederate Veterans II),[1] the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed in part and vacated in part this Court's opinion in Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Newton County Board of Commissioners (Sons of Confederate Veterans I).[2] Accordingly, we vacate our former opinion and adopt the judgment of the Supreme Court as our own.
But because the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the portion of our opinion pertaining to Tiffany Humphries in Case No A21A0735 by concluding she has standing to bring an action against the Newton County Board of Commissioners under OCGA § 50-3-1, we must now consider whether her action for injunctive relief is barred by sovereign immunity (an issue which the Supreme Court understandably did not address).[3]
The underlying facts have been thoroughly discussed in both of the published opinions in this matter, but what is germane for purposes of this appeal is that Humphries is a resident of Newton County and filed a complaint for damages on July 13, 2020, against that county's board of commissioners. Humphries sought to recover based on the Board's violation of OCGA § 50-3-1 by holding a special meeting to vote on the removal of a Confederate monument located in Covington, Georgia. She sought to recover treble and exemplary damages, and requested injunctive relief to prevent the statue's removal. In September 2020, the trial court concluded that Humphries lacked standing and, alternatively, that even if she had standing, her claims were barred by sovereign immunity.
And so now, we return to and address the issue of whether Humphries's claims are barred by sovereign immunity. She asserts they are not, but we disagree.
This Court, of course, reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss "based on sovereign immunity de novo because it is a matter of law,"[4] but factual findings made by that court are "sustained if there is evidence to support them, and the party seeking the waiver of immunity has the burden of proof."[5] Specifically, suits brought against the State which are barred by sovereign immunity are subject to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) dismissal for lacking subject-matter jurisdiction;[6] and like the State, counties are also protected by sovereign immunity.[7] Suffice it to say, sovereign immunity is a threshold determination because-like various other rules of jurisdiction and justiciability-it is "concerned with the extent to which a case properly may come before a court at all."[8] Importantly, sovereign immunity may only be waived "by an act of the General Assembly specifically providing for waiver and delineating the extent of that waiver," and implied waivers of sovereign immunity are "not favored."[9]
Of note, the Supreme Court of Georgia held in Georgia Department of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc.[10] that "sovereign immunity is a bar to injunctive relief at common law."[11] But in November 2020, effective January 1, 2021, the Georgia Constitution was amended to waive sovereign immunity such that citizens may now seek declaratory relief and-after obtaining a favorable declaratory ruling-then seek injunctive relief to enforce the favorable judgment.[12] Even so, we are required to consider whether OCGA § 50-3-1 waived the county's sovereign immunity such that the trial court improperly dismissed Humphries's suit seeking injunctive relief months before this constitutional amendment became effective.[13] And as our Supreme Court has explained, "[u]nder Georgia law, a waiver of sovereign immunity occurs at the time that the cause of action arises."[14]
Here, Humphries argues the plain language of OCGA § 50-3-1 (b) demonstrates that sovereign immunity was waived as to appellees' alleged violation of that statute because, under OCGA § 50-3-1 (b) (2), "[n]o officer or agency shall remove or conceal from display any [statutorily protected] monument for the purpose of preventing the visible display of the same."[15] Additionally, under OCGA § 50-3-1 (b) (5), "any person, group, or legal entity shall have a right to bring a cause of action for any conduct prohibited by this Code section for damages as permitted by this Code section." That portion of the statute further provides that "[s]uch action shall be brought in the superior court of the county in which the monument was located."[16]These are the statutory provisions she claims amount to a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Needless to say, when interpreting statutory language, we necessarily begin our analysis with "familiar and binding canons of construction."[17] And in considering the meaning of a statute, our charge as an appellate court is to "presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant."[18] Toward that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,[19] consider the text contextually,[20] read the text "in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would,"[21] and seek to "avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage."[22] Simply put, when the language of a statute is "plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly."[23]
Here, Humphries maintains the above-quoted portions of OCGA § 50-3-1 waive the county's sovereign immunity from injunctive relief sought in actions brought under this Code section because any such suit must be filed in superior court, and superior courts (unlike state courts) are authorized to grant injunctive relief. But the plain language of the statute does not waive sovereign immunity for injunctive relief.[24] Indeed, nowhere do the words enjoin, injunction, or injunctive appear within the statute-in fact, in 2019, the General Assembly removed language explicitly permitting such relief.[25] And that is the proverbial nail in the interpretive coffin.
Again, implied waivers of sovereign immunity are generally (and rightly) disfavored,[26] and the rules of statutory interpretation demand that we attach considerable significance to the General Assembly's removal of language permitting injunctive relief under OCGA § 50-3-1 prior to the filing of Humphries's action.[27] It strains credulity, then, to claim this statute encompasses an implied waiver of sovereign immunity for injunctive relief when the General Assembly deliberately removed language explicitly permitting injunctive relief under that statute[28]-a fact our Supreme Court has at least implicitly acknowledged.[29] Indeed, this legislative choice can only be understood as eliminating any suggested waiver of sovereign immunity for injunctive relief, and that choice must be honored by the judicial branch.[30] Finally, as our Supreme Court has explained, "sovereign immunity is waived only to the extent of the statute, which extends no further than the remedies specifically authorized by the Act."[31] And here, the statute does not include injunctive relief as a remedy.[32] As a result, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Humphries's action seeking injunctive relief on the ground that it is barred by sovereign immunity.[33]
Judgment affirmed.
DILLARD, Presiding Judge, concurring dubitante. [1] Old habits die hard, and so do deeply entrenched notions of justiciability. Shortly after the Supreme Court of the United States articulated and refined the modern Article III standing doctrine in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,[2] this formulation of standing became a core component of my judicial philosophy. Lujan standing is appropriately animated by separation-of-powers concerns[3] and helps ensure the judiciary concerns itself with actual cases and controversies, rather than academic questions, advisory opinions, or purely political disputes.[4] And until recently, this state's constitutional standing doctrine largely mirrored that of Lujan and its progeny.[5] But all of that changed with the Supreme Court of Georgia's opinion in Sons of Confederate Veterans II,[6] and I have serious concerns about the implications of this seminal decision.
So, what is standing and why does it matter? Standing is one of several doctrines of justiciability-including ripeness, mootness, and political questions-which are crucial limitations on the judicial power (be it state or federal).[7] As one prominent legal scholar has explained, "jusiticiability doctrines determine which matters . . . courts can hear and decide and which must be dismissed."[8]Importantly, these justiciability doctrines "are closely tied to separation of powers," and they "limit the power of the judiciary . . . and define the judicial role ...."[9] And as to standing, it is the "determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a particular matter to a . . . court for adjudication."[10] Put another way, the question of standing is "whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues."[11] Importantly, much like the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia has interpreted the Judicial these doctrines" (punctuation omitted)).
Power Paragraph of the Georgia Constitution to include a standing requirement of litigants.[12] And rightly so.
This...
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