Soper v. Montgomery County

• Decision Date: 17 September 1982
• Docket Number: No. 106,106
• Parties: Rudolph Furgang SOPER v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 331

294 Md. 331

449 A.2d 1158

Rudolph Furgang SOPER v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland.

No. 106.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 17, 1982.

F. Robert Troll, Jr., Hyattsville (Nylen & Gilmore, Hyattsville, on the brief), for appellant.

Thomas J. Davis, Asst. County Atty., Rockville (Paul A. McGuckian, County Atty., Rockville, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This case presents the question whether paid deputy sheriffs ¹ are entitled to a presumption of compensable occupational disease accorded to police officers under Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.), Art. 101, § 64A. That section provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Any condition or impairment of health of any paid municipal, county, State, airport authority or fire control district, fire fighter or fire fighting instructor caused by lung diseases, heart diseases, or hypertension and any condition or impairment of health of any paid State, municipal, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, county or airport authority police officer caused by heart diseases or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to be compensable under this article and to have been suffered in the line of duty and as a result of his employment." (Emphasis added.)

In 1978, the petitioner, Rudolph Furgang Soper, then a Montgomery County paid deputy sheriff (deputy sheriff), was diagnosed by a physician as suffering from heart disease and was placed on administrative sick leave by his employer, Montgomery County. After the deputy sheriff was hospitalized, a physician employed by Montgomery County determined that the deputy sheriff's medical condition rendered him incapable of performing his duties and, effective 1 September 1979, the deputy sheriff was administratively retired by Montgomery County.

In 1979, the deputy sheriff filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen's Compensation Commission (Commission). At a hearing, counsel for both parties stipulated that the single issue to be resolved was, in essence, the question presented here. The Commission found "that a Montgomery County Deputy Sheriff is not a 'police officer' within Section 64A of Article 101" and ordered that the deputy sheriff's claim be disallowed.

The deputy sheriff appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. That Court granted Montgomery County's motion for summary judgment and ultimately entered a final judgment in favor of Montgomery County.

On 24 June 1981, the deputy sheriff appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and on 22 September 1981, he filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. We issued such a writ before consideration by the Court of Special Appeals. We shall affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The deputy sheriff contends that sheriffs are constitutional officers who, notwithstanding the delegation of certain duties to state, county, and municipal police officers, retain the powers they possessed at common law. The deputy sheriff asserts that these powers include conserving public peace, preserving public order, preventing and detecting crime, enforcing criminal laws by, among other things, raising a posse and arresting persons who commit crimes in their presence, providing security for the courts, serving criminal warrants and other writs and summonses, and transporting prisoners. The deputy sheriff maintains that, under these circumstances, the powers of and duties performed by sheriffs and, therefore, by their deputies are identical or substantially similar to and concurrent with those of police officers and that deputy sheriffs are, therefore, subjected to similar risks and stresses. He points out that the Legislature, recognizing this similarity of functions, has frequently extended certain rights and benefits to and imposed certain obligations upon sheriffs and police officers alike. E.g., Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 594B(f)(9) & (10) (power to arrest without warrant); Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 727(b)(5) (Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights); Md.Code (1957, 1978 Repl.Vol., 1981 Cum.Supp.), Art. 41, § 59A-1 (death benefits); Md.Code (1957, 1978 Repl.Vol. & 1981 Cum.Supp.), Art. 41, § 70A(a)(4) & (8) (training requirements); Md.Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.), Art. 88B, § 2(e), § 4(a), & § 5 (general concurrent powers); see Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 36B(c)(1)(v) (carrying a handgun when engaged in law enforcement activities). The deputy sheriff claims, therefore, that the term "police officer" contained in Art. 101, § 64A(a) is ambiguous and argues that that term was legislatively intended to encompass deputy sheriffs. He ultimately concludes that a Montgomery County deputy sheriff is encompassed in the term "police officer" contained in Art. 101, § 64A(a). We do not agree with this ultimate conclusion.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the actual intent of the Legislature. Statutes are to be construed reasonably and with reference to the purposes to be accomplished. E.g., Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 155, 159, 438 A.2d 490, 491 (1981); Howard County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418 A.2d 1210, 1213 (1980); Comptroller of the Treasury v. John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 538-39, 404 A.2d 1045, 1052-53 (1979). The Workmen's Compensation Act should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes. Trotta v. County Car Center, Inc., 292 Md. 660, 663, 441 A.2d 343, 344 (1982); Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 185 Md. 416, 425, 45 A.2d 79, 83 (1945); Art. 101, § 63. That which necessarily is implied in the statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Insurance Comm'r of Maryland, --- Md. ---, ---, 446 A.2d 1140, 1148 (1982); Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs for Prince George's County, 247 Md. 373, 377, 231 A.2d 60, 62 (1967); Restivo v. Princeton Constr. Co., 223 Md. 516, 525, 165 A.2d 766, 771 (1960). However, neither statutory language nor legislative intent can be stretched beyond the fair implication of the statute's words or its purpose. Chillum-Adelphi, 247 Md. at 377, 231 A.2d at 62. Applying these principles to the instant case produces a clear result.

The purpose of Art. 101, § 64A is implicit in the language of the statute, and was recognized by this Court in Board of County Commissioners for Prince George's County v. Colgan, 274 Md. 193, 198-99, 334 A.2d 89, 92-93 (1975), a case involving fire fighters. There, in holding that the statute did not violate the equal protection clause and was, therefore, constitutional, this Court said:

" 'In the subject statute the legislature has seen fit to grant to fire fighters a presumption that a disability arising from lung and heart diseases was suffered in the line of duty and as a result of their employment. There is general public knowledge that fire fighters, in the course of their daily activities, are exposed to inhalation of smoke or noxious fumes and are subjected to unusual stresses and strains. An adequate constitutional base exists here.'

* * *

"Finally, ... not only may the Legislature properly determine that fire fighters are exposed to health hazards not shared by other government employees, but it may also rationally determine that full-time fire fighters are subject to greater hazards than unpaid fire fighters: volunteers and those whose principal duties do not involve fighting fires." Colgan, 274 Md. 205-06, 208, 334 A.2d 96, 97 (emphasis added).

Thus, this Court indicated that the purpose of Art. 101, § 64A is to provide a presumption of compensable occupational disease to certain classes of public employees including police officers who, in the course of their daily activities, are subjected to unusual hazards, stresses, and strains. If this purpose is to be effectuated, the functions that deputy sheriffs do, in fact, perform as a primary part of their daily activities, and not the functions that sheriffs and their deputies are authorized to perform, must control. Thus, in order to be encompassed within the term "police officer" contained in Art. 101, § 64A(a), deputy sheriffs must perform, as a primary part of their daily activities, those law enforcement duties ordinarily performed by police officers that include unusual hazards, stresses, and strains.

In determining whether deputy sheriffs are entitled to the benefits of Art. 101, § 64A(a), we note that ordinarily sheriffs retain the powers they possessed at common law including conserving public peace, preserving public order, preventing and detecting crime, enforcing criminal laws by, among other things, raising a posse and arresting persons who commit crimes in their presence, providing security for courts, serving criminal warrants and other writs and summonses, and transporting prisoners. South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 396, 402, 15 L.Ed. 433 (1856); Beasley v. Ridout, 94 Md. 641, 655, 52 A. 61, 64 (1902); Turner v. Holtzman, 54 Md. 148, 159-60 (1880); Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376, 488-89 (1860); 57 Op.Att'y Gen. 606, 609-10, 611 (1972). We shall additionally note that ordinarily those powers are concurrent with the powers now ordinarily exercised by police officers. We need only then determine which of the sheriffs' retained common law powers deputy sheriffs do, in fact, exercise as a primary part of their daily activities.

Article IV, § 44 of the Maryland Constitution provides that there shall be an elected sheriff in each county and Baltimore City who shall "exercise such powers and perform such duties as now are or may hereafter be fixed by law." Thus, sheriffs are constitutional officers whose powers and duties are not expressly enumerated in ...