Board of County Com'rs for Prince George's County v. Colgan

• Decision Date: 11 March 1975
• Docket Number: No. 143,143
• Citation: 274 Md. 193,334 A.2d 89
• Parties: BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, Maryland v. Colin C. COLGAN.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 193

274 Md. 193

334 A.2d 89

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, Maryland v. Colin C. COLGAN.

No. 143.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 11, 1975.

R. Roger Drechsler, Baltimore (Lord, Whip, Coughlan & Green, Baltimore on the brief), for appellant.

Joseph F. McBride, Greenbelt (Hooten, Fiege & McBride, Greenbelt, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

SINGLEY, Judge.

This issue in this case is the constitutionality of Chapter 695 of the Laws of 1971, effective 1 July 1971, which added a new section 64A (the Act) to Maryland Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol., 1970 Cum. Supp.) Art. 101 (Workmen's Compensation). The title of the Act was as follows:

'AN ACT to add a new Section 64A to Article 101 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1970 Supplement), titled 'Workmen's Compensation,' to follow immediately after Section 64 thereof, to provide that there is a presumption of compensable occupational disease in cases of certain fire fighters sustaining temporary or total disability or death under certain conditions, and to provide that benefits may also be payable under a retirement system under certain conditions.'

The text of the Act read:

'Any condition or impairment of health of any paid municipal, county, airport authority or fire control district fire fighter caused by lung diseases, heart diseases, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to be compensable under this article and to have been suffered in the line of duty and as a result of his employment.

'Notwithstanding any provision of this article any paid fire fighter whose compensable claim results from a condition or impairment of health caused by lung diseases, heart diseases or hypertension and has been suffered in the line of duty shall receive such benefits as are provided for in this article in addition to such benefits as he may be entitled to under the retirement system in which said fire fighter was a participant at the time of his claim. The benefits received under this article however, shall be adjusted so that the total of all weekly benefits shall not exceed one hundred percent of the weekly salary which was paid to said fire fighter.' ¹

On 9 September 1971, Colin C. Colgan, a paid fire fighter employed by the Department of Fire Protection of Prince George's County, Maryland filed with Workmen's Compensation Commission a claim for compensation as a consequence of a heart attack sustained two days earlier. After a hearing and rehearing, the Commission disallowed Colgan's claim, but properly declined to pass upon the constitutionality of the Act.

On Appeal to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, an order was entered holding the Act to be unconstitutional and affirming the action of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. That court's finding of unconstitutionality was in substance posited upon the variance between the title of the Act, which referred to 'a presumption of compensable occupational disease' and the body of the Act which, without referring to 'occupational disease' made injuries caused by lung disease, heart disease or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death presumptively 'compensable.'

Colgan appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the order of the circuit court and remanded the case 'for consideration as for an occupational disease,' Colgan v. Board of County Comm'rs, 21 Md.App. 331, 320 A.2d 82 (1974). We granted certiorari in order that we might review the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.

Prince George's County (the County), the petitioner here, would have us reverse the Court of Special Appeals for four reasons:

(i) The Act violates Constitution of Maryland Art. III, § 29;

(ii) The Act comes within the accidental injury provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law;

(iii) The Act violates the equal protection provisions of the Constitution of the United States; and,

(iv) The Act is unconstitutionally vague.

(i) Validity Under the Maryland Constitution

Judge Menchine, speaking for the Court of Special Appeals, described the background of this issue:

'Article III, Section 29 of the Constitution of Maryland (1867) reads as follows

'The style of all Laws of this State shall be, 'Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland:' and all Laws shall be passed by original bill; and every Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title; and no Law, nor section of Law, shall be revived, or amended by reference to its title, or section only; nor shall any Law be construed by reason of its title to grant powers, or confer rights which are not expressly contained in the body of the Act; and it shall be the duty of the General Assembly, in amending any article, or section of the Code of Laws of this State, to enact the same, as the said article, or section would read when amended. And whenever the General Assembly shall enact any Public General Law, not amendatory of any section, or article in the said Code, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to enact the same, in articles and sections, in the same manner, as the Code is arranged, and to provide for the publication of all additions and alterations, which may be made to the said Code.'

'(The Act) came into being as Chapter 695 of the (Laws) of 1971. In the course of its passage through the Legislature, both the title and the body of the Bill . . . were amended. As introduced, the title of the bill had provided, inter alia, that its purpose was to 'establish certain medical conditions where the death or disability of a fire fighter is presumed to be accidental and as a result of his employment.' . . . An amendment to the title of the bill struck out the above quoted language and declared that its purpose was to 'provide that there is a presumption of compensable occupational disease in cases of certain fire fighters sustaining temporary or total disability or death under certain conditions.' . . .

'The body of the bill at introduction had contained the words: 'presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the course of his employment.' . . . By amendment in the course of passage the above quoted language was stricken and the following words substituted: 'presumed to be compensable under this Article and to have been suffered in the line of duty and as a result of his employment.' ² (Emphasis in original.)

Our decisions in Clinton Vol. Fire Dep't v. Board, 259 Md. 456, 270 A.2d 778 (1970), and Shipley v. State, 201 Md. 96, 93 A.2d 67 (1952) are dispositive of this issue. In Clinton, supra, 259 Md. at 472, 270 A.2d at 787, we said:

'If the challenged provisions in the body of the statute are germane to the subject described in the title so that a person reading the title could be fairly advised of the subject matter, then the title will be deemed to have complied with the constitutional requirement.'

Earlier, in Shipley, supra, 201 Md. at 102, 93 A.2d at 70, the standard to be applied in evaluating challenges to the constitutionality of a statute was set forth:

'. . . (T)his Court has consistently held, with the great weight of authority in this country, that the purpose of Article 3, Section 29, of the Constitution is sufficiently fulfilled if the title of the legislation fairly advises the Legislature and the public, of the real nature and subject matter of the legislation sought to be enacted. In testing whether the title of a statute conforms to this constitutional requirement the courts are disposed to uphold rather than to defeat the constitutionality of a statute, and to hold that it cannot be declared unconstitutional unless it plainly contravenes the constitutional provision. A reasonable doubt in favor of its constitutionality is enough to uphold it.'

We adopt the conclusion reached by Judge Menchine for the Court of Special Appeals:

'In the subject case there is no repugnancy between title and body of the act. The body of the act provides that certain conditions may be 'compensated under this (Article 101).' The title of the act in no way conflicts with that purpose. The title simply makes clear that the act should be interpreted as granting such benefits in accordance with the provisions of that article as they relate to occupational diseases.'

(ii)

The Act Comes Within the Accidental Injury Provision of the

Workmen's Compensation Law.

Petitioner seeks to support this contention with the assertion that 'Sec. 64A is placed following the provision dealing with accidental injury (Sec. 64) rather than following the provisions dealing with occupational diseases beginning with Sec. 22. . . .' We cannot accept this proposition.

Sections 64 and 64A both appear under the subheading entitled 'Miscellaneous.' While it is true that section 64A does not follow the provisions dealing with occupational diseases, it cannot be said that section 64A is so placed as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that its subject matter is limited to accidental injury. Although both sections deal with presumptions to be engaged in when applying the Workmen's Compensation statute and although section 64A directly follows section 64, section 64A is not a subsection of section 64. Added subsequent to the original statute, section 64A is an independent section; the designation 'A' is only for placement purposes within the Article, and does not signify a complete subordination of the latter section to the prior.

Further evidence that this section does not deal with accidental injury is made clear by its title. Mass Transit Administration v. Baltimore County Revenue Auth., 267 Md. 687, 298 A.2d 413 (1973) and Shipley v. State, supra, 201 Md. 96, 93 A.2d 67, are controlling in this regard.

In Mass Transit Administration v. Baltimore County Revenue Auth., supra, we said 267 Md. at pages 695-96, 298 A.2d at...