Sorenson v. Colibri Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-398-A,93-398-A
• Citation: 650 A.2d 125
• Parties: John SORENSON v. COLIBRI CORP. et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 125

650 A.2d 125

John SORENSON v. COLIBRI CORP. et al.

No. 93-398-A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 25, 1994.

William F. Calise, Coventry, for plaintiff.

Patrick B. Landers, Kenneth P. Borden, Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Providence, for defendants.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Acting Chief Justice.

This case comes before us on appeal by the plaintiff, John Sorenson, from a grant of summary judgment entered in the Superior Court in favor of the defendant, Colibri Corporation. ¹ We affirm.

The issue presented is whether a "special employer" is an entity granted immunity from suit under the [Rhode Island] Workers' Compensation Act (the act), G.L. 1956 (1986 Reenactment) § 28-29-20. We answer this question in the affirmative.

The facts insofar as pertinent to this appeal are as follows.

On October 21, 1991, plaintiff was an employee of Temp Pro Resources (Temp Pro), an employment agency. He was assigned by Temp Pro to work for defendant, Colibri Corporation (Colibri). Colibri (1) exercised all supervision and control over plaintiff while he worked at the company, (2) was solely responsible for instructing plaintiff regarding how and where work was to be performed, (3) supplied any necessary tools and equipment, (4) determined the length of time that plaintiff would be required to work, and (5) had the right to refuse to accept plaintiff as an employee and to discharge him if his work was unsatisfactory. It is conceded by the parties that plaintiff was paid by Temp Pro. It is implicitly conceded that Temp Pro paid for workers' compensation insurance covering plaintiff. It is also undisputed that Colibri paid Temp Pro for plaintiff's services. This series of assertions leads ineluctably to the inference that said amount was sufficient to cover all Temp Pro's expenses incident to plaintiff's employment, including the cost of workers' compensation insurance. Although the record does not specifically set forth these amounts, the motion justice could take judicial notice that Temp Pro is not an eleemosynary corporation and would therefore include in its charge all necessary expenses together with an amount for profit.

The plaintiff and defendant Carlos Santiago, a Colibri employee, on October 21, 1991, were loading goods onto a trailer truck. Santiago, who was operating a fork-lift machine, had occasion to stop the fork lift and step out of the machine. While the fork lift was unoccupied, it rolled forward and struck plaintiff, pinning him against the trailer truck. The plaintiff suffered physical injuries and incurred hospital and medical expenses as a result of this accident.

The plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim with Temp Pro and received benefits from Temp Pro's workers' compensation insurance carrier. The plaintiff subsequently initiated an action against Colibri and Santiago, alleging that their negligence proximately caused his injuries. Colibri moved for summary judgment on the ground that the suit was barred by § 28-29-20, which provides that workers' compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy against an employer. The plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment, claiming that when there is both a general employer and a special employer, pursuant to § 28-29-2(3)(C), as amended by P.L.1991, ch. 206, § 1, the general employer is deemed the employer, and therefore, the special employer is not an employer as contemplated by the act. Because the special employer is not an employer, plaintiff argued, it is not protected by the immunity granted an "employer" by § 28-29-20 and is thus amenable to suit.

The motion justice granted Colibri's motion for summary judgment, interpreting the act as a whole and § 28-29-20 in particular to bar a common-law action against a special employer when an employee has received workers' compensation benefits from his general employer. This appeal followed.

A party may move for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that no issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law. Holliston Mills, Inc. v. Citizens Trust Co., 604 A.2d 331, 334 (R.I.1992). It should be granted when the pleadings, affidavits, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and other materials viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party reveal no genuine issue of material fact. Nichola v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 471 A.2d 945, 947-48 (R.I.1984).

Section 28-29-20, the exclusive-remedy provision of the act, provides:

"Rights in lieu of other rights and remedies.--The right to compensation for an injury under chapters 29-38, inclusive, of this title, and the remedy therefor granted by those chapters, shall be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that injury now existing, either at common law or otherwise against an employer, or its directors, officers, agents or employees; and those rights and remedies shall not accrue to employees entitled to compensation under those chapters while they are in effect except as otherwise provided in §§ 28-36-10 and 28-36-15." (Emphasis added.)

When an employee receives workers' compensation benefits, § 28-29-20 grants immunity from suit to the injured employee's employer or to the employer's directors, officers, agents, or employees. Workers' compensation benefits are thus the exclusive remedy for any loss or harm allegedly caused by any of these entities to which the Legislature has granted immunity. An injured employee who has received workers' compensation benefits may, however, seek further recovery from an entity that has not been granted immunity under § 28-29-20. DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., 612 A.2d 40, 42-43 (R.I.1992).

Our task here is to determine whether a special employer is an entity granted immunity from suit by § 28-29-20. To answer this question, we must first examine the definitions section of the act, § 28-29-2, which provides in pertinent part:

"Definitions.--In chapters 29-38, inclusive, of this title, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) 'Employer' shall include any person, co-partnership, corporation or voluntary association, and the legal representative of a deceased employer; it shall include the state, and the city of Providence. It shall include also each city, town, and regional school district therein that shall vote or accept the provisions of chapters 29-38, inclusive, of this title in the manner herein provided.

* * * * * *

(3) 'General or special employer'

(A) A general employer shall mean a person who for consideration and as a regular course of its business supplies an employee with or without vehicle to another person.

(B) A special employer shall mean a person who contracts for services with a general employer for the use of an employee, a vehicle or both.

(C) Whenever there be a general employer and special employer wherein the general employer supplies to the special employer [an] employee and the general employer pays or is obligated to pay the wages or salaries of such supplied employee, then and in that event notwithstanding the fact that direction and control shall be in the special employer and not the general employer, the general employer if it be subject to the provisions of the workers' compensation act or has accepted the same, shall be deemed to be the employer as set forth in subdivision (1) of this section."

Section 28-29-2 provides definitions of "employer," "general employer," and "special employer" and additionally instructs that when a general employer supplies an employee to a special employer, the general employer shall be deemed to be the employer for certain purposes. It is undisputed that in the case at bar Temp Pro would fit the definition of general employer and Colibri would fit the definition of special employer in § 28-29-2(3)(A) and (B). It appears to be the legislative intent that the general employer is responsible for the obtaining of workers' compensation coverage for the employee. The term "special employer" is defined and recognized in the statute. The act is not explicit concerning whether the special employer shares the immunity granted to employers pursuant to § 28-29-20. In respect to this question the statute is ambiguous and thus must be construed in order to effectuate the legislative intent. F.H. Buffington Co. v. Hanrahan, 622 A.2d 470, 472 (R.I.1993); Rhode Island State Police Lodge No. 25 v. State, 485 A.2d 1245, 1247 (R.I.1984).

Before we can answer the ultimate question of whether a special employer is an entity granted immunity from suit by § 28-29-20, we must first determine the meaning of § 28-29-2(3)(C). In making this determination, we follow the principle of statutory construction that we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Labbadia v. State, 513 A.2d 18, 21 (R.I.1986); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688, 693 (R.I.1985). In so doing, we consider the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections. Bailey v American Stores, Inc./Star Market, 610 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I.1992); Stone v. Goulet, 522 A.2d 216, 218 (R.I.1987). Moreover, "[i]f a mechanical application of a statutory definition produces an absurd result or defeats legislative intent, this court will look beyond mere semantics and give effect to the purpose of the act." Labbadia, 513 A.2d at 22 (quoting Delaurier, 488 A.2d at 694); see also Bailey, 610 A.2d at 119 ("[i]n effectuating the Legislature's intent, we review and consider the statutory meaning most consistent with the statute's policies or obvious purposes").

Under the act both employers and employees surrender certain rights and receive certain benefits. An injured employee subject to the act "is ensured timely and certain, though limited, compensation. In exchange he or she gives up the right to pursue an action at law that, although...