Sorokolit v. Rhodes

• Decision Date: 22 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. D-3639,D-3639
• Parties: Bob SOROKOLIT, M.D., Petitioner, v. Janice S. RHODES, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 239

889 S.W.2d 239

Bob SOROKOLIT, M.D., Petitioner, v. Janice S. RHODES, Respondent.

No. D-3639.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Oct. 13, 1993.

Decided April 20, 1994.

Rehearing Overruled June 22, 1994.

Daniel A. Foster, Richard U. Simon, Denise J. Collins, Fort Worth, for petitioner.

Alfred W. Ellis, Dallas, for respondent.

HIGHTOWER, Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which PHILLIPS, C.J., and DOGGETT, GAMMAGE, ENOCH and SPECTOR, JJ., join.

This case requires that we determine whether section 12.01(a) of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act ¹ precludes an action for knowing misrepresentation or breach of an express warranty under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). ² Janice Rhodes ("Rhodes") sued Bob Sorokolit, M.D. ("Dr. Sorokolit") for medical malpractice, breach of implied and express warranties, and knowing misrepresentation. Rhodes subsequently dropped all allegations of negligence and proceeded solely on the warranty and misrepresentation claims under the DTPA. Dr. Sorokolit filed special exceptions, arguing that Rhodes' DTPA claims are precluded under section 12.01(a). The trial court sustained the special exceptions and dismissed the case. The court of appeals reversed in part and remanded. 846 S.W.2d 618. For the reasons explained herein, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

I.

For the purpose of reviewing the dismissal, because it is based on special exceptions, we accept as true all material factual allegations and all factual statements reasonably inferred from the allegations set forth in Rhodes' pleadings. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 844 S.W.2d 773, 783 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992, writ denied); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Shubert, 646 S.W.2d 270, 277-78 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Armendariz v. Bill Sears Supermarket No. 1, 562 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). When Rhodes first saw Dr. Sorokolit for a proposed breast augmentation surgery, he guaranteed and warranted the results of the surgery. Dr. Sorokolit instructed Rhodes and her husband to select a picture of a nude model from a magazine, promising that, following surgery, her breasts would look just like those in the picture she selected. The result was not as guaranteed. Rhodes sued Dr. Sorokolit for medical malpractice, breach of implied and express warranties under the DTPA, and knowing misrepresentation under the DTPA, but later dropped the malpractice claims. In her DTPA allegations, Rhodes contends that Dr. Sorokolit's conduct amounted to false, misleading, and deceptive acts and practices for the following reasons:

1. [Dr. Sorokolit] represented to [Rhodes] that his services had characteristics, uses and benefits which [they] did not have;

2. [Dr. Sorokolit] represented to [Rhodes] that his services were of a particular standard, quality and grade when they were another;

3. [Dr. Sorokolit] represented to [Rhodes] that his warranty involved rights which he did not have or involve; [and]

4. [Dr. Sorokolit] breached his express and implied warranty to perform his services in a good and workmanlike manner.

Finally, Rhodes alleges that Dr. Sorokolit knowingly committed the described acts and practices. Sustaining Dr. Sorokolit's special exceptions, the trial court ruled that a physician cannot be sued under the DTPA for conduct arising from the provision of professional medical services. The court of appeals reversed in part and remanded, holding that section 12.01(a) bars DTPA claims for breach of implied warranty but that section 12.01(a) does not bar DTPA claims based on knowing misrepresentation or breach of express warranty.

II.

In his sole point of error, Dr. Sorokolit argues that section 12.01(a) of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act precludes an action for knowing misrepresentation or breach of an express warranty under the DTPA. We disagree.

The goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Harris County Dist. Attorney's Office v. J.T.S., 807 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex.1991). If language in a statute is unambiguous, this court must seek the intent of the legislature as found in the plain and common meaning of the words and terms used. Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Municipal Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex.1993); Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex.1990); RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.1985). ³ In applying the plain and common meaning of the language in a statute, courts may not by implication enlarge the meaning of any word in the statute beyond its ordinary meaning; such implication is inappropriate when legislative intent may be gathered from a reasonable interpretation of the statute as it is written. Monsanto, 865 S.W.2d at 939; Commonwealth of Mass. v. United N. & S. Dev. Co., 140 Tex. 417, 168 S.W.2d 226, 229 (1942); Sexton v. Mt. Olivet Cemetery Ass'n, 720 S.W.2d 129, 138 (Tex.App.--Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The language of section 12.01(a) is clear, unambiguous, and, when construed as written, not devoid of meaning. Section 12.01(a) states that there can be no DTPA claim against a physician or health care provider for damages for personal injury or death if the damages result, or are alleged to result, from the physician's negligence. Because the legislature has not defined "negligence" as it is used in section 12.01(a), we apply its common law meaning, see TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.03(b) (Vernon Supp.1994) (requiring that any legal term not defined in the statute be given its common law meaning);

                Monsanto, 865 S.W.2d at 939-940 (using the common law to determine the ordinary meaning of an undefined term), treating it as a breach of the accepted standard of medical care that proximately causes damages.  See, e.g., Peterson v. Shields, 652 S.W.2d 929, 930 (Tex.1983);  Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 164-66 (Tex.1977);  Chapman v. Wilson, 826 S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tex.App.--Austin 1992, writ denied).  Although the DTPA does not create a cause of action for negligence, see, e.g., TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1987) (only requiring proof that an act is a producing cause rather than a proximate cause of damages);  Richard M. Alderman, The Business of Medicine--Health Care Providers, Physicians, and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 26 HOUS.L.REV. 109, 141 (1989) ("Theoretically, a DTPA action should never be one 'resulting from negligence.' ");   DAVID F. BRAGG ET AL., TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 2.02, at n. 90 (2d ed. 1983) (stating that claims under the DTPA are not based on negligence), plaintiffs at times attempt to bring what might otherwise be negligence claims as DTPA suits.  See, e.g., John T. Montford et al., 1989 Texas DTPA Reform:  Closing the DTPA Loophole in the 1987 Tort Reform Laws and the Ongoing Quest for Fairer DTPA Laws, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 525 (1990).  Because section 12.01(a) operates to bar characterization of medical negligence claims against physicians and health care providers as DTPA claims, we conclude that section 12.01(a) is not meaningless as written.  Consequently, it is our duty to construe the statute as written by the legislature.  Government Personnel Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wear, 151 Tex. 454, 251 S.W.2d 525, 529 (1952).  If the legislature had intended otherwise, it could have expressed its intent in plain and specific language.  Id. at 528-529. 4  Accordingly, we conclude that section 12.01(a) only precludes a DTPA suit against a physician for negligence--that is, a suit founded on a breach of the accepted standard of medical care
                

III.

There can be no DTPA claim against a physician for damages for personal injury or death if the damages result, or are alleged to result, from the physician's negligence; however, if the alleged DTPA claim is not based on the physician's breach of the accepted standard of medical care, section 12.01(a) does not preclude suit for violation of the DTPA. Thus, the underlying nature of the claim determines whether section 12.01(a) prevents suit for violation of the DTPA. Claims that a physician or health care provider was negligent may not be recast as DTPA actions to avoid the standards set forth in the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act.

Rhodes does not allege that Dr. Sorokolit deviated from the accepted standard of care in performing the surgery, nor is it evident that her DTPA suit for knowing misrepresentation and breach of express warranty is merely the recharacterization of a negligence suit. Her claim is that Dr. Sorokolit guaranteed the results of his surgery and that the doctor knowingly breached his express warranty of a particular result and knowingly misrepresented his skills and the results he could achieve. The DTPA defines "knowingly" as meaning "actual awareness of the falsity, deception, or unfairness of the act or practice giving rise to the consumer's claim or ... actual awareness of the act or practice constituting the breach of warranty...." TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 17.45(9) (Vernon 1987). Neither DTPA claim involves negligence--neither requires a determination of whether a physician failed to meet the standard of medical care; each claim, by its nature, concerns intentional deception and CORNYN, Justice, joined by GONZALEZ, Justice, dissenting.

intentional breach of express guarantees. Accordingly, we hold that section 12.01(a), which does preclude DTPA suits founded on a breach of the accepted standard of medical care, does not preclude suits under the DTPA for knowing misrepresentation or breach of express warranty in cases in which a physician or health care provider warrants a particular result. ⁵ For the reasons explained herein, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

[I]t is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.

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