Sorrells v. State
| Decision Date | 11 December 1922 |
| Docket Number | 22723 |
| Citation | 130 Miss. 300,94 So. 209 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | SORRELLS v. STATE |
CRIMINAL LAW. Larceny. Circumstantial evidence must preclude every theory of innocence to convict; evidence held insufficient to show larceny.
Circumstantial evidence is always insufficient to convict a person of crime where, assuming all to be proved which the evidence tends to prove, some other hypothesis may still be true, for it is the actual exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis which invests mere circumstances with the force of truth; whenever the evidence leaves it indifferent which of several hypotheses is true, or merely establishes some finite probability in favor of one hypothesis rather than another such evidence cannot amount to proof, however great the probability may be. The evidence in this case examined, and held to be insufficient to sustain a conviction.
HON. G WOOD MAGEE, Judge.
APPEAL from circuit court of Jefferson Davis county, HON. G. WOOD MAGEE, Judge.
Robert Sorrels was convicted for stealing a bale of cotton, and he appeals. Reversed, and defendant discharged.
Judgment reversed, and appellant discharged.
Davis & Langston and O. C. Luper, for appellant.
The evidence is uncertain as to how many bales of cotton the appellant raised that year. Along this line with the testimony of Mr. Stringer, he says that he only saw two bales belonging to the appellant, but understands that he raised more cotton than this; that he had ten acres in cotton. At the conclusion of this evidence, which was offered by the state, and after the state had rested its case, the appellant refused to offer any evidence, and asked for the peremptory instructions, which was refused by the court.
This instruction should have been granted on the facts for the reason that there is nothing to show that the bale of cotton sold at Sumrall by the appellant was the same bale which was missing as Bassfield. The fact that the bale of cotton sold by the appellant was a three-hundred-pound bale, and was the same grade that had been sampled, certainly it is not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, that it was the same bale which was stolen, indeed if one was stolen. It will be remembered that no gin marks or anything of that nature was shown.
The second instruction granted the state by the court is clearly erroneous. In the first place it assumes as a matter of fact that a bale of cotton was actually stolen. Then it lays down the proposition that if the jury, believed that the bale which the appellant sold was the same bale which was missing at Bassfield, then, regardless of any other fact, the appellant was guilty. This is certainly not the law, possession of stolen property is only prima-facie evidence of guilt, and the jury may acquit or convict on such prima-facie evidence.
We feel that our contentions are so plain and certain that it would be useless waste of time to attempt to bore the court with authorities.
H. Talbot Odom, for the state.
There are only two questions presented by this appeal: first, it is contended by counsel for the appellant that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the appellant a peremptory instruction; second, it is insisted that the second instruction appearing on page three of volume one of the record granted for the state is erroneous, and that this should reverse the case.
(1) As I see it, very little argument will be required on either of the above propositions. With reference to the first question, it is sufficient to say that the question of whether the cotton was properly identified by the evidence was submitted to the jury. They passed on these questions and found that the evidence was sufficient. As I understand the law, this question was properly submitted to the jury, and this court will not reverse the finding of the jury unless there is no evidence at all to support their verdict. I do not feel that the court could say after reading the record in this case that there is no evidence by which the verdict can be supported. The record of the testimony in the case at bar consists only of thirty pages, and, as the final determination of the point in question hinges on the conception of this court as to the identity of the cotton, I feel that further argument on this point by me would be without much assistance to the court.
(2) The second assignment of error attacks the following instruction granted for the state, same appearing in Volume 1 at page 3 of the record: "The court instructs the jury for the state that the possession of recently stolen property is a circumstance which may be considered by the jury and from which, in the absence of a reasonable explanation, the jury may infer guilt, and if the jury believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the bale of cotton sold to J. J. Waits in Sumrall was the same bale which was stolen from the depot at Bassfield and was the property of S. S. Dale & Sons, then the jury should find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment."
The first objection to the foregoing instruction is that it is assumed that the bale of...
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Lambert v. State
...of one hypothesis rather than another, such evidence cannot amount to proof, however great the probability may be. Sorrells v. State, 130 Miss. 300, 94 So. 209 (1922). The question then is whether the State's circumstantial case was such as to exclude the defense's hypothesis of innocence. ......
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