Sorrels v. Queen of Peace Hosp., No. 20072

• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota
• Writing for the Court: KONENKAMP
• Citation: 575 N.W.2d 240,1998 SD 12
• Parties: William F. SORRELS, D.O., Appellee, v. QUEEN OF PEACE HOSPITAL, A South Dakota corporation, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 19 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 20072

Page 240

575 N.W.2d 240 1998 SD 12 William F. SORRELS, D.O., Appellee,
v.
QUEEN OF PEACE HOSPITAL, A South Dakota corporation, Appellant. No. 20072. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Argued Dec. 3, 1997.
Decided Feb. 11, 1998.
Rehearing Denied March 19, 1998.

Scott N. Heidepriem, Mark F. Marshall, of Johnson, Heidepriem, Miner, Marlow & Janklow Sioux Falls, for appellee.

James E. McMahon, Roger A. Sudbeck, of Boyce, Murphy, McDowell & Greenfield, Sioux Falls, for appellant.

KONENKAMP, Justice.

¶1Doctor William F. Sorrels admitted to possession of cocaine and resigned his medical staff privileges at Queen of Peace Hospital. After completing a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program, his privileges were restored, subject to conditions. When federal charges were later brought against him, he agreed to further restrictions, including that he not exercise any privileges requiring "a valid DEA registration permit and number," without which he was barred from dispensing controlled substances. Nonetheless, he prescribed a controlled substance for one of his patients believing another physician could later co-sign his order. The Hospital revoked his privileges without a hearing based upon his written waiver. Sorrels obtained a writ of mandamus from the circuit court ordering the Hospital to hold a due process hearing. Was he clearly and indisputably entitled to mandamus relief? Based upon the conditions he agreed to, we conclude Sorrels had no clear right to compel the Hospital to give him a hearing, and thus the circuit court abused its discretion in granting mandamus.

Facts

¶2On December 6, 1993, during an interview with agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency, William F. Sorrels, D.O., a licensed physician engaged in private practice, admitted to illegal possession of cocaine for personal use. Sorrels later entered the Worthmore Drug and Alcohol Treatment program and voluntarily relinquished his medical staff privileges at the Queen of Peace Hospital in Mitchell, South Dakota. ¹ After completing treatment, he reapplied for staff privileges at the Hospital, which were restored subject to certain conditions. Sorrels was thereafter indicted in January 1995 on charges of cocaine possession. As part of his guilty plea to a misdemeanor, he signed a written plea agreement, relinquishing his DEA certificate, without which he could not lawfully order, prescribe, or dispense controlled substances. ² See 21 U.S.C. § 821 et seq. Consequently, he agreed to new restrictions on his privileges. ³ Two pertinent conditions required:

1. Doctor Sorrels must voluntarily relinquish all medical staff privileges granted to him that require a valid DEA registration permit and number.

* * * * * *

4. With regard to the relinquishment of Doctor Sorrels' medical staff privileges, he must waive any and all rights of due process to which he is entitled under the Medical Staff Bylaws, Rules and Regulations of Queen of Peace Hospital, to be applicable only to acts which would violate the conditions placed upon his privileges.

(emphasis in original). His voluntary relinquishment also provided:

Page 242

I, William F. Sorrels, D.O., do hereby voluntarily relinquish, effective October 31, 1995, any and all medical staff privileges at Queen of Peace Hospital in Mitchell, South Dakota, that require a valid Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) registration permit and number. I also do hereby voluntarily give up all rights of due process which I am entitled under the Medical Staff Bylaws, Rules and Regulations of Queen of Peace, to be applicable only to acts which would violate the conditions as set forth in the attached list of "Conditions Placed Upon Dr. Sorrels' Associate Medical Staff Privileges at Queen of Peace Hospital" incorporated by this reference.

¶3On December 1, 1995, Dr. Ronald Anderson, the Hospital's Chief of Staff, wrote to Sorrels requesting that he "describe in detail any and all arrangements you made to insure that a physician with a valid DEA license will be available when you are confronted with a situation in which a prescription of controlled substances might be necessary." Sorrels promptly answered, writing "I have arranged with my associate, Dr. Christiane Maroun along with other surgeons, orthopedic surgeons and family practice specialists to co-sign my orders for controlled substances when the necessity arises for their use on my patients." ⁴ On December 14, 1995, Anderson replied: "Since Condition # 1 does not allow you to prescribe and/or sign orders for controlled substances, it would be inappropriate to have other physicians co-sign orders you prescribe for controlled substances."

¶4As it happened, however, between Sorrels' proposal and Anderson's response, the incident occurred giving rise to this case. Sorrels' two-year-old patient, Trevor Clark, had been suffering from febrile seizures. Trevor's father took him to the Hospital Emergency Room in the early morning of December 11, 1995. At 4:00 a.m., Sorrels was called. He prescribed Diazepam, a controlled substance, to be administered orally to Trevor. An emergency room physician was present, but Sorrels never conferred with that doctor, nor did he request any other physician with a DEA certificate to order or co-sign for the drug. The Hospital Executive Committee concluded Sorrels had violated his conditions by ordering a controlled substance without a DEA certificate and recommended his privileges be revoked. On December 20, 1995, the Board of Trustees agreed and effectively terminated Sorrels' staff privileges.

¶5Initially, Sorrels sued the Hospital for damages. Then, in October 1996, he filed an Application for Writ of Mandamus. The circuit court granted the writ compelling the Hospital to give Sorrels a due process hearing and reinstating his staff privileges until such hearing could be completed. We stayed the order of temporary reinstatement and granted intermediate appeal to consider whether Sorrels established a clear and indisputable case for mandamus.

Analysis and Decision

1. The Nature of Mandamus

¶6Mandamus is a potent, but precise remedy. Its power lies in its expediency; its precision in its narrow application. It commands the fulfillment of an existing legal duty, but creates no duty itself, and acts upon no doubtful or unsettled right. See generally Healey v. Rank, 82 S.D. 54, 58, 140 N.W.2d 850, 852 (S.D.1966). To prevail in seeking a writ of mandamus, the petitioner must have a clear legal right to performance of the specific duty sought to be compelled and the respondent must have a definite legal obligation to perform that duty. S.D. Trucking Ass'n., Inc., v. S.D. Dept. of Transp., 305 N.W.2d 682, 684 (S.D.1981)...