Sossamon v. Cleburne Independent School District Board of Trustees, No. 10-08-00355-CV (Tex. App. 1/20/2010)
| Decision Date | 20 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-08-00355-CV.,10-08-00355-CV. |
| Parties | CANDICE SOSSAMON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF KATELYN KIRKLAND, KATELYN KIRKLAND, AND JEFFREY S. DAVIS, Appellants, v. CLEBURNE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND JAMES WARLICK, INTERIM SUPERINTENDENT, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the 413th District Court, Johnson County, Texas, Trial Court No. C200800320.
Reversed and rendered.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice REYNA, and, Justice DAVIS (Chief Justice GRAY dissenting with note).*
Candice Sossamon and her daughter Katelyn Kirkland filed suit against the Cleburne Independent School District Board of Trustees and Interim Superintendent James Warlick (collectively, "Cleburne ISD") after Sossamon was informed that Kirkland would not be receiving a high school diploma from Cleburne High School ("CHS") and would not be allowed to participate in the CHS graduation ceremony. The trial court denied Sossamon's and Kirkland's request for a temporary injunction and later granted a motion for sanctions filed by Cleburne ISD. The court ordered Sossamon and Kirkland to pay $7,500 in costs and attorney's fees under section 11.161 of the Education Code and ordered Sossamon, Kirkland and their attorney Jeffrey S. Davis to pay an additional $3,500 as sanctions under Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and section 10.004 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
Appellants contend in three issues respectively that the court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions under Rule 13, section 10.004, and section 11.161. We will reverse and render.
During the 2007-2008 school year, Kirkland was a senior at CHS on track to graduate, except that she was failing her English class. She hid several report cards from Sossamon and finally revealed her predicament by leaving a letter on Sossamon's pillow. School officials advised Sossamon that the only way Kirkland would be able to graduate was to transfer to the TEAM School, an accelerated learning program. Sossamon and Kirkland completed the paperwork for the TEAM School. One document they signed concerned high school graduation and reads:
We understand that all students from the Cleburne Independent School District who complete their credits from the TEAM School will be provided a graduation exercise and diploma from the TEAM School. We also understand that should it be our desire to graduate from Cleburne High School, we may transfer to that school at the beginning of the last semester of our senior year.
Kirkland finished her coursework promptly and sought to transfer back to CHS so she could graduate with her class. Cleburne ISD officials advised that she would not be permitted to do so and referred them to the document they had signed regarding the TEAM School graduation. Sossamon and Kirkland sought administrative review and ultimately filed a grievance which was to be heard by the school board. However, because the grievance was not filed until May 7, they were advised that it would not be included on the agenda for the board's May 12 meeting. During the public comment section of the meeting, Sossamon presented her complaint to the school board, which advised that they would confer with Superintendent Warlick on the matter.
By letter dated May 16, Warlick advised Sossamon that Kirkland would not be permitted to graduate from CHS. Sossamon filed a second grievance which the school board placed on its agenda for the June 9 meeting. However, graduation was scheduled for May 30.
Sossamon and Kirkland filed suit on the afternoon of May 29. They alleged that Cleburne ISD failed to provide the notice required by section 28.022 of the Education Code to be given to the parent or guardian of a student whose performance in a subject "is consistently unsatisfactory." See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.022(a)(3) (Vernon 2006). They sought a temporary injunction prohibiting the defendants from preventing Kirkland from participating in CHS graduation ceremonies the following day and an order directing that she be given a CHS diploma. The court held an emergency hearing on May 30 and, after hearing Sossamon's testimony, denied the requested injunction.
The court granted Sossamon's and Kirkland's motion for non-suit on July 3. Cleburne ISD filed a motion for sanctions claiming that the "suit is groundless, brought in bad faith, misrepresented facts, and lacks basis in law and fact" because:
• Sossamon and Kirkland were aware before filing suit that Kirkland could not satisfy the local requirements necessary to receive a diploma from CHS and thus was not entitled to such a diploma;
• state and federal law is "very clear" that students do not have a fundamental right to participate in high school graduation ceremonies; and
• their claim that Kirkland should be awarded a diploma from CHS and allowed to participate in the CHS graduation ceremonies because of the defendants' alleged violations of the Education Code "is without support in Texas law."
At the sanctions hearing, the court heard argument of counsel and admitted in evidence a transcription of the injunction hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement and asked each side to submit a proposed order. The court signed its order granting sanctions about a month later.
The court ruled that the suit was groundless because: (1) "there is no remedy for a violation of Texas Education Code § 28.022"; and (2) the court was "without the authority to grant Plaintiffs their requested remedy." The court ruled that the suit was brought in bad faith for the purpose of harassing Cleburne ISD because Sossamon and Kirkman were aware before filing suit that: (1) Sossamon had received the notice required by section 28.022; and (2) they "were informed throughout their attempt to receive a diploma and graduate with [CHS] that Kirkland had not, could not, and did not meet all necessary requirements to so receive a diploma from and participate in graduation ceremonies with [CHS]."
We review an order imposing sanctions under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Loeffler v. Lytle Indep. Sch. Dist., 211 S.W.3d 331, 347 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
An appellate court may reverse the trial court's ruling only if the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles, such that its ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable. To determine if the sanctions were appropriate or just, the appellate court must ensure there is a direct nexus between the improper conduct and the sanction imposed. Generally, courts presume that pleadings and other papers are filed in good faith. The party seeking sanctions bears the burden of overcoming this presumption of good faith.
Low, 221 S.W.3d at 614 (citations omitted).
Appellants contend in their first issue that the court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions against them under Rule 13.
R.M. Dudley Constr. Co. v. Dawson, 258 S.W.3d 694, 707 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, pet. denied) ().
"'Groundless' for purposes of this rule means no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. "The trial court uses an objective standard to determine if a pleading was groundless: did the party and counsel make a reasonable inquiry into the legal and factual basis of the claim?" R.M. Dudley Constr., 258 S.W.3d at 708. In doing so, "the trial court must examine the facts available to the litigant and the circumstances existing when the litigant filed the pleading." Id.
Here, the trial court ruled that the suit was groundless because: (1) "there is no remedy for a violation of Texas Education Code § 28.022"; and (2) the court was "without the authority to grant Plaintiffs their requested remedy."
Generally, a party whose claim concerns a violation of school laws must exhaust the statutorily provided administrative remedies with the Commissioner of Education before seeking judicial relief. Guerra v. Santa Rosa Indep. Sch. Dist., 241 S.W.3d 594, 599-600 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2007, pet. denied); Dotson v. Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 S.W.3d 289, 291(Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057 (Vernon 2006) (). One exception to this rule applies when the party will suffer irreparable harm and the Commissioner is unable to provide relief. Houston Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. 1987); Dotson, 161 S.W.3d at 291; Harlandale Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 121 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.); see Guerra, 241 S.W.3d at 600.
Therefore, the court's conclusions are incorrect as a matter of law. See R.M. Dudley Constr., 258 S.W.3d at 708 (). Here, Sossamon and Kirkland had a statutory right to pursue administrative relief for the alleged violation of section 28.022. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057. And because the Commissioner is not authorized to award injunctive relief and Kirkland would not otherwise have been able to receive a CHS diploma and participate in the CHS graduation ceremonies, it was within the trial court's authority to grant injunctive relief if Sossamon and Kirkland otherwise established their entitlement to it. See Houston Fed'n of Teachers, 730 S.W.2d at 646.
Accordingly,...
To continue reading
Request your trial