Sotelo v. Bouchard

• Decision Date: 11 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 81015,81015
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court
• Parties: EFREN ISAAC SOTELO, AN INDIVIDUAL, Appellant, v. PHILIP MICHAEL BOUCHARD, AN INDIVIDUAL, Respondent.

EFREN ISAAC SOTELO, AN INDIVIDUAL, Appellant,
v.
PHILIP MICHAEL BOUCHARD, AN INDIVIDUAL, Respondent.

No. 81015

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

June 11, 2021

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court order awarding attorney fees and costs. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Joanna Kishner, Judge.¹

Respondent suffered injuries in a car wreck caused by appellant. Respondent then filed the underlying action against appellant, the company that had employed appellant, and appellant's father, who was the company's owner (the father and company are hereafter referred to as the "Employer Defendants"). In October 2016, a default was entered against appellant. Then in October 2017, respondent made a joint unapportioned offer of judgment to all three defendants for $99,000, which was not accepted. In August 2019, respondent settled with the Employer Defendants. Thereafter, in September 2019, a prove-up hearing was held, after which the district court entered a default judgment holding appellant liable for roughly $220,000 in damages to respondent.

Respondent then sought roughly $215,000 in attorney fees and roughly $33,000 in costs against appellant based on the offer of judgment.

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Over appellant's objections, the district court awarded respondent roughly $88,000 in attorney fees and roughly $32,000 in costs. This appeal followed.²

As a threshold matter, appellant contends that the district court acted in excess of its subject matter jurisdiction in entering the default judgment because appellant's due process rights were violated by virtue of respondent's complaint not sufficiently apprising appellant of his potential liability for money damages.³ Cf. Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 812, 59

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P.3d 463, 467 (2002) ("[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction is not waivable, and a court's lack of such jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal."); cf. also NRCP 54(c) ("A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings . . . ."). We are not persuaded by this argument, as respondent's complaint sought damages for medical expenses and general damages both in excess of $10,000, and alleged that respondent suffered "severe bodily injury" as a result of the accident. Given these requests for relief and the alleged injuries, appellant was given adequate notice of the type and amount of damages for which he might be liable. See Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 735 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The fact that the precise amount of the requested damages was not specified in the complaint does not mean that the resulting judgment necessarily resulted in a deprivation of due process of law."); see also Jones v. St. Paul Travelers, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (finding no due process violation where the damages awarded were the same kind as those sought in the complaint and where the scope of damages being sought was clear from the injuries allegedly suffered). In light of this notice and appellant's ability to answer respondent's complaint, appellant was afforded due process. Eureka Cty. v. Seventh Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 275, 279, 417 P.3d 1121, 1124 (2018) ("Procedural due process requires that parties receive notice and an opportunity to be heard." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Consequently, the district court did not exceed its subject matter jurisdiction in entering the default judgment.

Appellant similarly contends that his due process rights were violated with respect to the order awarding attorney fees and costs because,

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again, respondent's complaint did not...