Soto-Cintron v. United States
| Decision Date | 05 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 15–1123 (SEC) |
| Citation | 227 F.Supp.3d 178 |
| Parties | Eduardo SOTO–CINTRON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Jorge Martinez–Luciano, Emil J. Rodriguez–Escudero, M.L. & R.E. Law Firm, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Fidel A. Sevillano–Del–Rio, United States Attorneys Office, District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
On February 12, 2015, Plaintiffs Eduardo Soto–Cintrón and his minor son ASM sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2679, et seq , claiming that federal agents subjected them to unlawful arrest, detention, and assault. Pending before the Court is the United States' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, this motion is GRANTED.
On May 14, 2013, the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) intercepted a package sent from Florida, which they believed contained illegal firearms. The USPIS requested the assistance of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to make a controlled delivery of the package in Puerto Rico. See Docket # 32, ¶ 1. A warrant-backed examination of the package revealed that it contained six undeclared Glock semi-automatic pistols. The warrant was based upon possible felony violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and (a)(3), as well as 18 U.S.C. § 1715.
Rather than deliver the package to the addressee in Puerto Rico, the operational plan called for a notice to be left at the home of the addressee informing the recipient that the package could be claimed at the U.S. Post Office in Coto Laurel, Puerto Rico. The USPIS was the lead investigative agency with ATF providing assistance. USPIS personnel took up primary surveillance positions to observe activity inside the Post Office and parking lot while ATF personnel were posted within the perimeter.
During the operation, a USPIS inspector identified two vehicles over the radio entering the Post Office: Plaintiffs' red Ford F–150 pickup truck and a white Ford F–150 which was later determined to have been driven by the suspect. Special Agent (SA) Victor González heard over the radio that Plaintiffs remained in the vehicle for some period of time once it entered the parking lot. This raised a red flag to SA González.2 His suspicion was based on his experience as an ATF agent that, in some controlled-delivery cases, the person that retrieves the package hands it over to someone else. See Docket # 32, ¶¶ 5 and 7.3
While both trucks were still in the parking lot, a radio transmission from a USPIS inspector revealed that the package had been delivered to the suspect. Another radio transmission indicated that Plaintiffs' red pick-up truck was leaving the parking lot. See Docket # 32, ¶ 7. Upon hearing these transmissions, SA González concluded that the package containing the weapons may have been in that truck. Before acting on his belief, SA González called USPIS inspector Thompson to verify the location of the package. Thompson, however, told SA González that he did not know.
Given these circumstances, SA González decided to detain Plaintiffs' truck. ATF agents blocked the exit to the parking lot, approached the vehicle with weapons drawn, and ordered Plaintiffs to exit the truck. Initially, Plaintiffs did not understand what the ATF agents were saying because their windows were rolled up, the air conditioning was on, and the radio was playing. After the vehicle stopped, ATF agents removed Plaintiffs from the vehicles, placed them on the ground, and slapped on handcuffs.
Plaintiffs remained in handcuffs between 10 to 15 minutes, during which they were subjected to questioning by the ATF agents. A visual inspection of the truck's cabin did not reveal any package. The whole intervention lasted, at most, 20 minutes. It is uncontested that Plaintiffs were never placed inside a police car or other law enforcement vehicle during the stop. It is also uncontested that Plaintiffs did not suffer any lasting injury.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if a "reasonable fact-finder could resolve in favor of either party and a material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the case." Flood v. Bank of Am. Corp. , 780 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2015).
When conducting this analysis, courts "may not weigh the evidence," Casas Office Machs., Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc. , 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir. 1994), and must construe the record in the "light most flattering" to the nonmovant. Soto–Padró v. Public Bldgs. Authority , 675 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
The FTCA "comprises a limited waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity with respect to private causes of action sounding in tort." Fothergill v. United States , 566 F.3d 248, 252 (1st Cir. 2009). Among other things, the FTCA authorizes suits against the United States for claims of intentional torts (that is, claims based on "assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution") committed by its law enforcement officers. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). In assessing Plaintiffs' claim for unlawful arrest, detention, and assault, the Court must look to the "law of the place where the act or omission occurred." See Calderón–Ortega v. United States , 753 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) ). Puerto Rico substantive law thus governs here.
As to the scope of liability, the FTCA makes the federal government "liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674. This requirement is to be read liberally. As the Supreme Court has stressed, the phrase " ‘like circumstances' do not restrict a court's inquiry to the same circumstances, but require it to look further afield" for "private person analogies" to the conduct in question. United States v. Olson , 546 U.S. 43, 44, 126 S.Ct. 510, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (2005).
With respect to Plaintiffs' claim for unlawful arrest and detention, the Government raises a tiered defense. It first argues that Plaintiffs were never actually arrested or unlawfully detained; rather, they were only subjected to a "brief investigative stop" as authorized by Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Alternatively, the Government contends that the detention was not unlawful pursuant to the laws of Puerto Rico. Because the Court agrees with the Government on the first point, there is no need to address the second. Before the ship sails, however, some explanation is warranted as to that last statement.
The determination of whether a stop was lawful under Terry means only that the officer's intervention did not violate the detainee's right, under the Fourth Amendment, to be free from unlawful searches and seizures. Indeed, a Terry stop may be valid even though the officer had no probable cause to arrest. See United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). But Plaintiffs' false arrest claim comes under Puerto Rico law, which does require probable cause to arrest. As far as the Court has been able to discern, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has not addressed whether the Commonwealth's officers are allowed to perform Terry -style stops. And although the officers in question here are federal agents, federal law makes the United States liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances" under the law of the state in which the offense occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 ; Rodríguez v. United States , 54 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1995) (). So, the question is whether the United States is entitled to raise Terry v. Ohio as a defense to an FTCA suit under Puerto Rico law premised on false arrest and detention. While Puerto Rico substantive law governs, the answer to this quandary unexpectedly lies in the common law concept of "conditional privilege."
In Rodríguez v. United States , 54 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1995), federal agents mistakenly arrested the plaintiff because they had confused her with a wanted person. The plaintiff brought suit against the United States under the FTCA alleging unlawful arrest and detention. The district court entered summary judgment against the plaintiff. On appeal, the First Circuit noted a paucity of Puerto Rico Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing false arrest claims based on the execution of a valid arrest warrant against the wrong person. Yet, finding that the "Puerto Rico Supreme Court [had] conformed its limited ‘false arrest’ jurisprudence to common law principles," the First Circuit adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the appropriate framework for its analysis. The same reasoning applies here. Given that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has not addressed whether investigatory stops are valid under Puerto Rico law, the Court shall examine Plaintiff's false arrest and detention claim—and the viability of the government's defense—through the lens of the Restatement.4
A warrantless arrest is privileged whenever "the conditions stated in one or another of §§ 119, 120, and 121 and in §§ 122–132" are satisfied. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 118 (1965), cmt. c. Some of these sections are not relevant because they deal with liability for arrests performed by private persons, see § 119 and 120; and for arrests made under warrant, see § 122–126. The other subsections concern conditions of the arrest that are not in dispute here, see § 127–132 (...
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