Soto v. Corp. of Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ, CIV. 95-2299(RLA).
| Decision Date | 23 September 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 95-2299(RLA).,CIV. 95-2299(RLA). |
| Citation | 73 F.Supp.2d 116 |
| Parties | Eladio Seda SOTO, Plaintiff, v. CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Eric Rivera Cruz, Hato Rey, PR, for Plaintiff.
Jorge L. Capo-Matos, O'Neill & Borges, Hato Rey, PR, for Defendant.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
Pending before the Court is defendant Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints' (CPB), motion for summary judgment (docket No. 29), to which plaintiff, Eladio Seda Soto (Seda) has filed an opposition (docket No. 30).1 For the reasons set forth below, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED in its entirety.
This is an action originally filed by Seda before the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Court of First Instance, San Juan Part, against CPB, for alleged age discrimination and wrongful discharge. Plaintiff requests in excess of $200,000 in damages, back pay, front pay, costs and attorney's fees.
The complaint alleges that in May, 1995, defendant discharged Seda because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, as amended, ("Law No. 100"), 29 L.P.R.A. § 146, et seq. Plaintiff also alleges the dismissal was without just cause, in violation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's wrongful discharge statute, Law No. 80 of May 30, 1976, as amended ("Law No. 80"), 29 L.P.R.A. § 185a, et seq.
The case was timely removed by CPB to this Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 1441 of Title 28, United States Code. Jurisdiction is predicated on a federal question, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).
Defendant's motion for summary judgment contains a Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ("Statement"), supported by the appropriate references to the specific evidence on file, pursuant to Local Rule 311.12.
Based on the facts asserted in the Statement, defendant's motion for summary judgment requests dismissal of the complaint for the following reasons: (1) plaintiff failed to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")as required by the ADEA as a prerequisite for a judicial claim; (2) plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie case under the ADEA, since he did not meet CPB's legitimate job performance expectations, and after his dismissal was not replaced by a new employee; (3) defendant dismissed Seda for just cause and legitimate, non discriminatory business reasons, specifically the elimination of his position as mission accountant; (4) CPB provided plaintiff with a voluntary termination payment in excess of any amount which could be due if the dismissal was without just cause, as required by Law No. 80, thereby barring any subsequent Law No. 80 claim.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, did not file a separate statement of material facts as to which he contends exists a genuine issue to be tried, properly supported by specific reference to the record, as mandated by Local Rule 311.12.
Plaintiff's opposition and surreply simply argue that material factual disputes exist because: (1) plaintiff's prior demotion from distribution center manager to mission accountant in April 1994, was unjustified and he was used as a "scapegoat" to cover-up defendant's inefficient operations and/or Seda's supervisor's negligent performance; (2) the April 1994 demotion was part of a scheme to induce him to resign and/or subsequently dismiss him upon the elimination of the mission accountant position; (3) the real reason defendant wanted to terminate plaintiff's employment was to save approximately $30,000 per year (Seda's salary); and (4) the fact that defendant provided Seda with a "voluntary" termination payment which exceeds Law No. 80, is irrelevant to plaintiff's entitlement to a Law No. 80 indemnity payment, if the dismissal was without just cause.
Plaintiff also requests that, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), if the Court is "inclined" to grant summary judgment, that he be permitted to conduct additional discovery to unveil the evidence which will support his factual contentions. We begin by addressing this request, which we find has no merit.
First, we must assume that at the time plaintiff filed his complaint he had a reasonable factual basis on which to support his claim. Further, plaintiff was forewarned as to defendant's affirmative defenses and theories as soon as he received CPB's answer to the complaint. In the Joint Initial Scheduling Memorandum, plaintiff represented that he would notify defendant with interrogatories and a request for production of documents, which he never did. At the Initial Scheduling Conference held eleven (11) months after the complaint was filed, further discovery was stayed pending defendant's filing of its announced motion for summary judgment. See Minutes of Initial Scheduling Conference, docket No. 16.
It was only when defendant's summary judgment motion was notified pursuant to the undersigned's Standing order that plaintiff belatedly pleaded that he was under a disadvantage because of his lack of access to company records. See Opposition at p.3.
Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states the following:
"Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f) provides a method of tolling time for a party who, when confronted by a summary judgment motion, can demonstrate an authentic need for, and an entitlement to, an additional interval in which to marshal facts essential to mount an opposition." Resolution Trust v. North Bridge Assoc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1203 (1st Cir.1994). This does not mean, however, that Rule 56(f) has no effect or that it is available to rescue a litigant who acts lackadaisically. Use of the rule requires meeting several benchmarks, as well as due diligence in pursuing discovery.
Ordinarily, a party who wishes to conduct discovery before the court acts on a summary judgment motion should present timely affidavits under Rule 56(f); something plaintiff failed to do in this case. See Humphreys v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 990 F.2d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1993) (); Resolution Trust, 22 F.3d at 1204 (); Committee for First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir.1992)(unverified assertion by counsel which simply constitutes advocacy, does not suffice for evidence or facts required to grant continuance).
Furthermore, to satisfy Rule 56(f), a party must meet two additional requirements: (1) articulate a plausible basis for the belief that discoverable materials exist which would raise a trial-worthy issue and (2) demonstrate good cause for failure to have conducted discovery earlier. Mass. School of Law at Andover v. American Bar, 142 F.3d 26, 43-45 (1st Cir.1998); Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 531 (1st Cir.1996) (); R.W. Intern. Corp. v. Welch Food, Inc., 13 F.3d 478 (1st Cir.1994), appeal after remand, 88 F.3d 49 (1st Cir.1996) (); Bird v. Centennial Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 228, 235 (1st Cir.1993); Price v. General Motors Corp., 931 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1991).
In this case, Seda failed to identify any facts he would expect to discover. Further, he did not specify what information he had reasonable grounds to expect would be disclosed which would generate genuine and material disputes of fact.
Plaintiff has not provided minimal supporting factual allegations, and has not supplemented that deficiency. Thus, he has not made the slightest showing that his opposition is meritorious. See Néstor Colón Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 39 (1st Cir.1992) ( ) Id. at 39 (internal citations omitted).
Finally, plaintiff has not shown cause for his failure to advance his quest for discovery. Undoubtedly, plaintiff had ample opportunity for adequate discovery but failed to engage in same. We are not inclined to reward such lack of diligence. C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 137 F.3d 41, 44-45 (1st Cir.1998). Therefore, we deny plaintiff's request to conduct further discovery.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, summary judgment must be granted where the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As repeatedly stated, the function of summary judgment is "to...
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