Varela Teron v. Banco Santander De Puerto Rico, No. CIV. 01-2577(HL).

• Decision Date: 03 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 01-2577(HL).
• Citation: 257 F.Supp.2d 454
• Parties: Victor VARELA TERON, et al. Plaintiffs, v. BANCO SANTANDER DE PUERTO RICO Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

257 F.Supp.2d 454

Victor VARELA TERON, et al. Plaintiffs, v. BANCO SANTANDER DE PUERTO RICO Defendant.

No. CIV. 01-2577(HL).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 3, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Anibal Escanellas-Rivera, San Juan, PR, for Victor Varela-Teron, Darlene Rojas-Ithier, Conjugal Partnership Varela-Rojas, plaintiffs.

Pedro J. Manzano-Yates, Rebecca Paez-Rodriguez, Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, San Juan, PR, for Banco Santander Puerto Rico, defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAFFITTE, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant Banco Santander de Puerto Rico's ("Santander") Motion for Summary Judgment,¹ and Plaintiff Victor Varela Teron's ("Varela") Opposition.² Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated from his employment at Banco Santander because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. Plaintiff also brings this claim under Puerto Rico Law 100 of June 30, 1959, as amended, ("Law 100"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 146, et seq, Law 80 of May 30, 1976, as amended, ("Law 80"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit 29 § 185(a), et seq, and Article 1802 of the Civil Code of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.

I FACTS

As required under the summary judgment standard, the Court recites the following undisputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant Plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.1998).

1. Varela was born on December 27,

1956.³

2. Varela worked for Banco Popular de Puerto Rico as Information System Audit Manager before working for Santander.⁴

3. Due to a vacancy in the position of Information System Audit Manager in Santander, Varela was interviewed by Estrella Miranda, former Santander Human Resources Vice President, Madeline Davila, former Audit Director, Luis Ramos and Manuel Gutierrez from Human Resources Banco Santander-Spain.⁵

4. On November 12, 1998, Varela began working as Information System Audit Manager for Santander. Varela was 41 years old.⁶

5. According to Varela, the Information System Audit Manager was the only position that was offered to him within Santander.⁷

6. Madeline Davila, former Director of Audit of Santander, was Varela's supervisor.⁸

7. When Varela started working at Santander as Information System Manager, he was instructed to equip the communications systems, to start the recruitment of employees for the area, to train those new employees, to evaluate the auditable universe of the Bank, and to establish a working plan.⁹

8. Varela interviewed and recommended the recruitment of Jose Jimenez, Josue Santana, and Harry Hastings. According to Varela, the aforementioned recommendations were based on each candidate's academic background and experience.¹⁰

9. Jimenez was twenty-five (25) years old, Santana was approximately twenty-seven (27), and Hastings was thirty (30) years old at the time they started working for Santander.¹¹

10. On April 7, 2001 Varela was informed that his position was eliminated. Varela was 43 years old.¹²

11. At present, the position of Manager of Information Systems Audit which was held by Varela does not exist in the Banco Santander Puerto Rico organization.¹³

II DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The standard for summary judgment is straightforward and well-established. The Court shall grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining if a material fact is "genuine," the Court does not weigh the facts but, instead, ascertains whether "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id,; Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 751 (1st Cir.1995).

Once a party moves for summary judgment, it bears the initial burden. Specifically, "a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [evidence] ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Crawford-El v. Button, 523 U.S. 574, 600 n. 22, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

Once this threshold is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmovant may not rest on mere conclusory allegations or wholesale denials. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e); Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 435 (1st Cir.1995). Instead, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Further, the nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

The Court draws inferences and evaluates facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Leary, 58 F.3d at 751 (1st Cir.1995).

B. Age Discrimination Claim

Under the ADEA, an employer may not "discharge ... or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of his age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In the present case Plaintiff has presented no direct evidence of discrimination. Absent such direct evidence, the familiar burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), comes into play. Goldman v. First National Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir.1993). Thus, Varela must tender enough evidence to establish a prima facie age-discrimination claim. See Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 430 (1st Cir.2000). An ADEA claimant must adduce evidence that (1) he was at least forty years of age; (2) his job performance met the employer's legitimate expectations; (3) the employer subjected him to an adverse employment action (e.g., an actual or constructive discharge); and (4) the employer had a continuing need for the services provided by the position from which the claimant was discharged. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000).

Once the plaintiff meets the prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination is triggered, and the burden of production—as distinguished from the burden of proof—shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc. 304 F.3d 63, 68-69 (1st Cir.2002). As the First Circuit specified in El Dia, "Once this limited burden has been met by the defendant-employer, the presumption which attended the prima facie case vanishes and the claimant must adduce sufficient creditable evidence that age was a motivating factor in the challenged employment action." Id. The plaintiff may meet the burden of proof by showing that the employer's proffered reason for the challenged employment action was pretextual, from which the factfinder in turn may, but need not, infer the alleged discriminatory animus. Id (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)).

In our present case, Santander does not contest that Varela meets the first three prongs of the prima facie case:

1) Varela falls within the protected group under the ADEA, since at the time of his layoff he was 43 years old.

2) Varela met his employer's legitimate job performance expectations.

3) Varela was terminated.

Notwithstanding, Santander maintains that Varela fails to meet the fourth prong:

4) Varela is unable to prove that Santander retained an employee outside the protected class in the position of Information Systems Manager since said position was eliminated as part of a reorganization that took place in the Systems Audit Division of Santander.

According to Santander, it has been conducting changes through many of its banks, and it decided that the auditing services of the Systems Division would be performed by the Division of Internal Audits of Santander Central Hispano ("SCH") in Madrid, Spain.¹⁴ SCH decided that, in Puerto Rico, the direction of the Systems Audit Division would be conducted by the Internal Audit Division in Madrid.¹⁵ As a consequence, the position of Manager of Information Systems Audit, occupied by Varela, was eliminated in April 2000.¹⁶

After the elimination of Varela's position, Santander's Systems Audit Area was composed of Jose Jimenez, Junior Auditor, Josue Santana, Junior Auditor, and Harry Hastings, Senior Auditor. These employees had reported to Varela, prior to his termination, and would now communicate with the Internal Audit Division of SCH in Spain.¹⁷ Plaintiff had recruited and trained these employees. After the elimination of Varela's position, Hastings resigned to his position in September 2000, and Santana resigned on April 2001.¹⁸ Santander did not recruit any employee for the vacancies left by Hastings and Santana in light of the decision to centralize the Puerto Rico Division with that in Spain.¹⁹

According to Varela, on October 1, 2000, Santander placed an advertisement looking for candidates to fill his position. Plaintiff contends that although the advertisement in the newspaper searched for a System Senior Auditor,²⁰ Santander had changed the position's name from System Audit Manager to System Senior Auditor. Defendants have demonstrated that Plaintiffs allegation is unfounded. Varela...