Soto v. Gaudett

• Decision Date: 05 July 2017
• Docket Number: August Term, 2016,Docket No. 15-3764
• Parties: Orlando SOTO, Conservator of the Estate of Israel Soto, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Chief of Police Joseph GAUDETT, individually and in his official capacity; Officer Martin Heanue, individually and in his official capacity; Officer Damien Csech, individually and in his official capacity; Officer Chris Robinson, individually and in his official capacity; Sergeant Christopher Stepniewski, individually and in his official capacity; City of Bridgeport, Defendants-Appellants, Officer Jane Doe, individually and in her official capacity; Officer John Doe, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

862 F.3d 148

Orlando SOTO, Conservator of the Estate of Israel Soto, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Chief of Police Joseph GAUDETT, individually and in his official capacity; Officer Martin Heanue, individually and in his official capacity; Officer Damien Csech, individually and in his official capacity; Officer Chris Robinson, individually and in his official capacity; Sergeant Christopher Stepniewski, individually and in his official capacity; City of Bridgeport, Defendants-Appellants,Officer Jane Doe, individually and in her official capacity; Officer John Doe, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.^*

Docket No. 15-3764

August Term, 2016

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: October 19, 2016

Decided: July 5, 2017

MICHAEL P. FOLEY, Jr., Cheshire, Connecticut (David K. Jaffe, Brown Paindiris & Scott, Hartford, Connecticut, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee.

JOHN JERRY GLAS, New Orleans, Louisiana (Deutsch Kerrigan, New Orleans, Louisiana; Richard G. Kascak, Jr., Associate City Attorney for the City of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, Connecticut, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellants.

Before: KEARSE, JACOBS, and POOLER, Circuit Judges.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

Defendants Joseph Gaudett, Martin Heanue, Damien Csech, Chris Robinson, Christopher Stepniewski, and City of Bridgeport (the "City" or "Bridgeport") (collectively "Defendants") appeal from so much of an order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Warren W. Eginton, Judge , as denied their motions for summary judgment dismissing, on the basis of qualified immunity, claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by plaintiff as conservator of the estate of his brother Israel Soto ("Soto") for use of excessive force in the deployment of tasers and in striking Soto with a police cruiser, in connection with Soto's flight from police. Csech, Stepniewski, and Robinson contended that their taser deployments were objectively reasonable; Robinson contended that his vehicle's striking Soto was accidental; and Gaudett and the City sought summary judgment on the ground that Soto's constitutional rights were not violated. Defendants pursue these arguments on appeal. The district court denied these motions on the ground that there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the court erred in denying summary judgment to Csech and that its other denials of summary judgment are not immediately appealable.

I. BACKGROUND

The present litigation arises out of events in Bridgeport, Connecticut, beginning shortly after 2 a.m. on January 23, 2008, that commenced as a car-chase, became a foot-chase, and culminated in the capture and arrest of Soto. Heanue, Csech, and Robinson, Bridgeport police officers, and Stepniewski, a police sergeant (collectively the "Officers"), were involved in the pursuit and/or capture of Soto. Gaudett, not alleged to have been personally involved, was Bridgeport's chief of police.

The injuries suffered by Soto in the course of those events included a fractured skull

and severe traumatic brain damage. The complaint alleges that he lost the ability to speak, walk, or otherwise act as a functional human being, and requires around-the-clock care and life support. The factual evidentiary record in the district court thus consists principally of police records, including reports filed by the Officers, deposition testimony of the Officers, and transcripts of interviews of the Officers by the Bridgeport Police Department's Office of Internal Affairs ("OIA"). The record also includes OIA's interview of Carl Young, one of the other occupants of the pursued vehicle. The general sequence of events is not seriously disputed; the following description, except as indicated, reflects that sequence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Various details as to the Officers' reports and sworn statements are added in Part II.C.

A. The Events

At approximately 2:18 a.m. on January 23, 2008, Heanue, driving a marked police car, observed a vehicle—eventually identified as a Toyota Camry (the "Camry")—traveling without headlights, and making a turn without signaling. When Heanue began to follow the Camry and activated his car's siren and flashing lights in an attempt to stop the Camry, the Camry, occupied by three men, accelerated and sped through several red lights. Heanue radioed on a police channel that he was in pursuit, and soon several other police vehicles, with strobe lights and sirens activated, were involved.

With Heanue following, the Camry made several turns; sped the wrong way on a one-way street—Fairfield Avenue—nearly colliding with at least one police car coming toward it; and eventually turned south onto Park Avenue, following it to Waldemere Avenue ("Waldemere"), which bordered the north end of Seaside Park ("Seaside"). The Camry went over the curb, onto the grass inside the park, and before it came to a stop the occupants jumped out. Heanue saw the driver fall and be run over by the Camry's left rear tire, and saw one passenger—later identified as Carl Young—exit a rear door and run deeper into the park. The driver of the Camry, after the car rolled over him, got up immediately. Heanue drove into the park to follow Young, whom he captured.

In the meantime, Soto—who according to Young was the other passenger in the Camry, not the driver—had exited the car and had run in the opposite direction from that taken by Young. Csech (driving one of the police cars nearly hit by the Camry on Fairfield Avenue) had proceeded down Park Avenue and turned onto Waldemere, where he parked and exited. Csech saw Soto running through the park and yelled at him to stop. Soto continued to run toward the intersection of Park Avenue and Waldemere. Robinson was then slowly driving south on Park Avenue in the northbound lane, scanning the area for suspects. As Soto was running across Park Avenue, Robinson's cruiser struck Soto.

Soto was thrown backwards from the collision and hit his head on the ground, but he immediately got up and resumed running. Csech again yelled to Soto to stop; when he did not, Csech, then some 25 feet away, shot Soto with a taser. Soto fell on the pavement, flat on his face, unable to brace himself.

Stepniewski did not see Soto's collision with Robinson's cruiser. He had preceded Csech and Robinson down Park Avenue and had turned east on Waldemere; Stepniewski was about 1,000 feet east of Park Avenue when he saw Soto running through the park toward Waldemere. When Soto had resumed running after his collision with Robinson's cruiser, Stepniewski and Robinson followed Csech in the foot-chase of Soto; they saw Csech tase Soto, and saw Soto fall. Csech, Stepniewski, and Robinson continued to run toward the fallen Soto. When Soto, entangled in the wires of Csech's taser, appeared to be trying to rise from his prone position, both Robinson and Stepniewski, at or about the same time, shot Soto with their tasers, from a distance of two-to-five feet.

After these subsequent taser shots, Soto fell to the ground, did not move again, and was unresponsive. A medical team was summoned and took him to the hospital with serious injuries.

In the meantime, the Officers did not catch the third occupant of the Camry, and the vehicle itself had disappeared. It was quickly recovered in a nearby neighborhood, however. It was determined that the Camry had been stolen some weeks earlier, and that its contents on January 23 included numerous items of stolen property. Soto was charged with multiple traffic violations and with several crimes, including attempted assault of a police officer. Given his continued physical condition, he has never been convicted, tried, or arraigned on those charges.

B. The Present Action and Defendants' Summary Judgment Motions

In 2010, plaintiff Orlando Soto commenced the present action on behalf of Soto principally under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleged that the Officers violated Soto's Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause—apparently on the premise that Soto was not the driver of the Camry (the false arrest claim (count 3))—and by using excessive force in connection with his arrest, to wit, the use of tasers by Csech, Stepniewski, and Robinson, and the collision of Robinson's cruiser with Soto (count 1); it alleged that Gaudett and the City were liable for those violations by reason of maintaining policies, practices, and customs amounting to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights (count 2). The complaint also alleged several state-law claims.

Following discovery, Defendants moved in 2015 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety. With respect to the § 1983 claims, Defendants principally contended that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Csech, Robinson, and Stepniewski argued that it was not "clearly established" that taser deployments against "fleeing suspects" were unconstitutional (Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Qualified Immunity ("Defendants' SJ/QI Mem.") at 9) and, alternatively, that their deployments were "objectively reasonable" (id . at 19). Robinson also stated that the collision of his cruiser with Soto had been unintentional and argued that he was thus entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that "accidentally striking a fleeing suspect with a police vehicle does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure" (id . at 27). Gaudett and the City claimed that they were entitled to qualified immunity (see id . at 36) on the ground that plaintiff had "failed to prove that the (alleged) constitutional violations by the City of Bridgeport Officers were based on a municipal policy, custom or practice" or a "deliberate choice" on the part of policymakers (id . at 37-38) and "failed to prove that the (alleged) failure to train was the cause of Mr. Soto's injuries" (id . at 38).

C. The Decision of the District Court

The district court granted Defendants' ...