Soto v. Marist Coll.
| Decision Date | 05 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-CV-7976 (KMK),17-CV-7976 (KMK) |
| Parties | ROBERTO SOTO, Plaintiff, v. MARIST COLLEGE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Appearances:
Roberto Soto
Bronx, NY
Pro se Plaintiff
Dov Kesselman, Esq.
Seyfarth Shaw LLP
New York, NY
Lisa Louise Savadjian, Esq.
LeclaiRyan
Newark, NJ
Roberto Soto ("Plaintiff") brings this pro se Action asserting claims against Marist College ("Marist"), Dennis Murray ("Murray"), David Yellen ("Yellen"), Lyn LePre ("LePre"), Sue Lawrence ("Lawrence"), and Deborah Raines Colbert ("Colbert") (collectively, "Defendants"), for unlawful discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.; and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion To Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (the "Motion"). (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 32).) For the reasons to follow, the Motion is granted.
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and are assumed true for the purpose of deciding the instant Motion.
In September 2015, Plaintiff was hired by Marist, a college that "receives federal funding," to teach four courses over two semesters, with an approximate enrollment of 100 students each semester. (See Am. Compl. 10, 12.)1 Plaintiff was hired by Defendant Lawrence to fill a vacancy created by the departure of a tenured professor, and Lawrence assured Plaintiff that he would be "first in line" for a tenure-track appointment. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that he is "a handicapped Latino senior citizen," while the professor he replaced was white. (Id.) The professor Plaintiff replaced had "resigned in protest following the unfair dismissal of Raul Barcelona, an experienced Hispanic professor." (Id. at 11.) Upon being hired, some students told Plaintiff that they were not comfortable with the change "because a male Latino [was] replacing the female professor, who was white." (Id.) These students "complain[ed] to the Chair," who then "changed the entire course focus," despite having previously approved Plaintiff's syllabus. (Id.)
As a professor at Marist, Plaintiff applied for an employee savings plan and began making contributions. (Id. at 10.) However, Marist's human resources department informed him he was not eligible for the program, and he "lost several thousand dollars['] worth of employer matching funds" as a result. (Id. at 11.)
During a semester break, Defendant LePre asked Plaintiff to return to campus and directed him to change the grades of two students who had complained about grades they received in his class. (Id. at 10.) Specifically, LePre wrote to Plaintiff, (Id.) Plaintiff declined to change the students' grades, explaining that it "was not the right thing to do." (Id.) The two students filed an appeal and had their grades raised by the dean. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that this request "would never be asked of a tenured professor." (Id.)
While Plaintiff was employed at Marist, he observed that there "were very few blacks, or Latinos[,] either in the student body or in [their] faculty ranks." (Id.) Plaintiff characterized the environment as "overwhelmingly white," and he "conveyed this observation in one of [his] media arts classes." (Id.) Soon after, Plaintiff was "called in" by LePre and told that he was "being unprofessional," and asked to stop because she "doesn't like it." (Id.)
Toward the "end of the semester," Plaintiff "became severely ill and had to undergo emergency surgery" to remove his bladder. (Id. at 10, 12.) Due to "health related complications," Plaintiff was unable to finish teaching the semester. (Id.at 10.) He received a letter dated April 15, 2016 from an unspecified source, advising him that "because [he] had missed several weeks of classes which had to be taken over by others[,] [his] appointment would not be extended." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that "this explanation was pretextual," and that he wasin fact terminated because of his age, handicap, and ethnic background, and because he "engaged in protected activity" by stating that the school lacked diversity. (Id.)
After receiving a Right-To-Sue Letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on July 26, 2017, (Am. Compl. 9), Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in this Action on October 17, 2017, (Compl. (Dkt. No. 2)). On November 29, 2017, Plaintiff was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 5.)
On December 6, 2017, Chief Judge Colleen McMahon ("Chief Judge McMahon") issued an Order directing Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint because his Complaint had failed to state a claim. (Order (Dkt. No. 6).) When Plaintiff failed to file an Amended Complaint, the Action was dismissed on February 14, 2018. (Dkt. No. 7.) On February 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed a letter asking that his case be reopened, (Dkt. No. 9), and on February 28, 2018, his request was granted, and he was given 60 days to file an Amended Complaint, (Dkt. No. 10). After being granted an extension, (Dkt. No. 12), Plaintiff filed a letter on May 4, 2018 that included two pages of narrative relating to his claims, (Dkt. No. 13). On August 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complete Amended Complaint. (See Am. Compl.)
On October 12, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. ( ) (Dkt. No. 33).) Plaintiff did not file a response, and on December 11, 2018, Defendants' Motion was deemed fully submitted. (Dkt. No. 39.) On December 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed a letter asking the Court to "review and consider his case" but did not otherwise file a response to Defendants' Motion. (Dkt. No. 40.)
The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive a Motion To Dismiss, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Instead, a complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint," id. at 563, and a plaintiff must allege "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not "nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed," id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ( ; id. at 678-79 ().
In considering Defendants' Motions, the Court is required to "accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the [C]omplaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (same). And, the Court must "draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must "construe[] [his complaint] liberally and interpret[] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted). However, "the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedure and substantive law." Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).
Generally, "[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). However, when the complaint is pro se, the Court may consider "materials outside the complaint to the extent that they are...
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