Soto v. U.S.

• Citation: 11 F.3d 15
• Decision Date: 05 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. 93-1158,93-1158
• Parties: Elvin H. SOTO, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Page 15

11 F.3d 15

Elvin H. SOTO, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 93-1158.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard Oct. 5, 1993.

Decided Dec. 10, 1993.

Antonio Montalvo Nazario, for plaintiffs, appellants.

Isabel Munoz Acosta, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Charles E. Fitzwilliam, U.S. Atty., was on brief, for defendant, appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, ROSENN, ^* Senior Circuit Judge, and STAHL, Circuit Judge.

ROSENN, Senior Circuit Judge.

After exhausting their administrative remedies, plaintiffs-appellants Elvin H. Soto, his wife, Millie Torres Muniz, and her two sons, Augustin Lebron Torres and Daniel Lebron Torres brought an action against the United States of America (the Government) pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b). The plaintiffs sought to recover damages for injuries suffered as a result of a motor vehicle collision between an automobile driven by Soto and a vehicle operated by Sergeant Narciso Galarza Gonzalez (Galarza) of the United States Army Reserves. The Government filed a counter-claim for damages to the government vehicle operated by Galarza.

After a bench trial, the court found Soto ninety percent at fault and the Government ten percent at fault and dismissed the counter-claim for lack of evidence. The court further held that under Puerto Rico law, the negligence of Soto could not be imputed to any of the other passengers of his vehicle. Accordingly, the court entered judgment against the Government for damages aggregating $250,000. ¹ The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. ² The Government did not cross-appeal. We affirm.

I.

On February 9, 1990, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Soto was driving his father's automobile on State Road 465 in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico. At that time, Soto had a learner's permit but no driver's license. Riding in the car with Soto were his wife and her two sons from a previous marriage.

On the day of the accident, Soto stopped the vehicle at a stop sign at the intersection of State Road 465 and State Road 110. State Road 110 is a major highway and State Road 465 is a secondary road. Because the stop sign on State Road 465 is some distance from the intersection, Soto came to a full stop and then began to inch his way into the intersection. As Soto did so, Galarza approached the intersection in a three-quarter ton United States Army truck.

The trial court found that it was raining at the time the two vehicles approached the intersection and that Galarza was able to view the intersection from a distance of about 400 feet. The court further found that Galarza saw the plaintiffs' vehicle when he was approximately ten or eleven truck lengths away from the intersection and that he slowed down his vehicle by easing his foot off of the accelerator. However, Galarza did not apply his brakes until he was within one and one-half truck lengths of the plaintiffs' automobile. A collision occurred between the front of the United States Army truck and the left side of the plaintiffs' vehicle.

All of the plaintiffs suffered injuries, with Augustin suffering the most severe injuries. The plaintiffs sought damages for pain and suffering due to their bodily injuries and Muniz also sought damages for the mental anguish she experienced due to her son Augustin's injuries. On appeal, the appellants argue that the district court erred in the assignment to Soto of ninety percent of the negligence for the motor vehicle accident and in the sum awarded as damages to the appellants.

II.

The appellants first argue that the district court erred in assigning its apportionment of the negligence for the motor vehicle accident. A district court's findings of fact and apportionment of liability are reviewable by this court only for clear error. Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1990). If it appears that a district court applied an erroneous legal standard to the facts, however, our review will be de novo. Clement v. United States, 980 F.2d 48, 53 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 897 F.2d at 4). Here, the trial court applied the proper legal standard to the facts of this case, and thus we review the court's findings of fact and determination of the degree of negligence assignable to Soto and Galarza only for clear error.

In claims brought under section 1346(b) of the FTCA, a court must apply the "law of the place" where the negligent act occurred. See, e.g., Vega-Mena v. United States, 990 F.2d 684, 689 (1st Cir.1993). Claims for negligence in Puerto Rico are governed by 31 L.P.R.A. Sec. 5141 (1990). This statute provides that contributory negligence by the plaintiff does not exempt a defendant from liability; "[c]oncurrent imprudence of the party aggrieved does not exempt from liability, but entails a reduction of the indemnity."

Under Puerto Rico law, a person who is entering a highway from an alley, building, private road, or driveway must yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching on the public highway. 9 L.P.R.A. Sec. 951 (1990). Nevertheless, there is a duty upon a driver on a preferential highway to observe due care in approaching and crossing the intersection and to drive as a prudent person would to avoid a collision. Damiani Franco v. Donatiu Maldonado, 95 P.R.R. 809, 816 (1968); Carolina Casualty Co. v. Guzman, 87 P.R.R. 857, 858-59 (1963).

The district court found that the facts of two cases, Flores Ortiz v. F. & J.M. Carrera, Inc., 83 P.R.R. 320 (1961) and Carolina Casualty, 87 P.R.R. 858, are closely analogous to the facts of this case. In Flores Ortiz, the plaintiff driver was traveling on a secondary highway toward an intersection with a main highway. The plaintiff driver stopped at the intersection and observed the defendant's truck, but thought that he could safely cross the intersection. The defendant observed the plaintiffs' vehicle begin to move into the intersection, but he assumed that the plaintiff driver would stop when he got closer to the defendant's lane and therefore only applied his brakes just prior to the collision. The court found that the plaintiff driver, who was traveling on the secondary highway, should have waited for the defendant's truck to pass before attempting to cross the intersection. The court also found that when the defendant saw the plaintiff driver start to cross the main highway, he should have immediately taken the necessary precautions to avoid the collision, applying the brakes, reducing his speed, and not assuming that the plaintiff driver would stop. Therefore, the court held that both drivers were negligent and were equally responsible for the accident. The facts of the Flores Ortiz case closely resemble what occurred in this case between Soto and Galarza.

In Carolina Casualty, the converse occurred; the plaintiff had the right of way and the defendant was traveling on a secondary road. The defendant stopped at the intersection and observed the plaintiff's vehicle, but thought that he could cross before the plaintiff approached. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was...