Soud v. Kendale, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D00-1835.,1D00-1835. |
| Parties | Ginger SOUD, Warren Alvarez, et al., Appellants, v. KENDALE, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard A. Mullaney, General Counsel, Tracey I. Arpen Jr., Deputy General Counsel and Karl J. Sanders, Assistant General Counsel, Jacksonville, for Appellants.
Paul M. Harden, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
We grant the Jacksonville City Council's Motion for Rehearing, withdraw our opinion dated February 27, 2001 ("Per Curiam Dismissed"), and reverse the trial court's temporary injunction. The injunction is reversed for failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 1.610 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellee Kendale, Inc. applied to the City of Jacksonville for a land use amendment. The appellant Jacksonville City Council approved the amendment and transmitted it to the Florida Department of Community Affairs for a required review. The Department of Community Affairs objected to the amendment. The City Council scheduled a final public hearing for May 9, 2000, at 6:00 p.m., during which it would consider the Department's comments and vote on Kendale's amendment. Prior to this public hearing, the General Counsel's Office of the City of Jacksonville requested a closed meeting to discuss the Department's objections. The City Council scheduled this closed meeting, commonly referred to as a "shade meeting," for Tuesday, May 9, 2000, at 3:00 p.m.
On May 8, 2000, Kendale filed a complaint for injunctive relief, a motion for a temporary injunction, and an affidavit in support of the motion for temporary injunction. That same day at 3:00 p.m., the trial court granted Kendale's motion and entered an ex parte injunction.
The trial court's order granting the temporary injunction made the following findings:
The order then states, among other things, that "[t]he members of the Jacksonville City Council and each of them individually are hereby enjoined from participating in the "Shade Meeting" of the City Council scheduled for May 9, 2000 at 3:00 p.m."
The trial court scheduled a hearing on the matter for 10:30 a.m. on May 9, 2000 to allow consideration of the matters, including any objections to the temporary injunction that might be raised. No appearances were made on behalf of the Council at the May 9, 2000 trial court hearing. The Council elected to appeal the trial court's injunction, asserting that both the motion seeking the injunction and the trial court's ruling were deficient under Rule 1.610 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
A temporary injunction without notice is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted sparingly. State v. Beeler, 530 So.2d 932, 933 (Fla.1988). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610, relating to the procedural and content requirements for injunctions, must be followed. United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Quincy Corporation, 681 So.2d 773, 776-777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
A temporary injunction must be based on a showing of the following criteria: (1) a likelihood of irreparable harm, (2) no adequate remedy at law, (3) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and (4) a consideration of the public interest. City of Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co., 634 So.2d 750, 752 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Also, clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings must support each of the four conclusions. Id. at 754. Conclusory statements will not suffice. Id. at 753. Although the trial court's ruling appears to be conclusory without sufficient factual findings, we need not reach that determination. We reverse because Kendale and the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 1.610(a) for seeking and granting a temporary injunction without notice.
Rule 1.610(a)(1) states in pertinent part that a "temporary injunction may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party only if: ... (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts that have been made to give notice; and (C) the reasons why notice should not be required." In order to obtain the injunction, Kendale filed a complaint for injunctive relief, a motion for a temporary injunction, and a sworn affidavit made by Kendale's Vice President in support of the motion for a temporary...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mazer v. Orange County
...the third exception. The collateral legal consequence here is Mazer's right, vel non, to attorney's fees. See Soud v. Kendale, Inc., 788 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that a request for attorney's fees pursuant to the statute allowing attorneys fees when a defendant violates the S......
-
Mazer v. Orange County Fl
...the third exception. The collateral legal consequence here is Mazer's right, vel non, to attorney's fees. See Soud v. Kendale, Inc., 788 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that a request for attorney's fees pursuant to the statute allowing attorneys fees when a defendant violates the ......
-
Consumer Rights, LLC v. Bradford Cnty.
...... after the action was commenced, but prior to final adjudication ... does not render the case moot”); Soud v. Kendale, Inc., 788 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) ; Puls v. City of Port St. Lucie, 678 So.2d 514, 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) ; Wisner v. City of Tampa Police Dep't, 601 So.2d......
-
School Board of Miami-Dade County v. Florida Department of Health
...such a collateral legal consequence. See Mazer v. Orange County, 811 So. 2d 857, 859 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ; Soud v. Kendale, Inc., 788 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Consequently, we turn our analysis to whether, in the instant case, the School Board would have been entitled to recov......
-
Procedural remedies
...731 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). 9. Milin v. Northwest Florida Land, L.C ., 870 So.2d 135, 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). 10. Soud v. Kendale, Inc ., 788 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). 11. Glades Owners Association, Inc. v. Prentiss , 768 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). 12. Tom v. Russ , 752 So.2d......