Sound Investment & Realty Co. v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 21 October 1947
• Docket Number: No. 27286.,27286.
• Citation: 205 S.W.2d 257
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: SOUND INVESTMENT & REALTY CO. v. GRIFFIN.

205 S.W.2d 257

SOUND INVESTMENT & REALTY CO. v. GRIFFIN.

No. 27286.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

October 21, 1947.

Rehearing Denied November 19, 1947.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Louis County; Raymond E. LaDriere, Judge.

"Not to be reported in State Reports."

Suit by Sound Investment & Realty Company against W. L. H. Griffin for a declaratory judgment construing written lease agreement executed by plaintiff and defendant on July 18, 1946. From an adverse judgment, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Andrew J. Reis and N. Murry Edwards, both of St. Louis, for appellant.

Gilbert Penfield Strelinger, of St. Louis, for respondent.

ANDERSON, Judge.

In this case plaintiff brought suit to construe under the declaratory judgment statute a written lease agreement signed and executed by plaintiff and defendant on July 18, 1946, for the occupancy and possession by defendant of a five-room apartment dwelling unit owned by plaintiff at 6612 San Bonita, Clayton, Missouri. The lease covered a period of one year, commencing on September 1, 1946, and ending August 31, 1947, and provided for the payment of rental by said defendant at the rate of $70 per month on the 1st day of each calendar month in the total sum of $840. The cause was submitted to the trial court upon the pleadings and a stipulation of facts signed by the attorneys of record in the case, and resulted in a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $51.50 monthly for six months from September, 1946, to and including the month of February, 1947, or a total of $309. The costs were assessed against plaintiff. From this judgment appellant appealed to this court.

The petition alleged that plaintiff owned the four-family brick apartment dwelling at 6612 San Bonita, Clayton, Missouri, and that on July 18, 1946, for a valuable consideration, plaintiff and defendant entered into a certain agreement whereby plaintiff rented and leased for a term of one year to the defendant a five-room apartment on the second floor of said building. The petition set out the lease in full. It provided that plaintiff leased to defendant for one year from September 1, 1946, and ending August 31, 1947, the certain apartment on the East side and on the Second floor of the building known as 6612 San Bonita, at a yearly rental of $840, payable monthly in advance in equal installments of $70 each; that "The said lessee and all who may hold under said lessee, hereby engage to pay the rent above reserved, and double rent for every day lessee or any one else in lessee's name shall hold onto the whole or any part of said tenement after the expiration of this lease, or after its forfeiture for any cause whatever;" that "Any failure to pay each month's rent within five days after being due or to keep or perform any of the covenants herein contained shall produce a forfeiture of this lease, if so determined by said lessor, without further demand or notice." The petition further alleged that defendant failed and refused to pay plaintiff the amounts due under the lease, and that a controversy had arisen between plaintiff and defendant "respecting the validity and plaintiff's and defendant's rights under said apartment lease and the proper construction of said lease and the validity and legal effect of the same and the liability of defendant to plaintiff under said lease;" that plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law; and the petition prayed that the court determine the rights of the parties under said lease, and order "that defendant is liable to plaintiff for the amounts provided for under said lease."

For his answer defendant admitted the execution of said lease, in which he agreed to pay plaintiff $70 per month for the occupancy by defendant of the premises described in said lease, but alleged that the provisions of said lease for the payment of said rental thereunder had been "modified, and superseded by operation of law and constitutes an illegal and invalid provision which is not binding upon this defendant." The answer further admitted that defendant had refused to pay plaintiff $70 per month, the amount of rent specified in said lease; admitted that a controversy had arisen between plaintiff and defendant respecting the amount of rent due for the occupancy of the premises described in the lease; but denied that any controversy had arisen between plaintiff and defendant respecting the other provisions of the said lease. The answer further alleged that under the laws of the United States of America, and more specifically the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended and as extended by the Price Control Extension Act of 1946, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 901 et seq., and under the Regulations of the Office of Price Administration relating to housing, which regulations were promulgated pursuant to the authority conferred by said laws of the United States, the maximum rent which plaintiff could demand or receive for the occupancy of the premises described in said lease was $51.50 per month, or $618 per annum; that said laws of the United States of America and the Regulations promulgated thereunder made it illegal for any person to demand or receive rent for said premises higher than said maximum rent regardless of any contract, agreement, lease or other obligation; and that by reason of the superior and overriding operation of said laws of the United States of America, the rental provisions of said lease had been modified and superseded by operation of law, were illegal and invalid, and not binding on defendant. The answer further alleged that defendant had tendered $51.50 per month, the full amount of said maximum rent; that plaintiff refused to accept said amounts; and that defendant was ready and willing to pay said amounts then due or which would thereafter become due at the rate "lawfully fixed by the Office of Price Administration."

For reply, plaintiff denied that the rental provisions of said lease had been modified or superseded by operation of law; denied that the provisions in said lease constituted an illegal and invalid provision not binding on defendant; denied that the rent provided in the lease was not due at the rate mentioned in said lease; denied that under the laws of the United States of America, and more particularly the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, and alleged by defendant to have been extended by the Price Control Extension Act of 1946, and under the regulations of the Office of Price Administration relating to housing, promulgated pursuant to the authority of said laws of the United States, the maximum rent that could be demanded or received for the occupancy of the premises described in the lease was $51.50 per month, or $618 per annum; denied that said laws of the United States of America and regulations issued thereunder made it illegal for any person to demand or receive rent for said premises higher than the maximum rent prescribed therefor by said regulations, regardless of any contract agreement or other obligation; denied that the rental provisions of said lease providing for a yearly rent of $840, payable monthly in advance in equal installments of $70 each, had been modified or superseded by operation of law, or was illegal and invalid and not binding upon defendant; and denied that the provision of said lease providing for said rental had been overridden, superseded, or modified by operation of said laws of the United States.

The reply alleged that by reason of defendant's refusal to pay the rent provided for in the lease, defendant had forfeited his right under said lease and his right to occupy the premises described in said lease as a tenant; alleged that the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, expired on June 30, 1946, and had not thereafter been legally revived or extended; alleged that on July 25, 1946, the Congress of the United States passed a joint resolution pertaining to the Emergency Price Control Act, in which said joint resolution it was provided and stated: "Provided further, that no act or transaction or omission or failure to act, occurring subsequent to June 30, 1946, and prior to the date of enactment of this Act shall be deemed to be a violation of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, or the Stabilization Act of 1942, as amended, or of any regulation, order, price schedule, or requirement under either of such Acts."

The reply further alleged that under the Constitution of the United States, the Congress of the United States has no power or authority to pass a law or statute which is retrospective or retroactive, or which will impair the terms of a written contract which has heretofore been duly executed; alleged that said lease provided that "The said lessee and all who may hold under said lease, hereby engage to pay the rent above reserved, and double rent for every day lessee or any one else in lessee's name shall hold onto the whole or any part of said tenement after the expiration of this lease, or after its forfeiture for any cause whatever."

The reply further alleged that under the terms of said lease plaintiff was entitled to double the monthly rental in said lease, or $140 per month from and after September 1, 1946; alleged that said lease provided that, "Any failure to pay each month's rent within five days after being due or to keep or perform any of the covenants herein contained shall produce a forfeiture of this lease, if so determined by said lessor, without further demand or notice."

The reply further alleged that plaintiff had determined that said lessee had forfeited his rights under said lease and therefore was no longer a tenant of plaintiff.

The reply asked judgment as prayed in its petition, and that the court decree that defendant is indebted to plaintiff for double monthly rent, or $140 a month, and that defendant's failure to pay the rent called for in the lease within five days after the same became due has forfeited his right to remain a...