Souter v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of America, Local 72

• Decision Date: 11 May 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-2640,92-2640
• Citation: 993 F.2d 595
• Parties: 143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2269, 125 Lab.Cas. P 10,684 Patrick SOUTER and Hope Souter, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 72, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 595

993 F.2d 595

143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2269, 125 Lab.Cas. P 10,684

Patrick SOUTER and Hope Souter, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL

72, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 92-2640.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 4, 1993.

Decided May 11, 1993.

Walter Stern, Union Grove, WI (argued), for plaintiffs-appellants.

George Graf (argued), Gillick, Murphy, Wicht & Prachthauser, Brookfield, WI, for International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of America, Local 72 and International Union of United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of America, U.A.W.

Peter J. Stone (argued), Laura A. Brenner, Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, WI, for Chrysler Corp. and Jeep Eagle Corp.

Before POSNER, FLAUM, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Patrick and Hope Souter bring this appeal from an entry of summary judgment in favor of the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its local branch (collectively referred to as "the union") and Chrysler Corporation. The underlying suit was a hybrid action brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, against Patrick Souter's employer, Chrysler, and his union representative. The plaintiffs charged that Chrysler had violated the terms of a collective bargaining agreement by failing to honor Patrick Souter's "transfer rights," and that the union had breached its duty of fair representation by failing to represent Souter in the grievance process. Because we believe that Patrick Souter was not entitled to any relief under the collective bargaining agreement, we affirm the entry of summary judgment. ¹

Patrick Souter began working for American Motors Corporation in August of 1987 as an apprentice pipefitter at the Kenosha Engine Plant. Chrysler purchased American Motors in 1988, and Chrysler has been Souter's employer since then. On January 27, 1988, Chrysler announced that it planned to close the Kenosha Assembly and Stamping Plants, but that it would leave open the Kenosha Engine Plant. As a result of these closings, many employees at the Kenosha plants faced layoffs. The union and Chrysler reached an agreement to create a program to transfer qualified apprentices to other Chrysler plants throughout the country. Under the program, the apprentices were to be divided into two classes. "Temporary" apprentices were eligible for transfers, based on their performance on an employment test, while "permanent" apprentices were eligible for the positions that would remain at Kenosha, based on their seniority. According to the agreement, whether an apprentice qualified as "temporary" or "permanent" depended on his or her likelihood of being "laid off with no prospect for return to the program at Kenosha." Rusk Dep. Ex. 7.

Chrysler predicted that one pipefitter apprentice would be retained as an employee for every eight journeymen. Souter was ranked third in seniority among the apprentices, and Chrysler expected to keep twenty-four journeymen at Kenosha. Chrysler therefore classified Souter as a permanent employee likely to retain a position at Kenosha.

The purpose of this plan was presumably to protect the jobs of the more senior apprentices by giving them positions at Kenosha, and to award transfers to the more junior apprentices according to their test scores. In some cases, however, the permanent jobs unexpectedly turned out to be less secure than the temporary ones. In March of 1989, two temporary apprentices named Greg Wing and Gail Klebig were transferred to a Chrysler plant in Detroit, Michigan. Souter had scored higher than Klebig on the employment test that determined one's rank as a temporary employee, but Souter was already classified as a permanent employee. He therefore remained at Kenosha. After Klebig's transfer, Souter allegedly consulted officials of the union, including Curt Wilson, the recording secretary for the local union, about filing a grievance concerning his classification. Souter claims Wilson stated that he would investigate Souter's claim, but in fact never filed a grievance.

On September 1, 1989, Souter was told that he would be laid off from the Kenosha Engine Plant effective September 3. He then filed a grievance with the union based on two complaints: first, that an apprentice with less seniority and lower test scores received a transfer to Detroit; second, that he was being improperly laid off because more than twenty-four journeymen were working but only two apprentices. During the next few months, Souter worked on and off at Kenosha. In August of 1990, the union and Chrysler settled Souter's September grievance, reinstating him and awarding backpay, overtime pay, and holiday pay on his improper layoff claim. Souter insisted, nevertheless, that he was entitled either to a guaranteed job or to the right to "bump" another apprentice in Detroit.

In Souter's lawsuit against Chrysler and the union, the district court held that the union reasonably believed Souter's claim to be without merit, because he clearly was not entitled to a transfer or to any further remedies under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. It therefore granted summary judgment to the defendants. We review this decision by the familiar standard of whether all the pleadings and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Heck v. City of Freeport, 985 F.2d 305, 307 (7th Cir.1993); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

To prevail on his claim, Souter needed to demonstrate that the union's actions were arbitrary, discriminatory, or taken in bad faith. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1127, 1130, 113 L.Ed.2d 51 (1991); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, 916, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). We applied this standard in Ooley v. Schwitzer Div., Household Mfg., 961 F.2d 1293, 1302-04 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 208, 121 L.Ed.2d 148 (1992), to the issue of a union's duty of fair representation in the grievance process. We ruled that when an employee's underlying contract claim lacks merit as a matter of law, the employee cannot complain that the union breached its duty of fair representation in failing to process the grievance. See id., 961 F.2d at 1304. The employee suffers no injury when the union fails to go forward with a meritless claim. See id.

In this case, summary judgment for the union was properly granted. On the first part of Souter's grievance, in which he alleged that his September 1988 layoff was improper, Souter was entitled to no relief from the union because he won that dispute with Chrysler. The union properly represented him, and he prevailed. On the second part of Souter's grievance, in which he alleged that he deserved a permanent job at Kenosha or a preferential transfer, he was entitled to no relief because the claim is completely without merit. From Souter's personal standpoint, he may wish that he had been classified as a temporary employee rather than as a permanent one, since he thought a transfer to Detroit was more desirable than remaining at Kenosha. But failure to honor an employee's subjective preferences is not the test of whether the collective bargaining agreement was breached. At the time the transfer program was implemented, it appeared that Souter would retain his job at Kenosha, given the number of journeymen projected to stay. Gail Klebig, by contrast, had less seniority and a greater likelihood of being "laid off with no prospect for return" to Kenosha. Klebig was therefore transferred to Detroit. The...