South Carolina Dept. of Social Services v. Wheaton

Decision Date06 June 1996
Docket NumberNo. 2550,2550
Citation323 S.C. 299,474 S.E.2d 156
PartiesSOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent, v. Robert Charles WHEATON, Robert Cox and Shelly Cox, Defendants, of whom Robert Charles Wheaton is, Appellant. In the Interest of Keri A. Vause, Christopher Cox and Heather Cox, Minors Under the Age of 18. . Heard
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals

Kellum W. Allen and John G. O'Day, Kirkland, Wilson, Moore, Allen & Taylor, West Columbia, for appellant.

Daun C. Steigner, Lexington, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Robert Charles Wheaton appeals a family court order which found he sexually abused one child and threatened to harm two other children. We reverse.

D.S.S. alleges Wheaton sexually abused his seven year old niece. The only testimony of abuse came from hearsay statements from the child. Wheaton argues on appeal the family court judge erred in admitting those statements.

Prior to trial, the judge noted that none of the parties were present, although each was represented by an appointed guardian ad litem or retained or appointed counsel. Officer Ladd Roof of the Lexington County Sheriff's Department testified he had an order to transport the parties, except Wheaton, to the hearing. Roof went to the residence but found no one there. Roof stated he had served subpoenas on the parties, except Wheaton, at their residence.

Wheaton's attorney advised the judge he had not spoken to his client because Wheaton was incarcerated in Florida. He objected in advance to the court's accepting the hearsay testimony of the child, arguing the court could make no finding on the competency of the child without the child's presence. Wheaton's attorney also moved to dismiss the action because no witnesses had first-hand knowledge of the pertinent facts.

Michael May, Wheaton's guardian ad litem, joined in the motions because he, too, had been unable to contact Wheaton. The trial court proceeded, but held the motion to dismiss in abeyance.

Following the hearing, the family court found DSS had established the abuse had more likely than not occurred, and ordered Wheaton to cooperate with the proposed treatment plan. Wheaton appeals.

I.

Wheaton first argues the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony.

The law provides a child's out-of-court statement may be admitted in an abuse case if:

(1) the child testifies at the proceeding or testifies by means of videotaped deposition or closed-circuit television, and at the time of the testimony the child is subject to cross-examination about the statement; or

(2)(a) the child is found by the court to be unavailable to testify on any of these grounds:

(i) the child's death;

(ii) the child's physical or mental disability;

(iii) the existence of a privilege involving the child;

(iv) the child's incompetency, including the child's inability to communicate about the offense because of fear;

(v) substantial likelihood that the child would suffer severe emotional trauma from testifying at the proceeding or by means of videotaped deposition or closed-circuit television; and

(b) the child's out-of-court statement is shown to possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

S.C.Code Ann. § 19-1-180 (Supp.1995) (emphasis added).

DSS argued at trial the child's absence was equal to a "physical disability." Moreover, the attorney for the guardian ad litem alleged the guardian felt the child would suffer emotional harm if she testified. However, the judge rejected these arguments and specifically found DSS had showed none of the five reasons for unavailability. We agree the record does not factually support these blanket allegations.

The court thereafter erroneously treated the "particularized guarantee of trustworthiness" of the statement as a separate basis for admitting the testimony and allowed the hearsay. This was error.

The statute...

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5 cases
  • Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina, Inc.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • January 22, 2001
    ...beyond clear legislative intent. Smalls v. Weed, 293 S.C. 364, 360 S.E.2d 531 (Ct.App.1987); South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Wheaton, 323 S.C. 299, 474 S.E.2d 156 (Ct.App.1996). Therefore, a statute is not to be construed in derogation of common law rights if another interpretation i......
  • Doe v. Marion
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • October 25, 2004
    ...must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Wheaton, 323 S.C. 299, 302, 474 S.E.2d 156, 158 (Ct.App.1996). Therefore, a statute is not to be construed in derogation of common law rights if another interpr......
  • Gilfillin v. Gilfillin
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • March 26, 2001
    ...be strictly construed. "Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed." South Carolina Dep't. of Social Services v. Wheaton, 323 S.C. 299, 474 S.E.2d 156 (Ct.App.1996). We will not extend the application of the statute beyond the clear legislative intent. Id. In the ......
  • DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. Wilson, 25568.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 16, 2002
    ...at the time the child testifies, it contemplates the presence of the parent/defendant. See Dep't of Social Serv. v. Wheaton, 323 S.C. 299, 474 S.E.2d 156 (Ct.App.1995) (Section 19-1-180 provides hearsay statement is admissible if child testifies and submits to cross-examination). Should DSS......
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