South Carolina & G.R. Co. v. Dietzen

• Decision Date: 10 July 1897
• Citation: 29 S.E. 292,101 Ga. 730
• Parties: SOUTH CAROLINA & C. R. CO. v. DIETZEN.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

29 S.E. 292

101 Ga. 730

SOUTH CAROLINA & C. R. CO. v. DIETZEN.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 10, 1897

Syllabus by the Court.

An act of the general assembly of Georgia, which establishes jurisdiction of suits against railroad companies, and prescribes that suits for damages for injuries to person or property shall be brought in the county in which the cause of action originated, if the company has an agent in such county, if not, then in the county of the residence of the company, refers to causes of action originating in the countries of this state, and does not apply to causes of action originating outside the limits of the state. (a) As to the latter, the law in force, at the time of the passage of the act is not affected by its terms.

Error from City court of Richmond county; W. F. Eve, Judge.

Action by Joseph, Dietzen against the South Carolina & Georgia Railroad Company. A demurrer to the petition was overruled and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Joseph B. & Bryan Cumming, for plaintiff in error.

Fleming & Alexander, for defendant in error.

LITTLE J.

The defendant in error brought suit against the plaintiff in error in the city court of Richmond county to recover damages sustained by him in being unlawfully ejected from the train of the plaintiff in error in the state of South Carolina. The plaintiff in error demurred from the petition on the ground that it appeared from the petition that the court had no jurisdiction of the action, and that judgment rendered by a court in Richmond county would be void. The demurrer was based on the provisions of section 2334 of the Civil Code which declares that all railroad companies shall be sued in the county in which the cause of action originated; that any judgment rendered in any other county than the one in which the cause so originated shall be utterly void. This section was codified from the act of 1892 (Acts 1892, p. 59), wherein it is further stipulated that, if the cause of action arise in a county where the railroad company has no agent, then suit may be brought in the county of the residence of the company. The precise question in the case is whether the act of 1892, requirement suits to be brought in the county where the injury occurred, and declaring a judgment rendered elsewhere to be utterly void applies in this case. The plaintiff in error contends that it does. It is conceded that it is a foreign corporation, having its principal office in the state of South Carolina, and that the only county of Georgia in which it operates a railroad is Richmond county, and that the only county of and that there it has an office and does business. The language of the statute is, "All railroad companies shall be sued in the county in which the cause of action originated." If the plaintiff in error is right in its contention, it must be because the general assembly has deprived of jurisdictional courts other than those of the county in which the cause of action...