South Carolina Mental Health Commission v. May

Decision Date30 September 1954
Docket NumberNo. 16915,16915
Citation83 S.E.2d 713,226 S.C. 108
PartiesThe SOUTH CAROLINA MENTAL HEALTH COMMISSION, Appellant, v. Rufus A. MAY, Administrator of the estate of J. Hiram May, deceased, Respondent.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

T. C. Callison, Atty. Gen., James S. Verner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Mays, Featherstone & Bradford, Greenwood, for respondent.

TAYLOR, Justice.

J. Hiram May being mentally ill was admitted to the South Carolina State Hospital on November 14, 1911, and remained there as a patient until his death on July 15, 1952. Rufus A. May was appointed administrator of his estate and the South Carolina Mental Health Commission duly filed a claim amounting to $13,279.58 against such estate for the care and treatment furnished the deceased while a patient in the State Hospital, said claim being for treatment and care from May 2, 1915, he having been a patient continuously during this time. A verified claim for this amount was filed with the administrator and rejected. Defendant in his answer denied liability for any charges except those accruing after the approval of the Mental Health Act on March 7, 1952, 48 St. at Large, p. 2042, and interposed the defenses of waiver and the Statute of Limitations. Thereafter motion was made by Defendant for judgment on the pleadings. Judge Bellinger, then presiding, overruled the defense of waiver and the contention that the new Mental Health Act repealed all prior acts, upholding however, the plea of limitations and both parties now appeal, Plaintiff contending that there was error in upholding the Statute of Limitations and Defendant contending, first, that it was error to hold that the Mental Health Act of 1952 did not have the effect of rendering invalid all claims or charges which accrued prior to the date of the approval of the Act, March 7, 1952; second, that it was error not to hold that the Board of Regents of the Hospital had waived their rights to assess charges against the Defendant's estate.

The 1915 Act cut off all charges and claims prior to the date of that Act. It clearly sets forth the duties of executors or administrators as to ascertaining from the State Board of Charities whether or not the deceased person was supported while an inmate and if not it provided for the filing of a claim for such amount as might be due. Section 23, Act 100 of 1915, 29 St. at Large, pp. 132, 138, reads as follows:

'Upon the death of a person who is an inmate, or has been an inmate since the passage of this Act, of said institution, and who is possessed of property, it shall be the duty of the executor or administrator to ascertain from the State Board of Charities whether the deceased person was supported while an inmate, and if not, the Board may present a claim for support, or for the balance due in case less than the minimum rate had been paid. Such claim shall be allowed and paid as other lawful claims against the estate: Provided, That the Board may waive the presentation of any claim when, in their judgment, an otherwise dependent person would be directly benefited by the estate. It shall be lawful for the Board to accept from a guardian, committee or trustee of an inmate a contract agreeing to pay to the State from the property of his ward before or after death of his award a fixed annual amount for the support of such ward while an inmate, and with interest at four per cent. per annum. A copy of such contract shall be filed in the Probate Court of the proper county, and duly entered as a part of the records concerning such ward.'

Subsequent acts relating to this subject, however, reveal there is a continuity of provisions that such claims should be kept alive and not cut off as provided in the 1915 Act. The foregoing as carried in the 1952 Code appears as Section 975, Title 32 and reads as follows:

'Upon the death of a person who is an inmate, or has since February 20, 1915 been an inmate, of the State Hospital and who is possessed of property, the executor or administrator shall ascertain from the Board of Regents of the Hospital whether the deceased person was supported while an inmate and, if not, the Board may present a claim for support or for the balance due in case less than the minimum rate had been paid. Such claim shall be allowed and paid as other lawful claims against the estate. But the Board may waive the presentation of any claim when, in its judgment, an otherwise dependent person would be directly benefited by the estate.'

Act No. 836 of the 1952 Acts, provides in Section 16, Article 4, the following:

'Upon the death of a person who is or has been a patient or trainee of a state mental health facility the executor or administrator and the judge of probate shall notify the commission in writing. If the decedent was cared for at the expense of the state during his confinement, the commission shall present a claim for the amount due and this claim shall be allowed and paid as other lawful claims against the estate. The commission may waive the presentation of any claim where, in its opinion, an otherwise dependent person would be directly benefited by waiver.'

In an Act approved by the Governor, March 23, 1954, 48 St. at Large, pp. 1732, 1741, Section 20, we find the following:

'There is hereby created a general lien upon the real and personal property of any person who is receiving or who has received care or treatment in a state mental health facility, to the extent of the total expense to the State in providing the care, training or treatment. The commission shall send to the clerk of court and to the judge of probate of the county of the patient's or trainee's known or last known residence a statement showing the name of the patient or trainee and the date upon which the lien attaches, which shall be filed in the offices of the clerk of court and the judge of probate in each county in which the patient or trainee then owns or thereafter acquires property, real or personal, and no charge shall be made for this filing. From the time of filing in either office, the statement shall constitute due notice of the lien against all property then owned or thereafter acquired by the patient or trainee. No action to enforce the lien may be brought more than one year after the patient's or trainee's death. This lien shall in no way affect the right of homestead.'

Section 24, of the same Act, reads:

'Provided, however, that limitations against claims for charges for care, training, maintenance or treatment heretofore or hereafter received by any patient or trainee from the South Carolina State Hospital, any State Training School, or any State Mental Health Facility, shal commence to run against the State, its boards, commissions or agencies charged with the operation of the above institutions only from the last date upon which care, training, maintenance or treatment was furnished to any such patient or trainee.'

The foregoing Acts by using such expressions as 'Upon the death of a person who is an inmate, or has since February 20, 1915 been an inmate' and 'Upon the death of a person who is or has been a patient or trainee of a state mental health facility' together with an expressed provision that limitations against such claims or charges shall commence to run against the State, its Boards or Commissions or agencies charged with the operation of such institutions only from the last date of such care, training, maintenance or treatment denotes a continuity of thought running throughout such legislation to the idea that such indigent mentally ill are to receive such care upon the condition that they pay for it when and if able. The Act approved by the Governor March 23, 1954, heretofore referred to, came after the entering of judgment in this case on January 16, 1954, and is referred to only for the purpose of showing the intent of the Legislature running throughout its acts on this subject. Such legislation carries with it the thought of the responsibility of the State to care for its indigent insane with a view to improvement or cure, if possible, and that such treatment be paid for in whole or in part, if possible, by the patient or his or her estate. Conditions of life being subject to change as they are, it is hardly reasonable to say that because one is admitted to such institution as an indigent patient and later becomes one of substance by inheritance or otherwise he or she or the estate, as in this instance, should not be required to compensate the State for the costs of his or her care and treatment. The maintenance and care of one mentally ill is not an unconditional charity but rather based upon the expectation of future reimbursement if the circumstances should thereafter permit.

Prior to the passage of Act 836 of the 1952 Acts, the control of the Hospital was vested in the Board of Regents. Section 2, Article 1, of the 1952 Act, provides for the appointment of the Board of Regents to be known as the South Carolina Mental Health Commission. Section 3 of Article 1 vests this new Commission with all title to the property, real and personal,...

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14 cases
  • Gattis v. Chavez
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
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    ...must be pleaded and becomes an affirmative defense with the burden of establishing it on the defendant. South Carolina Mental Health Comm. v. May, 226 S.C. 108, 83 S.E.2d 713 (1954). It is undisputed that the applicable South Carolina statute of limitations is Section 10-143(5) which, in co......
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