South Carolina Public Service Authority v. Spearwant Liquidating Co.
Decision Date | 11 March 1941 |
Docket Number | 15229. |
Citation | 13 S.E.2d 605,196 S.C. 481 |
Parties | SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY v. SPEARWANT LIQUIDATING CO. et al. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
R M. Jefferies, of Walterboro, Ben Hill Brown, of Spartanburg and J. J. Bush, of Charleston, for appellant.
Norval N. Newell and Marion F. Winter, both of Monck's Corner and Stoney, Crosland & Pritchard, of Charleston, for respondents.
On August 1, 1939, appellant instituted proceedings to condemn a one-half interest in a tract of 829 acres of land known as Hanover plantation, the other one-half interest therein having already been acquired through direct purchase from one of the tenants in common, Mr. W. P. Montague. A board of referees was appointed for the purpose of assessing the amount of compensation to be paid for the one-half interest in the lands. From the award made by this board, which was not signed by the referee appointed by appellant, an appeal was taken to the Court of Common Pleas. Upon trial of the case de novo before Special Presiding Judge W H. Muller and a jury, a verdict was returned for respondents in the amount of $19,250. The Public Service Authority thereupon moved for a new trial, or a new trial nisi. This motion was overruled and the case now comes to the Supreme Court on appeal.
Appellant, by the first two exceptions, insists that the presiding judge committed error in refusing its motion for a new trial, or a new trial nisi, for the reason that the testimony shows that the valuation placed upon the one-half interest in the land by the jury is so excessive, exorbitant and unconscionable as to shock all ideas of right and justice; such valuation being based, not upon the true or fair market value of the land as shows by the greater weight of the testimony, but upon caprice, prejudice and personal feelings.
This court has held repeatedly that the granting of a new trial on the ground that a verdict is excessive is in the discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling thereon will not be disturbed unless it is shown that "a verdict is wholly unsupported by evidence, or is so excessive as to justify the inference that it was capricious, or influenced by passion, prejudice, or, other considerations not found in the evidence." Steele v. Railway Co. 103 S.C. 102, 87 S.E. 639, 644; Payne v. Cohen, 168 S.C. 459, 167 S.E. 665; Mishoe v. Railroad Company, 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97, and numerous other cases.
Russell Williams, Jr., who had the "farming privileges" on the lands in question, testified as follows: He also explained in detail his use of the land, and the production qualities thereof. Three other witnesses for the respondents valued the lands, respectively, at $40,000, $44,520 and $41,210. It was also testified that a state highway ran alongside the plantation for a distance of about a mile and a half. Valuations placed on the land by witnesses for appellant ranged from $12,000 to $15,785.
The presiding judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a new trial. The reasoning expressed in his order shows that he recognized and appreciated the responsibility resting upon him with reference to the setting aside, absolutely or conditionally, of the verdict. He stated that during the trial the jury paid the utmost attention, and that they considered the case long and seriously before reaching their decision. As already seen, witnesses valued the one-half interest in question at from $6,000 to $24,579.03. The jury is the tribunal to decide the weight to be given the testimony, and that body could accept or reject the valuation placed upon the land by any witness. Under the testimony, therefore, we cannot say that the amount of the verdict reached was so excessive as to warrant the conclusion that it was the result of caprice, passion, prejudice or other considerations not founded in the evidence.
Exception 3 charges the trial court with error in overruling appellant's "motion to strike the testimony of J. Russell Williams, Jr., relating to values, since it appeared for the first time on crossexamination that such values were based upon personal values and not market values," the contention being that "by such refusal the jury was allowed to take into consideration in arriving at its verdict, testimony of values of the property peculiar to the landowners as distinguished from its market value."
It is true that Mr. Williams stated that he based his valuation upon what the property was worth to him. He was not a real estate expert, but he had every reason to know the production qualities of the land and the income which he derived from its use. His testimony, therefore, was the expression of his opinion as to the market value of the property arrived at in the light of what it was worth to him were he buying it, as shown by the following question and answer: ...
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South Carolina Public Service Authority v. Spearwant Liquidating Co.
...PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY v. SPEARWANT LIQUIDATING CO. No. 15455.Supreme Court of South CarolinaOctober 13, 1942 See, also, 196 S.C. 481, 13 S.E.2d 605. M. Wilson, of Charleston, and Ben Hill Brown, of Spartanburg, for appellant. Norval N. Newell and Marion F. Winter, both of Monck's Corner,......