South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Moody
| Decision Date | 22 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 20248,20248 |
| Citation | 267 S.C. 130,226 S.E.2d 423 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Appellant, v. Mr. Richard D. MOODY et al., Respondents. |
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Atty. Gen. Richard B. Kale, Jr., Columbia, and Miley & Macauley, Walhalla, for appellant.
G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Anderson, for respondents.
This condemnation proceeding was commenced by the South Carolina State Highway Department pursuant to § 33--121 Et seq., Code of Laws of South Carolina (1962), which relate to 'Rights of Way, Lands and Condemnation.' The purpose of the proceeding is to determine the amount of just compensation to which Richard D. Moody and Gladys S. Moody (landowners) are entitled by reason of the fact that the Department has required a narrow strip of land, owned by them, for the purpose of widening highway 183, which runs in front of their residence in Oconee County.
The matter was first heard before a condemnation board. The landowners, being dissatisfied with the board's award, appealed and asked for a trial, De novo, in the court of common pleas, as is permitted by statute. The appeal was heard before the judge and a jury, which wrote a verdict in favor of the landowners in the amount of (1) $1,000 for land taken and (2) $15,400 for damages to the landowners' pond, which lies in front of the landowners' home and is immediately adjacent to and extends into the Department's right-of-way.
The Department has appealed, alleging that the jury verdict included damages for negligent conduct on the part of the independent road-construction contractor, for which the owners are not entitled to recover in a condemnation proceeding. We agree with the Department's contention that a condemnation proceeding, or an appeal therefrom, is not a proper proceeding in which to seek redress for trespass and/or damages, proximately caused by negligence of a road-construction contractor, to property, and we reverse.
The landowners' property involved in this action consists of approximately 2 1/2 acres, upon which is situated their residence, with a 1/2 acre pond located between the residence and the existing roadbed. The landowners' property fronts approximately 275 feet on the highway. At that point, the Department has owned, heretofore, a right-of-way measuring 37 1/2 feet on each side of the center of the road. The pond was mostly on the landowners' property, but extended onto the right-of-way of the Department to a depth of eight feet. In this proceeding, the Department is requiring a right-of-way of 20 additional feet for the purpose of widening the roadbed and the installation of curbs, gutters and sidewalks. At the time the case was tried, construction was still in progress, the curbs and gutters having been installed, but not finished. The amount of property being acquired is approximately .08 acre. The date of the taking was November 15, 1973. The date of the trial was September 15, 1975.
In order to widen the roadbed and install the sidewalk, it was necessary for the contractor to provide support for the addition. The contractor did this by dumping fill-in dirt alongside the old roadbed and into a portion of the pond. As a result, the pond became muddy. It is the testimony of the landowners that more than $15,000 will be required to clean out the pond and restore it to its original condition. The testimony relative to the cost of restoring the pond was objected to by the Department, which argued that evidence of damage to the pond was not admissible since the damage was not permanent and was the result of negligence by the independent contractor. The Department asserts that compensation for such is not recoverable in an eminent domain proceeding.
The basis of these condemnation proceedings is Art. I, § 13 of our Constitution, which states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The legislature, in Code § 33--121 Et seq., has set forth the procedures to be used, and the damages to be considered by a condemnation board and a jury when there is an appeal. Sections 33--135, --136 read as follows:
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Hawkins v. City of Greenville
...is the moving party, whereas, in inverse condemnation, the property owner is the moving party." South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Moody, 267 S.C. 130, 136, 226 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1976) (quoting 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 829 (1996)). The action is not based on tort, but on the consti......
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CITY OF NORTH MYRTLE v. Lewis-Davis
...to amend. On March 4, 2002, Appellant again moved to dismiss the counterclaim for trespass based on South Carolina State Highway Department v. Moody, 267 S.C. 130, 226 S.E.2d 423 (1976). Moody holds, "a condemnation proceeding, or an appeal therefrom, is not a proper proceeding in which to ......
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Cobb v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp.
...the sovereign has damaged his property to the extent of an actual taking entitling him to compensation. South Carolina State Hwy. Dep't v. Moody, 267 S.C. 130, 226 S.E.2d 423 (1976). These actions are treated alike under the takings clause of our State Constitution.3 E.g., Spradley v. South......
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Georgetown Cnty. v. Davis & Floyd, Inc.
...of the Act. Hawkins v. City of Greenville , 358 S.C. 280, 290, 594 S.E.2d 557, 562 (Ct. App. 2004) ; S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Moody , 267 S.C. 130, 136, 226 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1976). Therefore, the Act does not affect our conclusion that the term private property as used in the Takings Cla......