South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Westboro Weaving Co.

• Decision Date: 22 July 1964
• Docket Number: No. 18243,18243
• Citation: 137 S.E.2d 776,244 S.C. 516
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Respondent, v. WESTBORO WEAVING COMPANY, Appellant.

Page 776

137 S.E.2d 776

244 S.C. 516

SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Respondent, v. WESTBORO WEAVING COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 18243.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 22, 1964.

Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, for appellant.

E. P. Riley, Greenville, Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., Grady L. Patterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbia, for respondent.

TAYLOR, Chief Justice.

This proceeding was instituted by the South Carolina Highway Department to condemn for highway purposes certain property belonging to the Appellant, Westboro Weaving Company. Appellant being dissatisfied with the Condemnation Board award appealed to the Court of Common Pleas for Greenville County. The parties stipulate that the actual value of the land taken was $1,176.00. Testimony regarding damages to the remainder, resulting from the taking, was stricken on the grounds it was too remote and speculative, and a verdict was directed for Appellant in the amount of $1,176.00.

Appellant is a textile plant located in the City of Greenville and maintains a dyehouse and bleachery in connection with its operations. The land taken by the Highway Department was acquired in 1939 as a proposed site for pretreating its waste products should such become necessary. The evidence shows that the waste resulting from the operation of Appellant's dyehouse and bleachery is discharged without pretreatment into the public sewers operated by the Greater Greenville Sewer District. The regulations of the District, since approximately November, 1933, have required pretreatment of waste from textile plants before being discharged into the District's sewers, if in the opinion of the District, such is necessary for the safe, economical and efficient operation of the sewerage system. Approximately 10 years prior to trial, some communication was had between Appellant and the District relative to pretreating its waste but such has never been required and no negotiations thereabout have been had within the past 10 years.

The land taken by the Highway Department lies below the level of that whereon the plant is located, and waste therefrom could flow naturally without the necessity of pumping in the event a treatment plant was constructed thereon. Other land available to the Mill for pretreating operations lies at an elevation above that occupied by the Mill, which would necessitate the pumping of such waste should pretreatment of this waste be required.

Expert testimony was offered to show that the availability of such a site is one of the factors which would be taken into consideration by a prospective buyer, and that the absence or lack of such a site would have an adverse effect on the market value of its remaining property by $15,000.00. The proffered testimony was stricken by the lower Court on the ground that it was too remote and speculative.

Appellant owned this site for a period in excess of 20 years prior to institution of the condemnation proceeding and had never constructed such a plant and has no plans at the present or the immediate future of doing so.

Section 33-135, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, provides: 'In assessing compensation and damages for rights of way, only the actual value of the land to be taken therefor and any special damages resulting therefrom shall be considered,' and Section 33-136 requires that '* * * benefits to be derived by reason of the proposed road construction * * * shall be taken into consideration in determining the amount of compensation, if any, to be awarded to such person and due allowance made therefor.' The above Code Sections prescribed the yardstick for determining just compensation. Johnson v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 236 S.C. 424, 114 S.E.2d 591.

'* * * In estimating the value of property condemned, all of the uses to which it may be applied, or for which it is adapted, which affect its value in the market, are to be considered, and not merely the condition it is in at the time and the use to which it was then applied by the owner. * * *' City of Orangeburg v. Buford, et al., 227 S.C. 280, 87 S.E.2d 822.

The parties agreed to the actual value of the land taken; therefore, the only remaining issue to be determined in the lower Court was whether any special damages resulted to the remainder of the land by reason of such taking.

In South Carolina State Highway Department v. Bolt, et al., 242 S.C. 411, 131 S.E.2d 264, this Court said:

'In addition to the actual value of the land taken, where a portion of a tract of land is taken for such public use, the landowner is entitled to compensation for any special damages resulting to the remainder thereof. The special damages referred to in the above statutes relate to injury or damage to the remainder of the property from which a portion is taken. They would include any damage or any decrease in actual value of the remainder of the landowner's property which are the direct and proximate consequence of the acquisition of the right of way. In other words, as a general rule, special damages include all injuries or damages which cause a diminution in the value of the remaining property. As stated in 18 Am.Jur. 905, Section 265:

"When part of a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain, the owner is not restricted to compensation for the land actually taken; he is also entitled to recover for the damage to his remaining land. In other words, he is entitled to full compensation for the taking of his land and all its consequences; and the right to recover for the damage to his remaining land is not based upon the theory that damage to such land constitutes a taking of it, nor is there any requirement that the damage be special and peculiar, or such as would be actionable at common law; it is enough that it is a consequence of the taking. The entire parcel is considered as a whole, and the inquiry is, how much has the particular public improvement decreased the fair market value of the property, taking into consideration the use for which the land was taken and all the reasonably probable effects of its devotion to that use.'

'Therefore, where a portion of a tract of land is taken, the damages recoverable in an eminent domain proceeding brought under the foregoing statutes are limited to the value of the land actually acquired for the right of way and any injury...