South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Kaiser, 19100
| Citation | 254 S.C. 600,176 S.E.2d 532 |
| Decision Date | 03 September 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 19100,19100 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | SOUTH CAROLINA STATE PORTS AUTHORITY, Respondent, v. Ursula S. KAISER, and also all other persons unknown claiming any right,title, estate, interest in or lien upon the Real Estate described in thePetition herein, of whom Ursula S. Kaiser, is, Appellant. |
Pritchard, Myers, Morrison & Bloom, Charleston, for appellant.
Grimball & Cabaniss, Charleston, for respondent.
This is a condemnation case in which the respondent, South Carolina State Ports Authority, seeks to acquire a small lot of land in the City of Charleston, the property of appellant, Ursula S. Kaiser. For simplicity, we shall refer to the condemnor as the Authority, and the condemnee as Mrs. Kaiser. Action was instituted under the authority of Sec. 54--15 of the 1962 Code of Laws pursuant to the procedure provided for in the 'Public Works Eminent Domain Law', Secs. 25--1, et seq. of the Code. The Authority sought immediate possession and vesting of title by complying with Code Secs. 25--108 and 25--109. Mrs. Kaiser in her return asserted that there was no necessity or need for taking her property and that hence, the Authority had no right to condemn, and she prayed for a jury trial as to just compensation, if the court determined that the condemnor had the right to condemn. She raised no question as to the right of the Authority to take title to and possession of the subject property prior to judgment.
The matter, pursuant to Code Sec. 25--111, then came on for hearing before the Resident Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit for the purposes, inter alia, of (a) determining the validity of the proceeding, and (b) designating the procedure to determine the amount of compensation to be paid and to whom paid, whether by reference to a special master or by trial before a jury.
At the hearing, Mrs. Kaiser, through her counsel, requested that 'live testimony' of the witnesses be taken. The judge refused this request and heard the case on affidavits submitted by the respective parties, and no transcript was made of the hearing. Mrs. Kaiser at the hearing withdrew her request for a jury trial on the matter of compensation and expressly requested that such issue be referred to a special master. The Authority then took the position that it wished a jury trial. After the hearing, the court entered its order holding, inter alia, that the proceedings were valid and that the amount of compensation should be determined by trial before a jury.
The factual situation is substantially as follows. The Authority is the owner of an office building located at and known as No. 1 Vendue Range in the City of Charleston, near the Cooper River waterfront. The property sought to be condemned is a lot at the southeast corner of Vendue Range and Prioleau Street, measuring twenty feet, more or less, on Vendue Range, and sixty-one feet three inches more or less, on Prioleau Street. Such property is immediately to the west of the Authority's property at No. 1 Vendue Range. On Mrs. Kaiser's property there stood a building which, as early as 1960, was in a bad state of repair. The westernmost portion of the Authority's building and the easternmost portion of Mrs. Kaisser's building were connected. According to the Chief Engineer of the Authority, the easterly wall of the Kaiser property served three functions for the No. 1 Vendue Range building: (1) It tied and joined the north and south walls, giving them support and stability as well as support and stability to the roof; (2) it protected the inside of No. 1 Vendue Range from the elements, and (3) provided vertical support for the second floor beams.
The record reflects that as early as 1960 Mrs. Kaiser wished to demolish her building and there is evidence to the effect that she was requested or ordered to do so by the City of Charleston. A controversy developed between her and the Authority as to what arrangement would be made to protect and support the Authority's building if Mrs. Kaiser's building were demolished. Mrs. Kaiser commenced an action against the Authority in which she asserted that the Authority had no rights in the easterly wall of her building and prayed that the court direct the Authority to disconnect and remove its building from the easterly wall of her building. The Authority entered a general denial and asserted that the wall in question was a party wall. Such action is still pending and the status of the wall yet undetermined.
In October 1968, Mrs. Kaiser's husband, who is handling the property for her, announced their intention of demolishing the building on the property, notwithstanding any rights the Authority had or the effect that such demolition would have upon its property. The Authority offered to purchase the Kaiser property, but Mrs. Kaiser refused to even discuss such. In January 1969, she commenced demolition of her building, including the eastern wall, and this proceeding in condemnation followed. Since the Authority took possession in this proceeding, the eastern wall has been rebuilt and shored with wooden beams, the bases of which rest on the Kaiser lot. The northern wall of the Kaiser building has been reinforced and left standing to give support to the eastern wall. Photographs showing the use being made of the Kaiser property by the Authority were offered as exhibits.
At the commencement of this proceeding the Authority's office building was under lease to the United States (Army Engineers), but the Authority, under the terms of the lease, was bound to replace or repair the western or common wall should such be removed or damaged as a result of the demolition of the Kaiser building. Evidence on behalf of the Authority was to the effect that it had under consideration plans to build its main office building on or in the general vicinity of the Kaiser...
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South Carolina Nat. Bank v. Central Carolina Livestock Market, Inc.
...85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). Due process does not mandate any particular form of procedure. South Carolina Ports Authority v. Kaiser, 254 S.C. 600, 176 S.E.2d 532 (1970). Instead, due process is a flexible concept, and the requirements of due process in a particular case are d......
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Brown v. Aiken County
...of an additional facility to serve contemplated future industrial development in the area. As observed in South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Kaiser, 254 S.C. 600, 176 S.E.2d 532, "the mere fact that plans for contemplated future uses of the property were not yet firm or definite would ......
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South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Holston Land Co., Inc.
...Harbor] for the handling of water-borne commerce..." S.C.Code Ann. § 54-3-130(1) (1976). Previously, in S.C. State Ports Authority v. Kaiser, 176 S.E.2d 532, 254 S.C. 600 (1970), this Court construed § 54-3-150, then § 54-15 of the 1962 Code, to authorize the Ports Authority to condemn a bu......