South Carolina Steam-Boat Co. v. South Carolina Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 06 April 1889 |
| Citation | 9 S.E. 650,30 S.C. 539 |
| Parties | SOUTH CAROLINA STEAM-BOAT CO. v. SOUTH CAROLINA RY. CO. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Richland county; J. H HUDSON, Judge.
Action by the South Carolina Steam-Boat Company against the South Carolina Railway Company. Complaint dismissed, and plaintiff appeals.
Smythe & Lee, for appellant.
Brawley & Bamwell and John C. Haskell, for respondent.
This was an action to recover damages for the obstruction of a navigable stream, and, as the only question raised by the appeal is whether sufficient facts are stated in the complaint to constitute a cause of action, it will be necessary to make a condensed statement of the allegations found in the complaint. After stating the corporate character of both plaintiffs and defendants, the allegations are that the plaintiffs are engaged in the transportation of passengers and freight on the rivers and waters of this state by means of steam-boats, of which they own a large number that the Congaree river is a navigable stream, and is now and has been for some time past, actually navigated by steam-boats from a point near the city of Columbia to its junction with the Santee river; that the defendants are engaged in running a railroad, and in the prosecution of that enterprise have erected a bridge across the Congaree river whereby the navigation of that stream is obstructed; that by reason of such obstruction the plaintiffs have been and are deprived of the free navigation of said stream; that upon demand the defendants have refused to remove said obstruction, or to so alter and arrange the bridge constituting such obstruction as to permit the free and unobstructed navigation of said stream; and in the eighth paragraph of the complaint the allegations are as follows: "That by reason of said wrongful and unlawful obstruction the plaintiffs have been prevented from freely navigating the said stream in the usual and ordinary course of their business; have been unable freely to transport freight and passengers on and along the same, as was their right; have been compelled to remove a portion of the upper works of one of their boats in order for it to pass under the said bridge, and then rebuild on the other side; have been forced to keep and maintain one of such boats permanently above the said bridge, and have sustained loss and other great injury in their business, to their damage ten thousand dollars." The circuit judge held that the facts stated in the complaint were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and upon that ground rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.
From this judgment the plaintiffs appeal upon the several grounds set out in the record, which need not be repeated here, for as we shall see, there is really but a single question raised by the appeal. There can be no doubt that the Congaree, being a navigable river, is a public highway, the obstruction of which constitutes a public nuisance, the remedy for which is by indictment, and that remedy, it seems, has already been applied in the case of this obstruction. State v. Railway Co., 28 S.C. 23, 4 S.E. Rep. 796. It is, however, true that an individual who has sustained any particular, special injury over and above that sustained by the public generally, as the direct result of such obstruction, may also sustain a civil action to recover damages for such injury. In this respect the plaintiffs, though a chartered corporation, stand upon precisely the same footing as any private individual. Their rights are no greater and no less than those of an individual, and are to be tested by the same principles. While it seems to be very generally, if not universally, conceded that in order to sustain such an action as this the plaintiff must allege and prove some special, particular, or peculiar injury beyond that sustained by the public generally, yet it is not to be denied that there is a considerable conflict in the authorities elsewhere as to what will constitute such special, particular, or peculiar injury. Without going here into any detailed examination of the cases in England and other states, many of which we have examined, it seems to us that the true rule to be deduced from them is that the injury must be particular,--as several of the cases express it, "special or peculiar," --must result directly from the obstruction, and not as a secondary consequence thereof, and must differ in kind, and not merely in degree or extent, from that which the general public sustains. This rule is fully supported by what few authorities we have in this state upon the subject. The case of Carey v. Brooks, 1 Hill, (S. C.) 365, upon which the circuit judge rested his conclusion, seems to be the leading case in this state. There, as...
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