South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters
| Decision Date | 03 December 1958 |
| Citation | 107 So.2d 30 |
| Parties | SOUTH DADE FARMS, Inc., a Florida Corporation; and The Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, a Connecticut Corporation, Appellants, v. Frederick C. PETERS and Berenice T. Peters, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Caldwell, Parker & Foster, Tallahassee, and Ward & Ward, Miami, for appellants.
C. A. Hiaasen and McCune, Hiaasen, Kelley & Crum, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.
By interlocutory appeal the appellants, who were defendants below, seek reversal of an 'Order to Show Cause' issued by the Chancellor in a post-decretal proceeding. This is the fouth aspect of the instant matter which has been before this court. South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, Fla.1953, 69 So.2d 890; South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, Fla.1956, 88 So.2d 891; Alger v. Peters, Fla.1956, 88 So.2d 903.
Following our mandate in South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, Fla.1956, 88 So.2d 891, the appellees, who were plaintiffs in the lower court, filed a petition for the enforcement of the final decree of that court entered on June 5, 1953. This was the decree originally considered by this court in South Dade Farms v. Peters, Fla.s953 69 So.2d 890. By this petition the appellees set forth numerous factual allegations which in their view justify postdecretal relief, grounded on the original final decree of June 5, 1953. Pursuant to the prayer of the petition the trial judge on August 27, 1957 issued an 'Order to Show Cause' directing the appellants to file their sworn responsive pleadings showing cause why the relief sought in the petition of the appellees should not be awarded.
The appellants were allowed thirty days within which to file such responsive pleadings. Appellants immediately filed a notice of interlocutory appeal directed to the Order to Show Cause. They filed no response to the petition and in no way assaulted the petition. Reversal of the Order to Show Cause is sought by this interlocutory appeal.
It is the contention of the appellants here that the Chancellor had no authority to issue the Order to Show Cause.
The appellees take the position that the Order to Show Cause is nothing more than a form of process issued by the Chancellor to initiate the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to their petition for enforcement of the final decree.
Although the Order to Show Cause was entered after July 1, 1957, we have taken jurisdiction pursuant to the rule announced in Armenian Hotel Owners, Inc. v. Kulhanjian, Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 896. We do this with justification for the reason that implicit in any order which the Chancellor might enter is the proposition that he will necessarily be compelled to consider and apply the mandates of this court filed pursuant to the decisions of this court disposing of the prior appeals in this particular case. In view of the inherent authority of the court to see to it that its own mandates are properly complied with we have consistently taken jurisdiction of matters of this nature even though in particular cases the order of the trial court under assault would not otherwise fall within the constitutional jurisdiction of this court.
The original complaint which instituted the proceeding culminating in the final decree of June 5, 1953 was a complaint for specific performance as well as declaratory relief. The final decree contained provisions directing specific performance of a certain lease and likewise construed the lease in accord with the prayer for declaratory relief.
The post-decretal petition of the appellees in the instant matter seeks various types of relief supplemental to the final decree. The Order to Show Cause which is now under assault was nothing more than the initial process issued by the Chancellor to bring the appellants before him and to accord to them the opportunity to respond to the petition or otherwise assault it.
We here interpolate the view that pursuant to this Order to Show Cause the appellants shall have the privilege of assaulting the sufficiency of the petition as a matter of law as well as the privilege of answering the same on the facts if they are so advised.
It is well established that this court will not...
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Rice v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
...trial courts in the unitary judicial system. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 58 Fla. 268, 50 So. 985 (1909); South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, 107 So.2d 30 (Fla.1958); Paul v. Kanter, 155 So.2d 402 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). That practice need not deter us from considering freshly raised que......
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Smith v. Brantley
...Century Village, Inc. v. Wellington, E, F, K, L, H, J, M, & G, Condominium Association, 361 So.2d 128 (Fla.1978); South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, 107 So.2d 30 (Fla.1958). II To understand the matters that are properly before us, we must set out the following undisputed Samuel Smith became......
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Century Village, Inc. v. Wellington, E, F, K, L, H, J, M, and G, Condominium Ass'n
...on due process grounds. We need not reach this issue, however, since it was raised for the first time on appeal. South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, 107 So.2d 30 (Fla.1958). I Section 711.63(4), Florida Statutes (1975) provides a procedure whereby a condominium unit owner bringing or defendin......
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Posner v. Posner
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