South Euclid Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 80 v. D'Amico

• Decision Date: 25 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-864,86-864
• Citation: 505 N.E.2d 268,29 Ohio St.3d 50,29 OBR 398
• Parties: , 29 O.B.R. 398 SOUTH EUCLID FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE 80, et al., Appellants, v. D'AMICO, Mayor, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 50

29 Ohio St.3d 50

505 N.E.2d 268, 29 O.B.R. 398

SOUTH EUCLID FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE 80, et al., Appellants, v. D'AMICO, Mayor, et al., Appellees.

No. 86-864.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

March 25, 1987.

Syllabus by the Court

In a declaratory judgment action contesting the constitutionality of an ordinance, an entry granting judgment to plaintiffs without expressly directing the defendants to do, or refrain from doing, a particular thing or things, cannot be the basis of finding the defendants in contempt upon the enactment of subsequent legislation, allegedly containing the same or similar infirmities.

Since 1973, the city of South Euclid, Ohio has passed several ordinances for the purpose of regulating the sick-leave benefits of the police and fire fighters employed by the municipality. Also since 1973, the instant appellants, the South Euclid Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 80, and the South Euclid Fire Fighters Association, Local 1065, have on several occasions judicially attacked these attempts by the city to limit their sick-leave benefits.

In 1981, the city passed Ordinance No. 49-80. Appellants' declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of that ordinance resulted in a judgment in favor of the appellees, the city of South Euclid and its mayor (hereinafter collectively termed "the city"). On appeal, the court of appeals on November 7, 1983 reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that Ordinance No. 49-80 was unconstitutional ¹ because the city could not abridge rights granted to the appellants by R.C. 124.38. ² The court of appeals remanded the cause to the trial court and directed it to enter final judgment in favor of appellants. ³ South Euclid Fraternal Order of Police v. D'Amico (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 46, 13 OBR 49, 468 N.E.2d 735. The trial court entered judgment accordingly on May 4, 1984.

On December 26, 1984, the city passed Ordinance No. 29-84, again for the purpose of regulating the sick-leave benefits. The instant cause began with a motion filed by appellants in February 1985 wherein they requested that the trial court hold the city in contempt, arguing that the enactment of Ordinance No. 29-84 was in contravention of the previous entry of the trial court of May 4, 1984. On May 20, 1985, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the city had committed no act in violation of previous court orders. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, concluding that neither its order of November 7, 1983 nor the trial court's order of May 4, 1984 did anything other than to declare Ordinance No. 49-80 invalid, and thus there was no order that the city could have violated. ⁴

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. & Associates Co., L.P.A., Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. and William F. Schmitz, Cleveland, for appellants.

Victor E. DeMarco and Robert P. DeMarco, Cleveland, for appellees.

HILDEBRANDT, Justice.

The issue before this court is whether there was a court order in existence on December 26, 1984 that could form a basis for holding the city in contempt when it enacted Ordinance No. 29-84 on that date. We conclude that there was no such order and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

To begin our analysis, we observe that appellants' challenge to Ordinance No. 49-80 was in the form of a declaratory judgment action. Appellants were seeking a declaration from the trial court concerning their rights under that ordinance, as permitted by R.C. 2721.03. ⁵ While the trial court found for the city, the court of appeals declared the ordinance unconstitutional and directed the trial court to enter judgment for appellants. We agree with the court below that there is no order of record that affirmatively directs the city to act or to refrain from taking any action concerning sick-leave benefit ordinances.

R.C. 2705.02 reads in pertinent part:

"A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for a contempt:

"(A) Disobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ, process, order, rule, judgment, or command of a court or an officer[.]"

In Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 55, 56 O.O.2d 31, 271 N.E.2d 815, this court held in the first paragraph of the syllabus:

"Contempt of court is defined as disobedience of an order of a court. It is conduct which brings the administration of justice into disrespect, or which tends to embarrass, impede or obstruct a court in the performance of its functions."

In the instant case, there was no court order of record affirmatively directing how the city was to proceed in regard to ordinances regulating the appellants' sick-leave benefits. Therefore, we hold that in a declaratory judgment action contesting the constitutionality of an ordinance, an entry granting judgment to plaintiffs without expressly directing the defendants to do, or refrain from doing, a particular thing or things, cannot be the basis of finding the defendants in contempt upon the enactment of subsequent legislation,...