South Florida Hospital Corp. v. McCrea

• Decision Date: 17 February 1960
• Citation: 118 So.2d 25
• Parties: SOUTH FLORIDA HOSPITAL CORPORATION, a Florida non-profit corporation, d/b/a Hialeah Hospital, Petitioner. v. Naomi McCREA and Emory McCrea, her husband, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 25

118 So.2d 25

SOUTH FLORIDA HOSPITAL CORPORATION, a Florida non-profit corporation, d/b/a Hialeah Hospital, Petitioner. v. Naomi McCREA and Emory McCrea, her husband, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 17, 1960.

Rehearing Denied March 8, 1960.

Blackwell, Walker & Gray and Samuel J. Powers, Jr., Miami, for petitioner.

Sams, Anderson, Eaton & Alper and Phillip Goldman, Miami, for respondents.

WILLIS, BEN C., Circuit Judge.

This case is fefore us on a petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, 112 So.2d 393, on the ground that there is a direct conflict in that decision with decisions of this Court and of the Second District Court of Appeal on the same point of law. A prima facie showing was made as to such conflict and the writ was issued. ¹

The petitioner was defendant in the trial court ² in a suit brought by respondents husband and wife, as plaintiffs, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained by the wife, alleged to have been the result of negligence attributable to petitioner. The respondent wife was a surgical patient in petitioner's hospital and while in the recovery room, following an abdominal operation, she sustained fractures to the upper bone of both arms. The respondents contended that the fractures were caused when the patient was negligently permitted to fall from the recovery table while she was still under anesthesia and while she was exclusively under the custody and control of the agents and employees of the petitioner. The petitioner contended that such fractures were probably self-inflicted by involuntary convulsions of the patient, and that in any event there was no negligence for which the petitioner is answerable.

The trial court submitted the case to the jury, after giving an instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The plaintiffs recovered verdicts and final judgments on such verdicts were entered. The defendant in the trial court (petitioner here) appealed to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, which affirmed the trial court with opinion (112 So.2d 393).

The pertinent part of the opinion rendered by the District Court of Appeal is as follows:

'The defendant contends that the lower court erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because the plaintiffs introduced evidence of specific negligence on the part of the defendant. West Coast Hospital Ass'n v. Webb, Fla., 52 So.2d 803; Roth v. Dade County, Fla., 71 So.2d 169. That this jurisdiction has not aligned itself with those jurisdictions so holding (33 A.L.R.2d 800) is evident from the decision in McKinney Supply Company v. Orovitz, Fla., 96 So.2d 209; 33 A.L.R.2d 795.

'Defendant's second point has been carefully examined and found to be without merit.'

The petitioner contends that this decision is in direct conflict with two decisions of this Court ³ and one of the Second District Court of Appeal. ⁴

In this case, we must address our attention to the point or points of law pronounced by the District Court to ascertain if there is a conflict on the same point or points in pronouncements set forth in the cited cases and that such conflict requires resolving in order to achieve 'standardization of [the] decisions on the same point of law' ⁵. It was also said in the Lake case, ⁵ and such is equally applicable here, as follows:

'at this late date in the progress of the litigation the standardization of decisions on the same point of law will have become primary, the effect upon the immediate litigants consequential'.

Though it may be conceivable that a point of law may be pronounced by an appellate court in other ways, the usual and most common means is by the opinion of the court (or of a controlling majority of the court) which is published when the judgment and decision is rendered. It is in the opinions that legal principles are defined, discussed and pronounced. From them the 'case law' is derived and it is there that points of law are given expression which are regarded and relied upon as controlling precedents.

It is not amiss to again point out that the scope of review by the Supreme Court of a decision of a Court of Appeal is extremely limited when the ground of asserting jurisdiction is an alleged conflict of such decision with the decision of another appellate court on the same point of law. ⁶ For this court to interfere with the judgment of a district court of appeal, on the ground mentioned, it must appear that the court of appeal has, in the decision challenged, made a pronouncement of a point of law which the bench and bar and future litigants may fairly regard as an authoritative precedent but which is in direct conflict with the pronouncement on the same point of law in a decision or decisions of the Supreme Court or another District Court of Appeal. Constitution, Article V, Section 4(2), F.S.A.

We must, therefore, examine the point or points of law pronounced in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal in this case and compare it with the pronouncements of this court and of the Second District Court of Appeal to determine if there is a conflict to be resolved.

At the risk of being tedious, we will again reiterate that unless we find a conflict in decisions of other appellate courts ⁷ of this state on the point or points of law pronounced in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal in this case, we have no power or jurisdiction in any manner to disturb the judgment of the lower court. Courts of Appeal are and were meant to be courts of final appellate jurisdiction in the vast majority of cases, and in cases such as the one at bar it is only to harmonize and standardize decisions that this court may presume to interfere. As said by Mr. Justice Thomas in Lake v. Lake, supra:

'Sustaining the dignity of the decisions of the district courts of appeal must depend largely on the determination of the Supreme Court not to venture beyond the limitations of its own powers by arrogating to itself the right to delve into a decision of a district court of appeal primarily to decide whether or not the Supreme Court agrees with the district court of appeal about the disposition of a given case'.

We therefore initially refrain from scrutinizing the action of the trial court or of the Court of Appeal as to the effect on the parties to the cause. If what was decided finds no contradiction in what this court or another District Court has said in their official pronouncements on the same point or points of law, then our authorized examination is complete and the writ of certiorari will be discharged. If there is contradiction we will undertake to resolve the conflict.

The real (and only) point of law set forth in the first paragraph of the portion of the opinion quoted above is as follows:

A plaintiff is not precluded from resorting to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur merely because he introduces evidence of specific negligence attributable to the defendant.

This expression of the stated point or principle of law necessarily is based upon an assumption that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would unquestionably apply if the plaintiff had not offered or introduced evidence of specific acts or omissions in an effort to prove the issue of actionable negligence of the defendant. Therefore, we do not examine or question whether or not the doctrine would have been properly applicable in the absence of evidence of specific negligence. The narrow scope of the initial phase of our review does not permit such an inquity. We must assume that it would have been properly applicable.

The opinion of the Court of Appeal cites two different page references to 33 A.L.R.2d and an examination of these citations clearly reveals the true holding of the court. ⁸

Referring to 33 A.L.R.2d, it is found that there is an extensive annotation, commencing on page 791, on the subject 'Evidence of Specific Negligence as Affecting Reliance on Res Ipsa Loquitur'. On page 795 is the subtitle of 'Effect of Specific Evidence Not Clearly Establishing Precise Cause of Injury'. A general principle is there stated that:

'* * * most of the courts which have considered the question have recognized that where the circumstances of the occurrence and the pleadings of the parties would otherwise present a proper situation for the application of the doctrine, the plaintiff does not lose its benefits by introducing some evidence of specific negligence which does not establish clearly and definitely the cause of the injury, or, as it is sometimes more concisely phrased, that the plaintiff's unsuccessful attempt to prove specific negligence will not deprive him of the inferences or presumptions otherwise available under res ipsa loquitur'.

This is followed by two full pages of case citations from federal courts and courts of twenty states. This appears to be the decided weight of authority.

On page 800 is the subtitle 'Cases Indicating That Any Evidence of Specific Negligence Excludes Res Ipsa'. The general statement is made:

'While it is doubtful if they represent the considered rule in any jurisdiction, a number of decisions contain language indicating that the plaintiff's introduction of any evidence of specific negligence on the defendant's part will preclude his reliance on res ipsa.

'So, in several cases it has been said that the plaintiff cannot have the benefits of the doctrine where he has given evidence 'tending' to show specific negligence'.

This is followed by citation of an Illinois case, and several cases from Missouri and New York. ⁹ It is also stated:

'In other decisions the courts have used language indicating that the doctrine was inapplicable where there was 'direct evidence' or 'direct testimony' as to the specific negligence causing the injury'.

This is followed by digests of a number of cases which have held in accordance with that stated principle. Though all of these cases do not specifically so state, (two of them...