South Florida R. Co. v. Rhoads

• Decision Date: 18 January 1889
• Citation: 5 So. 633,25 Fla. 40
• Parties: SOUTH FLA. R. CO. v. RHOADS.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

5 So. 633

25 Fla. 40

SOUTH FLA. R. CO. v. RHOADS.

Florida Supreme Court

January 18, 1889

Appeal from circuit court, Orange county; ELEAZER K. FOSTER, Judge.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

In an action brought by a passenger against a railroad company to recover damages from the company for wrongfully expelling him from the defendant's train, it is not necessary for the declaration to allege that the passenger, at the time of his expulsion, was complying with all the reasonable rules of the company, nor to allege that the passenger was not about to violate any such reasonable rule at the time of his expulsion.

The question as to whether a contract or agreement entered into between the railroad company and a line of steamers plying between Jacksonville and Sanford was entered into in good faith, and was legal and binding, or that such contract constituted an oppressive monopoly, and hence was not legal and binding, is a mixed question of law and fact, and it was properly left to the jury to be passed upon by them.

The reasonableness of a rule prescribed by a railroad company for the government of its business is purely a question of law to be decided by the court, and not a question of fact to be passed upon by juries.

A rule adopted by a railroad company, which inhibited passengers on their trains from wearing the uniform cap of a line of steamers running in opposition to a line of steamers running in connection with the company, was not reasonable, and hence not binding on the public.

The statute (section 41, c. 1987, Laws Fla.) prohibits the expulsion of a passenger by a railroad company for non-payment of fare at any point other than a usual stopping place, or near some dwelling house. When, however, a passenger wantonly violates any other reasonable rule of a railroad company, the obligation to transport him ceases, and the company may expel him from the train at any convenient and safe point that may be selected by the officer in charge no more force being used than may be necessary for such purpose. This is a common-law right, and has not been restricted by statute as in cases of non-payment of fare.

The court charges upon the law of the case, and it is the duty of the jury in their verdict to conform thereto, but if they fail to do so it is the duty of the court to set aside the verdict.

COUNSEL S. M. Sparkman and S. T. Kingsberry, for appellant.

Geo. U Walker, for appellee.

OPINION

MITCHELL J.

This is cause was tried at the fall term, circuit court, 1885. The jury awarded the plaintiff $5,000 damages. Motion for new trial made and overruled, and the case is before this court upon appeal from the order of the circuit court overruling said motion.

The first error assigned is that the court erred in overruling the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration. The declaration alleges that on the 25th day of April, 1885, the plaintiff was received by the defendant to be carried as a passenger on its cars from Sanford to Orlando, Orange county, Fla.; that the defendant did not and would not carry the plaintiff as such passenger as aforesaid but, on the contrary, without reasonable and lawful excuse therefor, then and there, by its agent and servant, the conductor, and the train hands of its said train, by force and arms ejected plaintiff therefrom, and left him, and proceeded on its said journey; wherefore the plaintiff was injured in his person and feelings, and was compelled to travel afoot about four miles back to said Sanford, was prevented from accomplishing his purpose to go to Orlando, and was otherwise greatly damaged. Plaintiff claimed $20,000 damages. Second count: Plaintiff claimed from the defendant the further sum of $20,000 for damages for that whereas, heretofore, to-wit, the 25th of April, 1885, the plaintiff was a passenger on the railway passenger car of the defendant, and was with force and arms, without just, reasonable, or lawful excuse therefor, ejected from the said car, and forcibly prevented from returning to the same.

The declaration was demurred to, (1) that it is bad in substance, in that it does not allege that the plaintiff, at the time it is therein alleged he was put off the defendant's cars, was complying with all the reasonable rules of said defendant; (2) that said declaration does not allege that plaintiff was not violating, or about to violate, any reasonable rule of said railroad company; (3) that plaintiff does not allege in his said declaration that the defendant has or usually keeps an office for the transaction of its customary business in the county of Orange.

There was no error in overruling the demurrer to plaintiff's declaration. Gould, Pl. p. 164, § 17; 1 Chit. Pl. 390.

The circuit judge gave the jury a number of charges, or paragraphs of one charge, all of which except the last were excepted to by defendant. Inter alia, the judge charged the jury that 'railroad companies, as carriers of persons, are not bound to receive for carriage or to carry persons whose purpose while traveling on the cars is to interfere with or injure the legitimate business and lawful profits of the company, nor persons who are of known and violently bad character, or persons offensively gross and immoral in their conduct, habits, and behavior, or so intoxicated as to be offensive, nor such as will not conform with the reasonable rules and regulations of the company in respect to the carriage of passengers, they being informed thereof, or otherwise having knowledge of the same, nor such as refuse to pay their fare, or to procure tickets before entering the train. Such objectionable persons, for the objections aforesaid, may not only be refused admission into the cars of the company if their objectionable conduct, purpose, character, or intention be known previous to such admission, but, having been received thereon, may be expelled therefrom on rendering themselves obnoxious to any of such objections; the officer in charge using no more force or offensiveness than becomes necessary to effect such expulsion. * * * A railroad corporation has the right to enter into an agreement with other lines of travel for the purpose of enhancing its own business, and for the benefit of the public, but it has not the right to enter into such agreement when it is for the purpose of an oppressive monopoly, or to the injury of the public. In furtherance of such agreements, they have the right to make all reasonable rules and regulations that will enable them to carry out in good faith the agreement, and can enforce such reasonable rules and regulations to the ejection of the violator of them. These rules and regulations can be made and enforced to carry out a legal and proper agreement, but they cannot be made to enforce an agreement which is entered into for the purpose of oppressive monopoly. Should you find from the evidence that it was a bona fide agreement, and not entered into for the purpose of an oppressive monopoly, and that the rules and regulations made to enforce same are reasonable, and the plaintiff well knew such to be the rules and regulations at the time of his ejection from the train, and that he was knowingly and willfully violating the same, or that the conductor had from the facts that occurred to him at the time of the plaintiff's ejection good reason to apprehend that the plaintiff would violate one of such reasonable rules and regulations, you must find for the defendant. If, on the other hand, after viewing all the evidence, you believe that the rules and regulations were not reasonable, and that the plaintiff did not knowingly violate any reasonable rule or regulation, and that he paid his fare and went upon said train as a passenger, and properly demeaned himself and presented his ticket to the conductor, and was ejected by the conductor, and not allowed to go on the train to the destination his ticket called for, you must find for the plaintiff at such sum as you may, from the evidence, find him entitled to.'

It will be seen that the judge, in this part of his charge, left it to the jury to decide whether the rules and regulations prescribed by the railroad company were reasonable. This was error. The reasonableness of rules prescribed by railroad companies, and like corporations with like powers, is a question of law to be decided by the courts, and not a question of fact to be decided by juries. Railroad Co. v. Fleming, 18 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 347; Vedder v. Fellows, 20 N.Y. 126; Maroney v. Railroad Co., 8 Amer. Rep. 305; Yorton v. Railway Co., 41 Amer. Rep. 23, 11 N.W. 482; Railway Co. v. Nuzum, 19 Amer. Rep. 703; Pierce v. Randolph, 12 Tex. 290; 1 Ror. R. R. 226, 227; Railroad Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill. 420.

In the case of Railroad Co. v. Whittemore, supra, the supreme court of Illinois say: 'The circuit court left it to the jury to say whether the rule was reasonable. This was error. It was proper to admit testimony, as was done, but, either with or without this testimony, it was for the court to say whether the regulation was reasonable, and therefore obligatory upon the passengers. The necessity of holding this to be a question of law, and therefore within the province of the court to settle, is apparent from the consideration that it is only by so holding that fixed and permanent regulations can be established. If this question is to be left to juries one rule would be applied by them today and another to-morrow. In one trial a railway would be held liable, and in another, presenting the same question, not...