South Shore Country Club v. People

• Decision Date: 19 June 1907
• Citation: 81 N.E. 805,228 Ill. 75
• Parties: SOUTH SHORE COUNTRY CLUB v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

228 Ill. 75

81 N.E. 805

SOUTH SHORE COUNTRY CLUB

v.PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 19, 1907.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; George A. Dupuy, Judge.

Information by the people against the South Shore Country Club. From an adverse judgment, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

George P. Merrick (Mason B. Starring and Silas H. Strawn, of counsel), for appellant.

John J. Healy, State's Atty. (Howard S. Taylor and Church, McMurdy & Sherman, of counsel), for the People.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

By leave of court the state's attorney of Cook county filed in the superior court of said county an information in the name of the people against appellant, a corporation not for pecuniary profit, organized under the general incorporation laws of this state for pleasure, social recreation, and the promotion of outdoor sports, to require it to show by what warrant it sells intoxicating liquors without a license, and praying that its charter should be forfeited and it be ousted of its corporate franchise, or that such other penalty be imposed as the court might deem just. To the information appellant filed a plea showing the nature of the corporation and its objects, and the circumstances and conditions under which it keeps a stock of intoxicating liquors in its clubhouse and furnishes the same to its members. A general demurrer to the plea was sustained, and, appellant having elected to stand by the plea, the court adjudged it to be guilty as charged in the information of a misuse of its corporate powers by selling intoxicating liquors without a license, and imposed a fine of $500, together with the costs. From that judgment an appeal was taken to this court.

The facts stated in the plea, which the court adjudged insufficient as a defense to the charge of the information, are as follows: Appellant is a corporation not for pecuniary profit, and its objects, as stated in its charter, are pleasure, social recreation, and the promotion of outdoor sports. The number of resident members is limited to 2,000 and nonresident members to 250. An applicant for membership must be recommended in writing by at least two resident members, and applications are referred to and acted upon by a board of governors. The vote upon admission is by secret ballot, two negative votes excluding, and the entrance fee is $200 and annual dues $50, payable semiannually. Membership is terminated by resignation, failure to pay dues, or conduct at variance with the purpose of the corporation or the house rules. Each member is given a certificate evidencing his respective share in the club and his right to its privileges. Appellant owns a clubhouse and property in Chicago in that portion of the city which was formerly the village of Hyde Park, wherein no license can be issued to any one to keep a dramshop, and the club property represents an expenditure of $250,000. In addition to the clubhouse, appellant has tennis courts, polo fields, golf courses, stables, and other buildings, and the clubhouse is an elaborate one, including a library, reading rooms, card and billiard rooms, a dining room, restaurant, and other facilities. It maintains a riding school, with horses and equipment, and employs a riding master and teachers. It holds regular receptions, lectures, musical and literary entertainments, and the library and reading room is well stocked, and it serves lunches and dinners. The purpose of the club is the physical and mental improvement of its members, and to that end physical and athletic exercises are provided for the improvement of the bodily and mental health of the members and their families. All the members share equally in the use of the house, grounds, library, literature, and entertainments; but members are charged and pay for meals and liquors, and for the services of caddies, boatmen, and teachers, and for horses, golf supplies, and special services. There are about 50 servants, including cooks, stewards, porters, waiters, hostlers, and other help, and the membership includes many of the best known and most reputable men in the social and professional world in the city of Chicago. Appellant keeps a stock of intoxicating liquors in its clubhouse, which it furnishes only to its members and their guests accompanying them, upon a member's written order therefor. It maintains a steward's room, used exclusively by the club steward for preparing and dispensing liquors. The member ordering liquor is charged with it, and the charges are paid upon bills rendered semimonthly. The charge is no more than the amount paid by the appellant for the liquor and the service; but the charge is greater than the charge for similar supplies in places patronized by the public. The club has obtained a United States retail liquor dealer's license, but the plea avers that it was done unadvisedly and was not necessary.

The right to engage in the business of selling intoxicating liquors by retail is not now a common right, and it can be exercised only in the manner and upon the terms which the statute prescribes. People v. Cregier, 138 Ill. 401, 28 N. E. 812. The statute provides for licensing such sales, and makes a sale without a license a criminal offense. It provides that whoever, not having a license to keep a dramshop, shall sell any intoxicating liquor in any less quantity than one gallon, or in any quantity, to be drank upon the premises, shall be punished by fine or imprisonment, or both; and if appellant has been guilty of a misuse of its corporate power, by making sales of liquor to be drank upon its premises, the judgment of the superior court must be affirmed. The only question to be determined is whether the furnishing and delivery of intoxicating liquors by appellant to its own members, to be drank upon the premises, and which are paid for by the individual members to whom the same are furnished and delivered, constitute a sale. Counsel for appellant admits that the letter of the statute requires any and every one, without exception, who sells intoxicating liquors in any less quantity than one gallon, or in any quantity, to be drank upon the premises, to take out a license to do so, and he fully appreciates that the definition of a dramshop adopted by the Legislature is board enough to include any place where intoxicating liquors are retailed in less quantity than one gallon; but he says that appellant contests the right to demand a license because it refuses to have its clubhouse considered a dramshop or to be regarded as a dramshop keeper. The argument is that the court should not take the language of the statute literally, and that the general intent and spirit of the act do not require that it should be so taken. A dramshop, as defined by the statute, is a place where spirituous or vinous or malt liquors are retailed by less quantity than one gallon, and it is true that the term has in popular acceptation a more restricted meaning. It is commonly used to designate a place where intoxicating liquor is sold at a public bar frequented by the public without restriction, and, if the Legislature and failed to define what was intended by the term ‘dramshop,’ it would be reasonable to presume that it was used in the ordinary and popular sense; but, of course, the Legislature had a right to define what was meant by the term as used in the act, and the courts are bound by the definition. The argument of the appellant is the same as that of the druggist, Wright, who felt himself aggrieved that his drug store should be brought...