South v. Gojet Airlines, LLC

Decision Date30 September 2013
Docket NumberNo. 4:12-cv-00378 - JEG,4:12-cv-00378 - JEG
PartiesMARK SOUTH, Plaintiff, v. GOJET AIRLINES, LLC, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on motion by Defendant GoJet Airlines, LLC (GoJet), to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), and improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), or in the alternative, to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiff Mark South (South) resists. A hearing on this matter was held on August 13, 2013. Attorney Patrick R. Martin represented Defendant, and attorneys Michael J. Carroll and Kodi A. Brotherson represented Plaintiff. The motion is fully submitted and ready for disposition.

I. BACKGROUND

South was employed by GoJet as a pilot from January 2009 to May 14, 2010. South lived in Ankeny, Iowa, but was based out of Chicago, Illinois. South was a member of an airline union, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Airline Division, Local 619 (the Union); and his terms and conditions of employment, including leave, discipline and discharge, grievances, and arbitration, were governed by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between GoJet and its pilots.

GoJet is a commercial passenger airline that operates flights as United Express and Delta Connection and is a Delaware limited liability company, headquartered in Bridgeton, Missouri, a suburb of St. Louis. Trans States Holdings, Inc. (Trans States), is GoJet's parent company and sole member and is incorporated in Delaware and, like GoJet, has its principle place of business in Bridgeton, Missouri. GoJet maintains flight crew bases in St. Louis, Missouri; Chicago, Illinois; and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina. GoJet does not have any crew bases, offices, or property in Iowa; nor is GoJet authorized to conduct any business in Iowa.

According to South's Petition, his wife fell and injured herself on March 10, 2010. The injury required surgery, which was scheduled for May 7, 2010. On April 21, 2010, South submitted paperwork to GoJet to request leave from May 7 through May 15, 2010, to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. The completed paperwork, including the physicians findings, was submitted to GoJet on April 30, 2010. On May 4, 2010, Chief Pilot Captain Dennis Craig (Craig), South's supervisor, called South and asked him to reconsider taking FMLA leave because GoJet was short on pilots. On May 5, 2010, Craig informed South that his request for FMLA leave was denied because he did not make his request thirty days prior to taking leave and he did not earn sixty percent of his salary over the previous twelve months. Subsequently, South called in sick for the days he had previously requested FMLA leave.

On May 13, 2010, Craig directed South to report to his office in St. Louis, Missouri, for a meeting that would be held on May 14, 2010. South did not show up for the May 14 meeting. Craig thereafter terminated South's employment and sent him a termination letter to that effect. The termination was based on South's chronic absenteeism and for falsely calling in sick when his FMLA leave request was denied.

In accordance with the CBA grievance procedure, the Union filed a grievance complaint of South's termination on May 21, 2012. After failing to resolve the grievance at earlier stages, thematter proceeded to an arbitration hearing convened in St. Louis, on April 23, 2012. In an October 30, 2012, Order and Award, the arbitrator sustained the grievance in part, finding as follows:

The company has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the grievant had engaged in chronic absenteeism. The Company did not follow the terms of its General Operations Manual with respect to the imposition of progressive discipline for this offense. This should mitigate the discipline from termination.
The evidence did show that the grievant failed to follow appropriate policy in reporting off sick for his scheduled May 12, trip. This gives the appearance the grievant abused Company policy in order to circumvent the denial of FMLA leave. Therefore, the discipline should be reduced to a 60 day suspension.

Opinion and Award 2, Pl.'s Resist. - Ex. A, ECF No. 21-3. South's discipline was reduced to a 60-day suspension.

In the meantime, South filed the instant action on May 4, 2012, in the Iowa District Court for Polk County, alleging his termination was in retaliation for exercising his rights under the FMLA. GoJet was served notice on July 30, 2012, and thereafter removed the action on August 20, 2012, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. GoJet filed this Motion to Dismiss on September 24, 2012. After four motions for extension of time, the motion was resisted, and a hearing on this motion was conducted on August 13, 2013.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

GoJet moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). When a defendant makes a factual challenge to jurisdiction, "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1990); see Iowa League of Cities v. E.P.A., 711 F.3d 844, 861 (8th Cir. 2013).

It is undisputed that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this case under federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and also diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.2 GoJet, however, argues that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction because the CBA requires that claims arising under the CBA be submitted to mandatory, binding arbitration, and in fact this claim has been arbitrated to a final and binding decision. GoJet further argues that subject matter jurisdiction in this Court does not exist because Plaintiff's claim requires an interpretation of the CBA and is thereby preempted by, and subject to, mandatory dispute resolution under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.

1. CBA Arbitration Provision

GoJet first contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the CBA mandates this claim be decided by arbitration. Section 25.A of the CBA, System Board of Adjustment, contains an arbitration clause that states as follows:

In compliance with Section 204, Title II of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, there is hereby established a System Board of Adjustment for the purpose of adjusting and deciding disputes which may arise under the terms of this Agreement and which are properly submitted to it. This Board shall be known as the GoJet Airlines Pilots' System Board of Adjustment.

CBA 66, Ex. 1 to Craig's Decl., ECF No. 9-4 (emphasis added). Section 15.F of the CBA provides that "[GoJet] shall grant family and medical leaves in accordance with applicable law." Id. at 45. GoJet argues that these provisions, read together, mandate that this dispute be settled through arbitration, pursuant to the grievance procedure contained in the CBA.

In support, GoJet relies on 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009), for the proposition that the CBA's arbitration clause must be upheld unless the FMLA explicitly provides otherwise. However, 14 Penn Plaza is distinguished from the case at hand. In 14 PennPlaza, unionized employees, who were subject to a collective bargaining agreement, brought claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) after they were reassigned to less desirable positions. Id. The Court held that a provision in the collective bargaining agreement requiring arbitration of ADEA claims was enforceable because the provision "clearly and unmistakably" mandated arbitration of ADEA claims. Id. at 274. The collective bargaining agreement specifically provided that there shall be no discrimination against employees by reason of age, including claims under the ADEA, and "[a]ll such claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures . . . as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations." Id. at 252 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court noted that the union and the employer "collectively bargained in good faith and agreed that employment-related discrimination claims, including claims brought under the ADEA, would be resolved in arbitration." Id. at 256.

In this instance, the CBA does not "clearly and unmistakably" require all relevant and available FMLA claims to be decided by arbitration. The CBA provides only that "disputes which may arise under the terms of this Agreement" shall be submitted to arbitration. CBA 66, Ex. 1 to Craig's Decl., ECF No. 9-4. The CBA governs Plaintiff's right to take leave under the FMLA as well as all procedures for discipline and discharge; however, the CBA does not govern the statutory cause of action asserted by South. South filed a claim alleging that he was retaliated against for exercising his statutory rights under the FMLA. The CBA only requires arbitration over contractual rights under the terms of the agreement and does not mandate arbitration of statutory claims. See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79 (1998) (noting that provisions requiring arbitration of statutory claims must be explicitly stated in the collective bargaining agreement); see also Keymer v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 169 F.3d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that in Wright, the Court found the "presumption of arbitrability in collective bargaining agreements does not extend to statutory claims of employment discrimination" andheld that "any collective bargaining agreement requirement to arbitrate employment discrimination claims must be 'particularly clear'" (quoting Wright, 119 U.S. at 79)). The claim at...

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