Southeastern Exp. Co. v. Edmondson

• Decision Date: 24 August 1923
• Docket Number: 14294.
• Parties: SOUTHEASTERN EXPRESS CO. v. EDMONDSON.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

119 S.E. 39

30 Ga.App. 697

SOUTHEASTERN EXPRESS CO. v. EDMONDSON.

No. 14294.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

August 24, 1923

Casemaker Note: Portions of this opinion were specifically rejected by a later court in 76 S.E.2d 709

Syllabus by the Court.

The Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act (section 57) requires that the award of the Industrial Commission shall be accompanied with a statement of the findings of fact upon which it is made, in order that the losing party may intelligently prepare his appeal, and that the cause may thereupon be intelligently reviewed. See section 59.

(a) This requirement contemplates a concise but comprehensive statement of the cause and circumstances of the accident as the Commission shall find it in truth to have occurred. A repetition of the evidence heard is not a compliance with this requirement, but will not vitiate the findings if otherwise sufficiently stated.

(b) Nor is it enough to state merely in the language of the statute that the injury is found to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment.

(c) A failure of the Commission to state its findings will not necessarily require a rehearing de novo, but the case may be recommitted merely in order that the Commission may state its findings from evidence already heard, according as the reviewing court may direct.

(d) If upon an application for a review under the provisions of section 58, the full Commission shall find the facts as they were found by the sole Commissioner, it will be sufficient for the statement of the findings of the latter to be adopted by the full Commission, without the necessity of a restatement in detail.

(e) It cannot be said in the instant case that there is no sufficient statement by the Commission of its findings of fact.

(f) The facts found support the order and decree.

(g) There was sufficient competent evidence to authorize a finding of the ultimate fact that the injury of the employee arose out of and in the course of his employment and to warrant the Industrial Commission in making the order and decree complained of.

After a finding and award by one of the Commissioners, the full Commission, upon an application for review, is not required to retake the testimony, unless it deems it advisable so to do. Section 58.

(a) Conceding (but not deciding) that the exercise of its discretion upon such a matter may in a proper case be the subject of review, there was no abuse of discretion in the refusal of the full Commission to rehear the evidence, with that alleged to have been newly discovered, upon the application of the employer, in the case now under consideration.

(b) While section 6086 of the Civil Code 1910, relating to newly discovered evidence as a ground for a new trial, is no part of the Workmen's Compensation Law, yet upon an application for review, the full Commission, in determining whether on account of newly discovered evidence it will rehear the witnesses, may properly be guided by similar considerations to those referred to in this section.

There was no error in the action of the judge of the superior court in refusing to sustain the appeal of the employer from an award of compensation to the employee.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; W. D. Ellis, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Law by T. A. Edmondson for compensation for injuries, opposed by the Southeastern Express Company, employer. Compensation was awarded, and superior court refused to sustain an appeal, and the employer brings error. Affirmed.

Sanders McDaniel and Harry L. Greene, both of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Reuben R. Arnold, Lowry Arnold, and Herman B. Evins, all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

BELL J.

1. This was a proceeding under the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Law (Laws 1920, p. 167 et seq.), heard by one of the Commissioners alone. His award in favor of the employee was affirmed by the full Commission, upon an application for review, and the case is here upon exceptions to the refusal of the superior court to sustain the employer's appeal. It is complained, among other things that the award is not accompanied by a sufficient statement by the Commission of its findings of fact.

It is provided by section 57 that:

"The award, together with a statement of the findings of fact and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue shall be filed with the record of the proceedings."

The statement of the findings of fact and the Commission's order take the respective places in an ordinary case of the verdict and judgment. The order must be supported by the findings, and each, as against proper assignments, must be warranted by sufficient competent evidence. The findings of fact made by the Commission within its power are, in the absence of fraud, conclusive, but, of course, the Commission would have no power to make a finding of fact entirely without evidence. Section 59.

A statement of the findings is necessary in order that the losing party may intelligently prepare his appeal and that the cause may thereupon be intelligently reviewed. This requirement contemplates a concise but comprehensive statement of the cause and circumstances, or controlling facts, of the accident, as the Commission shall find it in truth to have occurred. Dodge v. Barstow Stove Co., 40 R.I. 191, 100 A. 245; Gurski v. Susquehanna R. R. Co., 262 Pa. 1, 104 A. 801; Flucker v. Carnegie Steel Co., 263 Pa. 113, 106 A. 192; Miller v. State Industrial Commission, 84 Or. 507, 159 P. 1150, 165 P. 576; Prouse v. Industrial Commission, 69 Colo. 382, 194 P. 625; Weaver v. Industrial Commission, 69 Colo. 507, 194 P. 941.

It is not enough to state merely as a conclusion, in the language of the statute, that the injury is found to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment. In re Mathewson, 227 Mass. 470 (2), 116 N.E. 831; Prouse v. Industrial Commission, 69 Colo. 382, 194 P. 625; Weaver v. Industrial Commission, 69 Colo. 507, 194 P. 941; Jenczweski v. Aluminum Co. of America, 199 A.D. 156, 191 N.Y.S. 392 (2); Gallagher v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 72 Pa. Super. Ct. 124.

It seems, however, that, if there is no sufficient statement by the Commission of its findings it is not for that reason required absolutely that the case shall be remanded for a rehearing de novo, but it may be merely recommitted in order that the Commission may state its findings upon the evidence previously taken. Reilly v. Erie Railway Co., 264 Pa. 329 (3), 107 A. 736; McCarthy's Case, 230 Mass. 429 (3), 119 N.E. 697; Hallett's Case, 230 Mass. 326, 119 N.E. 673; Dodge v. Barstow Stove Co., 40 R.I. 191, 100 A. 245; Miller v. State Industrial Commission,

84 Or. 507, 159 P. 1150, 165 P. 576; Weaver v. Industrial Commission, 69 Colo. 507, 194 P. 941. But even this may not be necessary in a case where the facts disclosed by the record are undisputed. Prouse v. Industrial Commission, 69 Colo. 382, 149 P. 625 (3).

A repetition of the evidence heard is not a compliance with the act, because it is the duty of the Commission to weigh the evidence and to declare what it finds to be the truth. Some of the witnesses might make a case demanding compensation, while the evidence of others might demand just the opposite. A mere narrative of conflicting testimony would leave it impossible for a reviewing court to determine whether the truth of the transaction as conceived by the Commission would support its decree. Grabowski v. Miskell, 97 Conn. 76, 115 A. 691; Orsinie v. Torrance, 96 Conn. 352, 113 A. 924; Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444, 97 A. 328, L.R.A. 1916E, 506.

In what is considered the statement of findings and the award in the instant case is included a narration of the testimony of the various witnesses. The testimony is required to be shown in the transcript, but we do not think that the needless repetition of it in connection with the findings and the award will vitiate either, if the findings are otherwise sufficiently stated.

Measuring now the case before us by the propositions stated above, the most of which are advanced by the plaintiff in error, we cannot concur in the view that the record discloses a failure of the Commission to comply with the requirement that it accompany its award with a statement of its findings of fact. Notwithstanding what we have said in regard to the essentials of the required statement, it must be remembered that legal precision and nicety in the report should not be insisted upon. Flucker v. Carnegie Steel Co., 263 Pa. 113, 106 A. 192. See, also, section 53 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Independently of matter contained in the report of Commissioner Slate, which might have been omitted, we find in it the following:

"This is the case of T. A. Edmondson v. Southeastern Express Company, who claims an accidental injury sustained in the course of employment on the 23d day of May, 1922. Both the employer and employee were under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The average weekly wages of T. A. Edmondson were $33; therefore his compensation would be at the rate of $12 per week.

No rules or regulations of any kind had been filed by the Southeastern Express Company with the Industrial Commission. In order to clear the record as far as rules are concerned the testimony shows: 'Q. Do you remember of your own knowledge giving particular instructions to Mr. Edmondson with reference to getting on or off trains?' 'A. Don't know that that subject ever came up.' No rules were placed in evidence, and no effort was made to show that any rules relating to the safety of employees had ever been brought to the attention of Edmondson. The Commissioner desires to state that any rule relating to how the money should be kept and the safety of valuables intrusted

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