Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Heard, 45925

Decision Date08 April 1971
Docket NumberNo. 45925,No. 3,45925,3
Citation182 S.E.2d 153,123 Ga.App. 635
PartiesSOUTHEASTERN FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY v. Horace HEARD
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Stack & O'Brien, Joseph R. Manning, Atlanta, for appellant.

Paul R. Koehler, Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

EBERHARDT, Judge.

Horace Heard, employed by SOS Quick Printing for making deliveries of goods by motorcycle, was injured when the motorcycle collided with an automobile at an intersection. He sued the operator of the automobile and obtained a judgment. He now sues Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Company, alleging that it had issued a liability policy to SOS Quick Printing which included uninsured motorist coverage, that the defendant against whom he obtained judgment was uninsured, that the liability policy afforded coverage to him as a permissive driver of the SOS motorcycle and that Southeastern had been served with a copy of his suit against the operator of the automobile in compliance with the requirements of § 56-407.1 of the Insurance Code relative to the method of enforcing uninsured motorist coverage.

Southeastern denies that Heard was entitled to coverage under the policy, asserting that the collision had occurred on a Saturday when the business of SOS was not operating but was closed, and that he was using the motorcycle on a purely personal mission, without the knowledge, consent or authority of his employer. Southeastern also denied that service of Heard's suit for damages against the automobile operator had been lawfully perfected upon it, and that for this reason Heard was not entitled to coverage under the policy. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of these two contentions, introducing certain depositions and affidavits in support thereof. The motion was denied and, having obtained a certificate from the judge that the ruling should be reviewed, it appeals. Held:

1. The entry of service which is under attack reads: 'Georgia, Fulton County. Served the defendant, Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., a corporation, by serving Maxine Freeman, Agent, by leaving a copy of the within writ and summons with her at the office and place of doing business of said corporation, in Fulton County, Ga. This September 25, 1968. T. O. Beter, Deputy Sheriff.'

Methods for perfecting service on corporations in this state are provided by Code § 22-1101: 'Service of all writs, attachments, and other process necessary to the commencement of any suit against any corporation in any court, except as hereinafter provided, may be perfected by serving any officer or agent of such corporation, or by leaving the same at the place of transacting the usual and ordinary public business of such corporation, if any such place of business then shall be within the jurisdiction of the court in which said suit may be commenced. The officer shall specify the mode of service in his return.'

The Civil Practice Act provides in Code Ann. § 81A-104, as to corporations: 'Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the summons attached to a copy of the complaint as follows: (1) If the suit is against a corporation incorporated or domesticated under the law of this State, to the president or other officer of the corporation, secretary, cashier, managing agent, or other agent thereof. * * * ' This is, of course, 'personal service,' and further provision is made for substituted service by serving the Secretary of State. These are cumulative of other methods provided by statute.

When the service is made upon one as the agent of the corporation it is 'personal service' on the corporation, while service by leaving a copy at its place of transacting business is 'substituted service.' Redwood Restaurant & Bars, Inc. v. Spruill, 108 Ga.App. 95(1), 132 S.E.2d 235; Kimsey & Dopson v. Macon Lumber Co., 136 Ga. 369, 71 S.E. 675; Dowe v. Debus Mfg. Co., 49 Ga.App. 412, 413, 175 S.E. 676.

2. It is to be noted that the statute requires that the officer specify the mode of service in his return. We take this to mean that when the officer proceeds to serve the process he will select one or the other of the two modes, and when the specifies that he has perfected 'personal service' it excludes any attempt to make 'substituted service.' There is reason for the requirement. If the service is to be contested the defendant or party upon whom service purports to have been perfected is entitled to know what he must contest.

Any other construction of the requirement that the officer specify the mode of service in his return would render it meaningless, and it is our duty so to construe the statute that this, as well as other portions of it, have meaning, purpose and effect. Brooks v. Brooks, 185 Ga. 549, 554, 195 S.E. 869; Mitchell v. Union Bag & Paper Corp., 75 Ga.App. 15, 17, 42 S.E.2d 137. 'All statutes should be given logical meaning and effect.' Sale v. Leachman, 218 Ga. 834, 836, 131 S.E.2d 185, 188. It is not presumed that the legislature intended that any portion of a statute should be without meaning, or that there was no purpose for its inclusion. State Revenue Commission v. Alexander, 54 Ga.App. 295, 187 S.E. 707. We should keep in mind, too, the provisions for service prescribed in the Civil Practice Act, under which no question can arise as to which of the modes may have been attempted. It is the policy of the law to make certain wherever possible, and we think the requirement that the officer specify the mode is a part of that policy.

The return here is of 'personal service' on the corporation, for it recites that it was accomplished by service on Maxine Freeman, as its agent. Compare Grading, Inc. v. Cook, 93 Ga.App. 68, 91 S.E.2d 129 and Clements v. Sims T.V., Inc., 105 Ga.App. 769, 125 S.E.2d 705 with the situation here.

3. (a) Southeastern denies that Maxine Freeman was its agent, and introduced an affidavit of its payroll clerk in which it was asserted that she was employed only as a typist, was paid as a typist, and that she had no other duties or authority. The Supreme Court held in Citizens Bank of Hapeville v. Alexander-Smith Academy, 226 Ga. 871, 178 S.E.2d 178 that a typist-receptionist is not an agent in charge of the office or business of a corporation for which she works, and is not a person on whom 'personal service' of the corporation can be made. That case involved the question of whether service of a summons of garnishment on her amounted to service of the corporation. Personal service of a garnishment summons is required. Code § 46-106.

(b) Similarly, it was held in Georgia Railway & Power Company v. Head, 150 Ga. 177, 103 S.E. 158 that service of an ordinary suit could not be perfected on a corporation by serving a mere employee, holding that 'the person served must be an agent of the company as distinguished from a mere subordinate employee or servant.' And in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Parker, 119 Ga. 721, 727, 47 S.E. 194, 197 it was asserted: 'Of course, it was never intended that a corporation should be bound by service on a mere employee or a mere servant of the corporation, in a limited sense.' '(S)ervice or process on merely an apparent agent...

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