Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Commission

• Decision Date: 21 February 1969
• Parties: SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, Appellant, v. KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION and Nelle P. Horlander, Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 775

437 S.W.2d 775

SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, Appellant, v. KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION and Nelle P Horlander, Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 21, 1969.

Robert G. Breetz, Lively M. Wilson, Stites, Peabody & Helm, Louisville, for appellant.

Paul E. Tierney, Ben J. Mann, Wm. G. Childers, Frankfort, Herbert L. Segal, Segal, Isenberg, Sales & Stewart, Louisiville, for appellees.

REED, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment confirming an award of the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission to Nelle P. Horlander, an employee of appellant, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company. We sustained a motion to grant the appeal herein because the case presented a question of first impression in this jurisdiction.

Mrs. Nelle P. Horlander has been an employee of the appellant for some fifteen years. Her job is that of service advisor in the Louisville office.

She is and was at all times mentioned herein a member of the Communication Workers of America, and this union was a party to a collective bargaining agreement with appellant. This collective bargaining agreement provides in part:

'In all maternity cases the employee shall present to the Company not later than the end of the fifth month of pregnancy a doctor's certificate stating the probable date of confinement. After the presentation of such certificate the Company shall grant the employee's request for a leave of absence if the leave is to begin not later than 60 days prior to the probable date of confinement. If the employee fails to request such a leave the Company shall place the employee on a six months' leave of absence to begin 60 days prior to the probable date of confinement.'

On January 27, 1964, Mrs. Horlander requested a maternity leave of absence and signed a form which recited that the request was for six months beginning March 14, 1964. By letter of February 10, 1964, the appellant granted this leave request and stated in the letter that the leave was granted in order to protect the term of service of the employee when and if re-employed. Mrs. Horlander's child was due May 15, 1964. The child was born on April 21, 1964. On April 22, 1964, she wrote a letter to appellant requesting a return to her former job on June 2, 1964. Appellant replied that there would not be a vacancy in her job at that time. She then filed a claim for unemployment benefits on June 8, 1964. Appellant protested her claim and a hearing was held before a referee of the Unemployment Insurance Commission. He found that Mrs. Horlander was eligible for unemployment benefits beginning with June 21, 1964. The employer appealed this decision of the referee to the Unemployment Insurance Commission which upheld the referee's decision and confirmed his findings. Appellant then appealed this decision to the circuit court. The circuit court confirmed the award.

It appears that she was paid these benefits until September 13, 1964. On September 14, 1964, the leave of absence expired and she returned to appellant's payroll and the unemployment compensation benefits ceased.

The hearing before the referee revealed that there was a sharp dispute between Mrs. Horlander and her supervisor concerning the circumstances surrounding the request for leave of absence with particular reference to the time period it was to continue. Mrs. Horlander testified that she clearly advised her supervisor that she wanted to return to work as soon as possible after the birth of her baby, because her husband was out of work and she had compelling personal reasons requiring her early return to employment. She further testified that her supervisor filled in the request form for a six-month period but with assurances to her that she could return to work as soon as she was able. Mrs. Horlander admitted that she signed this form with the six-month duration period in it, but explained her action by stating that she felt forced to do so because she believed she would lose her job if she refused to sign the form in the manner in which it was presented to her by the supervisor. The supervisor, on the other hand, testified that although Mrs. Horlander expressed the hope that she could return to work as soon as possible after the birth of her expected baby she, nevertheless, fully understood the duration of the leave of absence request and voluntarily agreed to it.

The decision of the referee stated as follows:

'Because the adjusted determination predicated its imposition of a benefit ineligibility upon the sole fact that claimant is in maternity-leave status, a wide latitude was allowed in the admission of evidence bearing upon discussions between claimant and the company which culminated in the company's granting of her written request for a six-month maternity leave. Such written request is a matter of record. Whether claimant orally requested a shorter leave and whether the company violated the collective-bargaining agreement by granting a leave of six months are matters appropriate for a grievance committee but are...