Southern Cellular Telecom v. Banks
| Decision Date | 11 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | Nos. A93A0221,A93A0222,s. A93A0221 |
| Citation | 433 S.E.2d 606,209 Ga.App. 401 |
| Parties | SOUTHERN CELLULAR TELECOM et al. v. BANKS. BANKS v. SOUTHERN CELLULAR TELECOM et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Hurt, Richardson, Garner, Todd & Cadenhead, Henry D. Fellows, Jr., Martha L. McGhee-Glisson, Hunton & Williams, Kevin A. Ross, Atlanta, for appellants.
McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols & Clark, C. James Jessee, Jr., Charney K. Berger, L. Matt Wilson, Atlanta, for appellee.
These cases are related to Southern Cellular Telecom v. Banks, 208 Ga.App. 286, 431 S.E.2d 115 (1993). The four cases arose from a trial in the Superior Court of Fulton County. The issue presented in these two appeals is whether the trial court erred in its determination of the amount of an award of attorney fees.
Nancy Banks filed a ten-count complaint against Southern Cellular Telecom (SCT) and its president, Edward Grenvicz. Banks' fraud claim was the only claim of the ten to survive the defendants' motions for summary judgment and directed verdict. On this single remaining claim, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Banks, awarding general damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Prior to the submission of the case to the jury, the parties stipulated that if the jury determined that Banks was entitled to recover attorney fees and expenses of litigation, the court rather than the jury would determine the amount of such fees and expenses. After an initial hearing to determine the amount, the court concluded that Banks had not adequately distinguished between the time her attorneys spent on her various unsuccessful claims and the time attributable solely to her successful claim. The court allowed Banks several days to submit edited time records. The documentation Banks then submitted consisted of affidavits of her attorneys, time sheets, and a copy of a contingent fee agreement between herself and her attorneys. The court apparently found this evidence to be adequate, and it entered an order fixing the amount of the award at $95,067 in attorney fees; $5,765.99 in accounting expenses; $1,150 in paralegal fees; and $39,308.34 in other actual expenses. The defendants appeal from the court's order, and Banks cross-appeals.
In their sole enumeration of error, the defendants contend that the amount of the attorney fees awarded by the trial court was not supported by sufficient evidence. We agree. Fiat Auto U.S.A. v. Hollums, 185 Ga.App. 113, 116(5), 363 S.E.2d 312 (1987). Banks submitted time sheets for work which her attorneys performed in connection with the entire case. Many of the time entries consist of a simple statement that a conference was held, a letter was written, a telephone call was made or research was conducted. Such broad statements fail to demonstrate the function or substance of the task with sufficient particularity to permit the court to distinguish between time and expenses attributable to the successful fraud claim and time and expenses attributable to her other unsuccessful claims.
We recognize the trial court's dilemma in attempting to determine with specificity the amount of attorney fees, given the nature of the documents and other evidence provided. This evidence did not provide a sufficiently narrow basis for such a determination. Nor did the process of allowing Banks to submit edited time records and affidavits adequately afford SCT's attorneys the opportunity to cross-examine Banks' attorneys either on the issues of reasonableness and value or on the allocation of time and expenses among the various claims. A determination of the amount of an award of attorney fees cannot be based on guesswork. See generally Wahnschaff Corp. v. O.E. Clark Paper Box Co., 166 Ga.App. 242, 244(2), 304 S.E.2d 91 (1983). While we are convinced that the trial court mightily endeavored to determine the correct amount from the evidence, rather than basing all or any part of the award upon speculation, we conclude that the state of the evidence was insufficient to support the award made.
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