Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson
Decision Date | 30 June 1920 |
Citation | 86 So. 629,80 Fla. 441 |
Parties | SOUTHERN COTTON OIL CO. v. ANDERSON. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 1920.
Error to Court of Record, Escambia County; E. C. Love, Judge.
Action by L. J. Anderson against the Southern Cotton Oil Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
See also, 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975, L. R. A. 1917E, 715.
Syllabus by the Court
Owner intrusting motor vehicle to another is liable for his negligence. A motor vehicle operated on the public highways is a dangerous instrumentality, and the owner who intrusts it to another to operate is liable for injury caused to others by the negligence of the person to whom it is intrusted.
Responsibility for custody of dangerous applicance cannot be shifted to servant.
Responsibility of owner of automobile extends to its use by one with his knowledge or consent. An automobile operated upon the public highways being a dangerous machine, its owner is responsible for the manner in which it is used, and his liability extends to its use by any one with his knowledge or consent.
Owners of motor vehicles liable under doctrine of respondeat superior. The Legislature, under its police power to protect the public from dangerous instrumentalities using the highways, has imposed rigid restraints, regulations, and restrictions upon the use of motor vehicles, thus recognizing the danger from their operation, which makes owners liable in damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior as applied to dangerous agencies.
Automobile dangerous instrumentality, notwithstanding operation by another than owner. Chapter 7275, Acts 1917, treats the automobile when operated on the public highways as a dangerous instrumentality, so as to require special regulation and control under the police power, and it is not divested of its dangerous character in an action for damages caused by the negligence of the operator, who is using the car with the owner's knowledge or consent.
Owner of dangerous agency liable for injuries through servant's negligence. In intrusting a servant with a highly dangerous agency the master puts it in his servant's power to mismanage it, and as long as it is in his custody or control under such au hority the master is liable for any injury committed through the servant's negligence.
Ruling as to sufficiency of evidence is law of case on appeal after second trial. Where the Supreme Court has reversed a judgment on the ground there is substantial evidence tending to prove a certain issue, on appeal after a new trial, the Supreme Court is bound by such ruling as the law of the case, and will not disturb the ruling of the trial judge on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict rendered on the second trial, where the testimony is substantially the same as on the first.
'Dangerous per se' defined. By 'dangerous per se' is meant that a thing, by or through itself, may inflict injury without the immediate application of human aid or instrumentality.
Watson & Pasco and Blount & Blount & Carter, all of Pensacola, for plaintiff in error.
F. W Marsh, of Pensacola, and Scott M. Loftin, of Jacksonville for defendant in error.
This is an action by Louis J. Anderson against the Southern Cotton Oil Company for personal injuries caused by the negligent operation of an automobile belonging to the Southern Cotton Oil Compamy.
The case is before the court for the second time.
On the first hearing Anderson, the plaintiff below, brought writ of error to test the ruling of the trial judge in directing a verdict for the defendant. This we held was error, and the judgment was reversed on that ground. Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975, L. R. A. 1917E, 715.
On a retrial of the cause the plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment for $7,500 with interest, and the defendant is here on writ of error complaining that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict, and of rulings of the court on the evidence and of certain instructions given on request of the defendant.
The defendant in error contends that, as this court reversed the former judgment on the ground that there was substantial evidence tending to prove the issue, we are bound by that as the law of the case, and should not disturb the ruling of the trial judge on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict rendered on the second trial, where the testimony is substantially the same as on the first. the same as on the first.
The rule contended for in that proposition is supported by strong authority. In Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116, 22 L.Ed. 780, it is thus stated:
In Wilson v. Jernigan, 57 Fla. 277, 49 So. 44, the distinction is drawn between the duty of the court on a motion to direct a derdict, where there is evidence tending to prove the issue, and the denial of a motion to set aside the verdict on the ground of the insufficiency of the testimony to support it. The court said:
'The first assignment is based upon the overruling of the motion for a new trial, while the seventh is based upon the refusal of the trial court to instruct or direct the jury to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs'
--and held that the request for a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff 'was properly refused,' citing German-American Lumber Co. v. Brock, 55 Fla. 577, 46 So. 740; Starks v. Sawyer, 56 Fla. 596, 47 So. 513; McKinnon v. Johnson, 57 Fla. 120, 48 So. 910.
The case being submitted to the jury a verdict was rendered for defendant, and this court reversed the judgment, because the trial judge refused to set it aside on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the jury in finding a verdict for the defendant.
Thus the court approved the ruling of the trial court, refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant, and reversed the judgment, because he denied the motion to set aside the verdict on the ground that----
'The evidence adduced was not sufficient to warrant the jury in returning a verdict for the defendant.'
This court has endeavored in several cases to point out the distinction between what is essential on motion to direct a verdict, and on motion to set aside a verdict because the evidence is insufficient to support it. The distinction is probably as clear as language is capable of showing so shadowy a difference, but it is the frequent cause of contention before this court, and the trial judges are often lost in its mazes.
What this court has said on this subject can be found in Carney v. Stringfellow, 73 Fla. 700, 74 So. 866; Gravette v. Turner, 77 Fla. 311, 81 So. 476.
It is not necessary to consider the assignments of error separately, as this case must be decided on a doctrine that disposes of all of them adversely to the plaintiff in error.
It is conceded by the plaintiff in error that the negligence of the driver of the automobile that caused the injury to the defendant is established, and the only issue is the responsibility of the Southern Cotton Oil Company for this negligence. This responsibility must be measured by the obligation resting on the master or owner of an instrumentality that is peculiarly dangerous in its operation, when he intrusts it to another to operate on the public highways.
The rule is not a new one, and, far from being the enunciation of 'a judicial statute,' as intimated by counsel for plaintiff in error, it is but the application of an old and wellsettled principle to new conditions. The rule is thus stated in Pollock on Torts, 506:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Borchert, Application of
...33 A.L.R.2d 1102; Florida Accountants Ass'n v. Dandelake, Fla. 1957, 98 So.2d 323, 70 A.L.R.2d 425; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 1920, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 16 A.L.R. 255; Wisconsin Ornamental Iron & Bronze Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 1930, 202 Wis. 355, 229 N.W. 646, 233 N.W. 72......
-
Hull v. Gillioz
...with respect to it under particular circumstances. [Burbee v. McFarland, 114 Conn. 56, 158 Atl. 538; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 16 A.L.R. 255; Majestic Theatre Co. v. Lutz, 210 Ky. 92, 275 S.W. 16; O'Hara v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 244 Mo. 395, 148 S.W. 884......
-
Jackson By and Through Whitaker v. Hertz Corp.
...Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832 (Fla.1959); Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268 (1947); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920); Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975 (1917). This liability extends to the negligent act of ......
-
Henry v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.
... ... Barmore ... v. Vicksburg R. Co., 85 Miss. 426; Southern Cotton Oil ... Co. v. Anderson (Fla.), 86 So. 629 ... The ... owner of a dangerous ... ...
-
Negligence cases
...court first extended the common law dangerous instrumentality doctrine to automobiles in 1920. See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson , 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920); See also Enterprise Leasing Co. South Central, Inc. v. Hughes , 833 So.2d 832, 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), rev. denied , 848 So.2d 11......
-
Liability of the commercial driver: negligent hiring meets the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
...dangerous tool is liable for any injuries caused by that tool's operation.(1) In the seminal case of Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1938), the Florida Supreme Court first extended the doctrine to motor vehicles, holding that owners may be held accountable for any dama......