Southern Crawford Road Improvement District v. Brown
| Decision Date | 18 December 1922 |
| Docket Number | 50 |
| Citation | 245 S.W. 821,156 Ark. 267 |
| Parties | SOUTHERN CRAWFORD ROAD IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT v. BROWN |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Crawford Chancery Court; J. V. Bourland, Judge; reversed in part.
Decree affirmed, reversed and cause remanded.
C M. Wofford, for appellants.
Sec. 25 of act 235 Acts of special session of 1920 is constitutional as is also sec. 29 of said act. The legislative determination of benefits is conclusive.
Starbird & Starbird, for appellees.
The commissioners have no power other than that conferred by statute. 115 Ark. 96. The words "otherwise improve" limited the power of the commissioner to other improvements of the general class of those named. 36 Cyc. 1119; 73 Ark 602; 95 Ark. 114. Those contracting with the commissioners are bound to take notice of the extent of their authority.
C M. Wofford, Coleman, Robinson & House and Daily & Woods, for appellants, in reply.
The entire class of improvements was exhausted by the kinds named. The commissioners had full power to enter into the contracts. 36 Cyc. 1119; 123 Ark. 68; 147 Ark. 80.
A road improvement district was organized in Crawford County under the general statutes (Crawford & Moses' Digest, § 5399 et seq.), designated as Road Improvement District No. 5 of Crawford County, for the improvement of certain roads, and some of the preliminary work preparatory to constructing the roads was performed, but before the construction work was begun the General Assembly, at the extraordinary session in January, 1920, enacted a special statute creating a road improvement district designated as Southern Crawford Road Improvement District of Crawford County for the improvement of certain roads, which included a portion of the road authorized by District No. 5.
Section 29 of the statute just referred to reads as follows:
Another section of the statute (sec. 25) reads as follows:
"In case, for any reason, the improvement contemplated by the district is not made, the preliminary expenses shall be a first lien upon all the land in the district, and shall be paid by a levy of a tax thereon upon the assessed value for county and State taxation, which levy shall be made by the chancery court of Crawford County, and shall be collected by a receiver to be appointed by the court."
The commissioners of the new district created by the special statute proceeded with the preliminary work and adopted some of the preliminary expenses incurred for District No. 5, principally for engineering expenses in making preliminary surveys and preparing plans, the value of which was ascertained in the present litigation to be the sum of $ 4,609.90. An assessment of benefits was duly made by the assessors, in accordance with the terms of the statute, and filed, but it was ascertained from the assessments that it was impracticable to construct the improvement, by reason of the excessive cost, and the commissioners filed a complaint in the chancery court of Crawford County, in accordance with § 25 of the statute creating the district, for the purpose of winding up the affairs of the district and paying the preliminary expenses.
Those holding claims against the district for preliminary work filed their respective claims with the court. These included the claims of the engineers and others who had performed preliminary work for the district.
During the progress of the preliminary work, certificates of indebtedness were issued to the engineers for services performed, and these certificates were assigned to other parties, who also intervened as claimants.
The commissioners borrowed $ 8,000 from a banking institution for use in the payment of preliminary expenses, and it was so used, and that institution also intervened for an allowance of its claim.
Appellees who were the owners of real property in the district, intervened and not only contested the claims of those who had performed work, but also attacked the constitutionality of the two sections of the statute quoted above. On final hearing the court decided that both of the above-quoted sections of the statute were unconstitutional and void, and made a finding as to the amounts to which the claimants for the value of preliminary work were entitled on a quantum meruit, and also for the amount of money borrowed for use in preliminary work, and decreed the same as charges against appellant district, and ordered a levy upon the assessed benefits, and not upon the assessed value for State and county...
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