Southern Express Co. v. Williamson

• Citation: 66 Fla. 286,63 So. 433
• Parties: SOUTHERN EXPRESS CO. v. WILLIAMSON.
• Decision Date: 04 November 1913
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

63 So. 433

66 Fla. 286

SOUTHERN EXPRESS CO. v. WILLIAMSON.

Florida Supreme Court

November 4, 1913

Error to Circuit Court, Orange County; J. W. Perkins, Judge.

Action by J. M. Williamson against the Southern Express Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

'Actionable negligence' may flow from the failure of a party to observe a general or particular duty towards others under circumstances that in law impose the duty, where such failure proximately injures another. Whether there has been actionable negligence depends upon the particular facts and the law applicable thereto.

In an action to recover damages for a negligent injury, where it clearly appears that from any reasonable aspect of the facts and circumstances alleged or proven actionable negligence cannot be imputed to the defendant in the premises, the court should, by appropriate procedure, determine the issue in favor of the defendant as matter of law.

When the standard of the defendant's duty under the facts and circumstances alleged or proven is fixed in law or certain or undisputed in fact, and the breach of such duty to the plaintiff's injury is clearly shown, or when the defendant's negligence and liability therefor are, under the showing, made so clear and palpable that no verdict could make it otherwise, then actionable negligence appears as matter of law, and the court in appropriate procedure may so determine.

Ordinarily when actionable negligence is duly alleged, the existence of negligence as alleged is a question of fact for the jury to determine from the evidence, under proper instructions as to the law applicable thereto, and not for the court to declare as matter of law.

Whenever under the facts sufficiently alleged, actionable negligence may be shown by competent evidence, the question of defendant's negligence as alleged, and of the injury proximately resulting therefrom to the plaintiff or to those represented by the plaintiff, should be properly submitted to the jury, with appropriate instructions from the court as to the law applicable to the facts and circumstances rightly in evidence.

Where in an action for damages there are, in one court of a declaration, general allegations of negligence and also allegations of specific negligence that caused the stated injury, the plaintiff should prove the specific allegations substantially as alleged, and ordinarily will not be permitted to prove under the general allegation negligence that is not included in the negligence specifically alleged and a failure to substantially prove the specific allegations of negligence and resulting injury as alleged precludes recovery in the action.

The rule of respondeat superior, within its proper scope, is applicable to corporations.

Contributory negligence is defensive matter. But if contributory negligence appears in the case made by the plaintiff, the defendant may have the benefit of it by appropriate action duly taken.

Where a person or corporation invites a member of the public into his or its place of business, he or it owes such person a duty with respect to his safety, which may vary with the circumstances of each case. This is essentially true of a public utility corporation such as a common carrier. In any event there is a duty to have the place of business in a reasonably safe condition. And the care required depends upon the circumstances of each case.

Where a person after going safely on premises is expressly invited to a particular part of the premises in the course of the business in hand, he is not a trespasser, and he has a right to assume that the premises are safe; and it is not contributory negligence to fail to look out for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.

A verdict for the defendant should never be directed by the court, unless it is clear that there is no evidence whatever adduced that could, in law, support a verdict for the plaintiff. If the evidence is conflicting, or will admit of different reasonable inferences, or if there is evidence tending to prove the issue, it should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact to be determined by them, and not taken from the jury and passed upon by the court as a question of law.

Legal liability in damages for a negligent injury does not require that the particular injury alleged should have been contemplated by the defendant. In a case like this it is sufficient if, by the exercise of reasonable care, the defendant should have anticipated that a heavy casting left insecure standing against and under a counter in the office would fall by force of gravity, and that the negligent act or omission in leaving the casting insecure would naturally and probably cause an injury to some one of the general nature or character of that here alleged.

Because of the general instinct of self-preservation which generally prompts men to exercise care and caution for their safety there is ordinarily a presumption that due care and caution were observed in particular instances. But, like other presumptions of fact arising from the ordinary or usual as distinguished from the invariable or universal conduct of normal men, this presumption may be rebutted, and does not exist where it is incompatible with the duly proven conduct of the person in particular circumstances.

While the legal effect of the evidence, or the lack of evidence, is a question of law that may be reviewed by the court upon proper procedure, conflicts in the testimony and questions of the credibility of competent witnesses are eliminated by the verdict, when there is substantial legal evidence sufficient to support the verdict, and it does not appear that the jury misapplied the law or were not governed by the evidence in making their finding.

Where a person, after safely entering the office of an express company common carrier, is by the company's agent specially invited to stand at a particular place at the counter in transacting business with the company, and while so doing is injured by the falling of a heavy casting left standing insecurely under and against the counter, which was not known to the plaintiff, who had no cause to apprehend danger, the defendant company is liable in compensatory damages for the injury where the plaintiff is not guilty of contributory negligence.

Where there is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict, and technical errors, if any, could not reasonably have been prejudicial to the defendant, who was not denied any fundamental right to which he was entitled, and no material errors of law appear, the judgment will be affirmed.

COUNSEL Kay & Doggett, of Jacksonville, for plaintiff in error.

Starbuck & Starbuck, of Orlando, for defendant in error.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

The declaration alleges that Williamson, the plaintiff, went into the office or station of the express company, the defendant, 'for the purpose of receiving a bag of seed which had been shipped to him and carried by the said defendant; that the defendant * * * negligently, carelessly, and recklessly stood up in said office or station against the counter or desk at which customers or patrons were expected, allowed, and invited to deliver and receive parcels and receipt therefor a heavy casting, which was imminently dangerous to customers and patrons of said defendant; that plaintiff was then and there requested by the defendant * * * to receipt for the aforesaid bag of seed, and that while he was doing so the aforesaid casting fell, striking plaintiff's foot' causing the injury alleged.

The following pleas were filed:

'(1) That defendant is not guilty as alleged.

'(2) That the plaintiff's own acts contributed to his alleged injury, in this: That the plaintiff went behind defendant's counter to sign for the alleged package, and while behind said counter, at a place where the plaintiff, as a customer of this defendant, and the general public are not invited, and alleged piece of iron fell on the plaintiff's foot. That had the plaintiff remained on the outside of said counter, where defendant's customers ordinarily receive packages and transact business with this defendant, the plaintiff would not have been injured.

'(3) That the plaintiff was at the time and place of its alleged injury a trespasser in this: That the alleged piece of iron fell on the plaintiff's foot while he was behind defendant's counter, and when at a place where the defendant and the general public were warned not to go, and this defendant did not wantonly and willfully injure the plaintiff.'

Issue was joined on the first plea, and the following replications to the second and third pleas were filed:

'For replication to the second and third pleas in this behalf plaintiff says that he entered the office of the defendant by the door which appeared to be open to the public, and to which he was directed by a notice on the other door of said office, and was injured as alleged in the declaration.

'(2) And for a second replication to said second and third pleas this plaintiff says that he entered the office of the defendant by the door which had been commonly used by the public for many years, and that he was not warned in any manner by the defendant, its servants, agents, or employés that he was in a part of said office where he or the general public was not invited; and was injured as alleged in the declaration.

'(3) And for a third replication to the second and third pleas in this behalf plaintiff says that the defendant, by its servants, agents, and employés, directed and invited the plaintiff to stand at the counter and sign for the package described in said declaration and that this plaintiff stood at said counter at the point indicated by the...