Southern New England Tel. v. Cashman

• Decision Date: 28 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 17741.,17741.
• Citation: 931 A.2d 142,283 Conn. 644
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE COMPANY v. Shaun B. CASHMAN, Commissioner of Labor, et al.

931 A.2d 142

283 Conn. 644

SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE COMPANY v. Shaun B. CASHMAN, Commissioner of Labor, et al.

No. 17741.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 9, 2007.

Decided August 28, 2007.

David Vegliante, New Haven, with whom were Lori B. Alexander, North Haven, and, on the brief, Christopher A. Kelland,

New Haven, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Thomas P. Clifford III, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and William J. McCullough, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (named defendant).

Atul Talwar, pro hac vice, with whom was Mary E. Kelly, for the appellee (defendant Local 1298, Communications Workers of America).

NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

The plaintiff, Southern New England Telephone Company, appeals from the judgment of the trial court affirming the declaratory ruling of the named defendant,¹ Shaun B. Cashman, the commissioner of labor (commissioner), regarding the application of the Connecticut family and medical leave law, General Statutes § 31-51kk et seq. (family and medical leave law) to the sick leave policy set forth in the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff and its employees. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly affirmed the commissioner's ruling that an employer's policy provides "accumulated sick leave," as that term is used in General Statutes § 31-51pp(c)(1), when it grants to each employee a maximum number of sick days per year for which the employee may be paid for his or her own illness but does not permit unused leave at the end of the year to be carried over to the following year. The plaintiff claims that employees subject to policies that do not permit them to carry over unused sick leave are not covered under § 31-51pp(c)(1), which prohibits employers from denying employees the right to use up to two weeks of "accumulated sick leave" for family medical leave purposes. We disagree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history, as set forth by the trial court in its memorandum of decision, are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In 2001, the plaintiff and its employees entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing for a graduated sick leave policy based on longevity of employment. The agreement granted full-time employees no sick leave during their first year of employment, five days of paid sick leave at the commencement of their second year of employment and ten days of paid sick leave at the commencement of their third year of employment and for each year of employment thereafter.² The agreement did not permit unused sick leave at the end of the year to be carried over to the following year.

In 2003, the General Assembly amended the family and medical leave law, effective October 1, 2003, to prohibit employers from denying employees the right to use up to two weeks of "accumulated sick leave" for family medical leave purposes. Public Acts 2003, No. 03-213, § 1, codified at General Statutes § 31-51pp(c). On April 16, 2004, the plaintiff requested a declaratory ruling from the commissioner with respect to the following question: "Does an employer's policy provide `accumulated sick leave,' as that term is used in [§ 31-51pp(c)], when it sets a maximum number of sick days per year for which an employee may be paid for [his or her] own illness, and [when] such leave is not carried over from one year to the next but is lost if not used by the employee by the end of any calendar year?"³ (Emphasis in original.)

Thereafter, the commissioner ruled that the type of paid sick leave described in the collective bargaining agreement satisfied the meaning of "accumulated sick leave" as contemplated in § 31-51pp(c). In support of his ruling, the commissioner cited the remedial purpose of the family and medical leave law⁴ and its regulations, and the fact that the plaintiff's policy tied progressive increases in the availability of paid sick leave to an employee's seniority. The commissioner also examined the legislative history of the family and medical leave law and concluded that the General Assembly did not intend to limit the meaning of "accumulated sick leave" to leave carried over from one year to another. The commissioner thus determined that "accumulated sick leave" under § 31-51pp(c)(1) included "the kind of annual renewal of sick days described under the collective bargaining agreement."

The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the commissioner's ruling pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183,⁵ claiming that the decision was "erroneous, incorrect, in violation of statutory provisions, contrary to law, and based [on] a misapplication and/or misinterpretation of the law." The plaintiff also argued that the decision was arbitrary, capricious and clearly erroneous. The trial court affirmed the ruling on grounds similar to those on which the commissioner had relied. This appeal followed.

The plaintiff claims that § 31-51pp(c)(1) applies only to sick leave policies that permit employees to accumulate sick leave by carrying over unused sick leave from one year to another r on a regular basis over the course of a single year. The defendants respond that, because the statute is remedial in nature, it must be liberally construed and applied to sick leave policies similar to that described in the collective bargaining agreement, which does not allow employees to carry over unused sick leave from one year to another.⁶ We agree with the defendants.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the applicable standard of review. "Ordinarily, [o]ur resolution of [administrative appeals] is guided by the limited scope of judicial review afforded by the [Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.] ... to the determinations made by an administrative agency. [W]e must decide, in view of all the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.... Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts....

"A reviewing court, however, is not required to defer to an improper application of the law.... It is the function of the courts to expound and apply governing principles of law.... We previously have recognized that the construction and interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the courts, where the administrative decision is not entitled to special deference.... Questions of law [invoke] a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.... Because this case forces us to examine a question of law, namely, [statutory] construction and interpretation ... our review is de novo." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Semerzakis v. Commissioner of Social Services, 274 Conn. 1, 11-12, 873 A.2d 911 (2005). We are also compelled to conduct a de novo review because the issue of statutory construction before this court has not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny. E.g., Tracy v. Scherwitzky Gutter Co., 279 Conn. 265, 272, 901 A.2d 1176 (2006) ("[a] state agency is not entitled ... to special deference when its determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny" [internal quotation marks omitted]); Tele Tech of Connecticut Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 270 Conn. 778, 788, 855 A.2d 174 (2004) ("the traditional deference accorded to an agency's interpretation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute ... has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] ... a governmental agency's time-tested interpretation" [internal quotation marks omitted]).

"The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Friezo v. Friezo, 281 Conn. 166, 181-82, 914 A.2d 533 (2007).

General Statutes § 31-51pp(c) provides: "(1) It shall be a violation of sections 31-51kk to 31-51qq, inclusive, for any employer to deny an employee the right to use up to two weeks of accumulated sick leave or to discharge, threaten to discharge, demote, suspend or in any manner discriminate against an employee for using, or attempting to exercise the right to use, up to two weeks of accumulated sick leave to attend to a serious health condition of a son or daughter, spouse or parent of the employee, or for the birth or adoption of a son or daughter of the employee. For purposes of this subsection, `sick leave' means an absence from work for which compensation is...