Southern New England Telephone Company v. Cashman, No. CV04 4002298-S (CT 3/10/2006)
| Decision Date | 10 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. CV04 4002298-S,CV04 4002298-S |
| Parties | Southern New England Telephone Company v. Shaun B. Cashman, Commissioner State of Connecticut Department of Labor et al. Opinion No.: 92660 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
In this matter, the Southern New England Telephone Company (SNET) appeals a declaratory ruling by the Connecticut Department of Labor (DOL), dated September 21, 2004, concerning the application of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to its collectively bargained sick leave benefit. SNET's amended appeal, dated March 19, 2005 is made to the superior court pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes §4-183 (UAPA)1 claiming that the DOL ruling is contrary to law2 and, in addition, that it is arbitrary and capricious and clearly erroneous.
In 2003, the General Assembly enacted legislation3 amending the FMLA to include the right of employees to use two weeks of "accumulated sick leave" for the purposes set forth in the family leave act. In 2001, prior to the effective date of this new law, SNET and its employees had entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing for a graduated sick leave policy, based upon longevity of employment. The 2001 agreement provided no right to sick leave for full-time employees during their first year of employment. The agreement further provided for five days of sick leave at the commencement of their second year of employment and, finally, ten days of sick leave at the commencement of their third year of employment and for each year of employment thereafter. Any sick leave unused at the end of each year was forfeited, and did not "roll over" to the next year. Subsequent to the enactment of Public Act §03-213, the parties entered into a renegotiated collective bargaining agreement, the terms of which are not before the court.
The DOL's declaratory ruling in this case responded to three questions presented by SNET. SNET questioned first whether the amended FMLA applies to a sick leave policy where unused sick days are not accumulated little by little, are not carried over from year to year and are therefore forfeited at the end of each year. Second, SNET questioned whether the act applies to a sick leave policy that provides a limited pay protection benefit for sick days, but which does not create an entitlement to take a particular number of sick days off per year. And third, SNET questioned whether the act prevails over an existing collective bargaining agreement that was in effect prior to October 1, 2003, the effective date of the amended FMLA, Public Acts No.§03-213.
In its declaratory ruling, the DOL concluded that the FMLA, as amended by Public Act §03-213, applied under all of the circumstances assumed in the questions posed by SNET.
The parties agree that the DOL's interpretation of the amended FMLA, General Statutes §31-51 pp., is a question of first impression before the court. It is well established that, (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 274 Conn. 119, 127, 874 A.2d 776 (2005). Accordingly, the court will review the claims of law in this case de novo.
Notwithstanding the legal questions presented in this appeal, the DOL and Local 1298 Communications Workers of America each argue that the administrative findings in this case are findings of fact to be accorded proper deference in an administrative appeal; namely, that the questions posed by SNET constituted "accumulated sick leave" under the FMLA. They argue that the application of the FMLA to the collective bargaining agreement involves a determination of fact, and that the contract provides a benefit that involves "accumulated sick leave." The court disagrees.
In order to address this question, the court acknowledges the well settled principles of contract interpretation. "Although ordinarily the question of contract interpretation, being a question of the parties' intent, is a question of fact . . . [w]here there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law . . . When only one interpretation of a contract is possible, the court need not look outside the four corners of the contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bentz v. Halsey, 54 Conn.App. 609, 616, 736 A.2d 931 (1999). On the other hand, "[w]hen an ambiguous term is at issue, the trial court can examine the extrinsic evidence to resolve the question of the parties' intent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Larson v. Jacobson, 38 Conn.App. 186, 190, 659 A.2d 753 (1995). "Contract language is unambiguous when it has a definite and precise meaning about which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion." Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Pastena, 52 Conn.App. 318, 322, 725 A.2d 996, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 917, 734 A.2d 567 (1999), citing Levine v. Advest, Inc., 244 Conn. 732, 746, 714 A.2d 649 (1998).
The present issues arise from an appeal of a declaratory ruling by the DOL. The underlying questions posed by SNET involved the proper interpretation of a new state law and did not involve an analysis of or assessment of facts. Although the interpretation of a contract can be a question of fact, as noted above, the DOL made no specific findings of fact in this case. The DOL made no finding that the contractual terms of the collective bargaining agreement were ambiguous. It neither sought extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties, nor did it make any specific findings concerning the intent of the parties. Instead, the DOL simply interpreted the SNET contract for sick leave to be "accumulated sick leave" under the FMLA. Therefore, the findings of the DOL are not factual findings for the purposes of an administrative appeal. Instead, for the purpose of this appeal, they are to be treated as conclusions of law.
The fundamental question presented in this appeal is whether the SNET "sick leave" benefit is "accumulated," as contemplated by the amended FMLA. This issue raises a matter of law involving the proper interpretation of statutory language.
Under the provisions of General Statutes §1-1(a),4 statutory words are to be construed according to their ordinary meanings. The particular word in question in this case is the word "accumulated" sick time. Although General Statutes §31-51pp defines the term "sick leave," the word "accumulated" is undefined by the statute. Under the well established rules of statutory construction, statutory words are not to be treated as superfluous. Szewczyk v. Dept. of Social Services, 275 Conn. 464, 684-85, 881 A.2d 259 (2005). In addition, pursuant to General Statutes §1-2z, the court is required to interpret statutory language according to its "plain meaning."5
"In order to ascertain the plain meaning of a word, it is appropriate to look to the dictionary definition." Washington v. Meachum, 238 Conn. 692, 714 n.14, 680 A.2d 262 (1996). Accumulate6 is defined to mean "to gather or pile up esp. little by little to increase gradually in quantity or number." Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, at 8 (1997). It may similarly mean "assemble," "increase," "join," "procure" and "store up." Roget's International Thesaurus (4th Ed.) at 796. In addition, the word accumulation is defined to mean "1: something that has accumulated or has been accumulated 2: the action or process of accumulation: the state or being or having accumulated 3: increase or growth by addition esp. when continuous or repeated . . ." Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, at 8 (1997). It may similarly mean "acquisition," "assemblage," "increase," and "store." Roget's International Thesaurus (4th Ed.) at 796.
The DOL argues that the FMLA, as amended by P.A. §03-213, is a remedial statute which should therefore be liberally construed by the court. SNET counters that the plain meaning rule supersedes and curtails this method of statutory analysis. The court agrees with the DOL. General Statute §31-51pp(c)(2) provides a remedy for employees aggrieved by a violation of the substantive right to use up to two weeks of "accumulated sick time," as specifically provided in §31-51pp(c)(1). Therefore, General Statute §31-51pp(c) is a remedial statute.
The longstanding rule of statutory construction in Connecticut is that a remedial statute is to be liberally construed. See Clifford v. Cronin, 97 Conn. 434, 438, 117 A. 489 (1922); Ackerman v. Hughes, 11 Conn.Sup. 133, 135-36 (1942); Mytych v. May Dept Stores Co., 260 Conn. 152, 160-61, 793 A.2d 1068 (2002); Butler v. Hartford Technical Institute, Inc., 243 Conn. 454, 463, 704 A.2d 222 (1997); Tianti v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 231 Conn. 690, 696, 651 A.2d 1286 (1995). Therefore, where remedial statutes are concerned, the court "must resolve statutory ambiguities . . . in a manner that will further the remedial purpose of the act." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mello v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 265 Conn. 21, 26, 826 A.2d 1117 (2003). Since the enactment of the "plain meaning rule" in 2003, remedial statutes have continued to be construed liberally by our courts. See Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 275 Conn. 72, 881 A.2d 139, (2005), also see Rutolo v. Tietjen, 93 Conn.App. 432 (2006). In addition, "[w]hen a dispute arises regarding application of [a remedial] statute . . . the burden rests on the party seeking to deny the statutory protection." Rutolo v. Tietjen, supra, 93 Conn.App. at 439.
Since the enactment...
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