Southern Pac. Transportation Co. v. Dolan

• Decision Date: 30 August 1972
• Citation: 27 Cal.App.3d 534,104 Cal.Rptr. 131
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Thomas R. DOLAN, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 30057.

Page 131

104 Cal.Rptr. 131

27 Cal.App.3d 534

SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Thomas R. DOLAN, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 30057.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Aug. 30, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 1972.

Hearing Denied Nov. 15, 1972.

Douglas E. Stephenson, Corrigan & Stephenson, San Francisco, for appellant.

John S. Mead, Hoge & Mead, San Francisco, for respondent.

KONGSGAARD, ^* Associate Justice.

Plaintiff, Southern Pacific Company, appeals from a judgment dismissing its complaint following an order sustaining defendant's demurrer without leave to amend.

On June 12, 1967, Thomas Dolan, a minor 19 years of age, was involved in a collision between a car driven by him and owned by his parents, and a motorized hand car owned by Southern Pacific and operated by its employees. As a result of the collision, several of Southern Pacific's employees were injured, including one Estrada. Estrada filed a complaint for damages against his employer, Southern Pacific Company, pursuant to the Federal Employers Liability Act and against young Dolan. In this complaint, Estrada alleged he was operating the rail car at the time of the accident and was injured as a result of negligence on the part of both Southern Pacific and young Dolan.

Following trial by jury, a judgment in favor of plaintiff Estrada was entered against both defendants in the amount of $85,000. After the entry of judgment, the parties satisfied the judgment with Southern Pacific paying $64,864.96 and young Dolan's insurer paying $20,364.36. After the judgment was satisfied, Southern Pacific obtained a judgment of contribution against young Dolan pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 878, in the amount of $23,000. This sum represented the amount Southern Pacific paid in excess over its share of the judgment. After it became apparent that young Dolan had insufficient assets to satisfy the $23,000 judgment against him, Southern Pacific filed the present action against the parents ¹ of young Dolan. Its complaint sets forth three causes of action predicated upon certain Vehicle Code sections each of which impose vicarious liability on persons other than drivers for the improper operation of automobiles. At the time of the accident, the three Vehicle Code sections read as follows:

Section 17150. 'Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or injury to person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner, and the negligence of such person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil damages.'

Section 17707. 'Any civil liability of a minor arising out of his driving a motor vehicle upon a highway during his minority is hereby imposed upon the person who signed and verified the application of the minor for a license and the person shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages proximately resulting from the negligence or wilful misconduct of the minor in driving a motor vehicle, except that an employer signing the application shall be subject to the provisions of this section only if an unrestricted driver's license has been issued to the minor pursuant to the employer's written authorization.'

Section 17708. 'Any negligence or wilful misconduct of a minor, whether licensed or not under this code, in driving a motor vehicle upon a highway with the express or implied permission of the parents or the person or guardian having custody of the minor shall be imputed to the parents, person, or guardian for all purposes of civil damages and the parents, person, or guardian shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages proximately resulting from the negligence or wilful misconduct.'

In section 17707 the vicarious liability is imposed upon one who signs the driver's application of a minor; in section 17708 it is imposed upon parents who permit a minor to drive a motor vehicle; and in section 17150 it is imposed upon an owner who permits another person to drive the owner's vehicle. The single issue presented in the case at bench is whether a party who has obtained a judgment of contribution against a minor codefendant, can maintain an independent action under any of these three sections against persons made vicariously liable for the actions of that minor.

Appellant contends the clear and unambiguous language of each of the Three Vehicle Code sections permits it to maintain an independent action against such persons. Appellant argues that since it has a judgment for contribution against the minor that is unsatisfied, it may proceed against the parents who are jointly and severally liable with the minor for his civil liabilities and damages. The basis of this assertion by appellant is language in each of the three code sections which, plaintiff contends, unequivocally allows recovery from one who is vicariously liable. Section 17150 stated, '. . . the negligence of such person (the minor) shall be imputed to the owner (respondent) For all purposes of civil damages.' (Emphasis added.) Section 17708 ² which was in effect at the time of the accident contained similar language: 'Any negligence . . . of the minor shall be imputed to the parents . . . For all purposes of civil damages . . ..' (Emphasis added.) And in section 17707 it is stated that, 'Any civil liability of a minor . . . is hereby imposed upon the person (the parent) who signed . . . for a license . . . and the person (parent) shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for Any damages . . ..' (Emphasis added.) Appellant contends that the broad language of the sections 'for all purposes of civil damages' and 'any civil liability,' places no limitation on the right to recover from one who is vicariously liable. Even though the language of sections 17150, 17707 and 17708 is not identical, appellant contends the meaning of each section is explicit and free of ambiguity and the thrust of each of the sections is the same. Since the statutes are unequivocal, the railroad argues that the lower court erred in ignoring their clear mandate by construing the statutes so as to preclude any recovery from respondent.

Respondent on the other hand urges that these sections of the Vehicle Code confirm no right upon a joint tortfeasor to satisfy a judgment of contribution against one who may be vicariously liable for the acts of the other joint tortfeasor.

The general rule is that the meaning of a statute is determined from its language considered as a whole. (City of Escondido v. Municipal Court (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 801, 805, 61 Cal.Rptr. 362, and cases cited therein.) Where the language used, given its ordinary and probable effect, is reasonably free from ambiguity and uncertainty, there is no room for construction. (City of Escondido, supra, at 805, 61 Cal.Rptr. 362; Alalunga Sport Fishers, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 663, 666, 55 Cal.Rptr. 875; see also Gaumer v. County of Tehama (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 548, 551, 55 Cal.Rptr. 777.) This principle was eloquently put forth by the court in Holder v. Superior Court (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 314, at page 317, 74 Cal.Rptr. 853, at page 855 when it stated: 'In any event, it should not be overlooked that a rule of construction becomes applicable only when uncertainty is found. . . . Clear statutory language no more needs to be interpreted than pure water needs to be strained.'

Appellant applies these principles to the statutes in question and argues that the phrase 'Any civil liability' in sections 17707 and the phrases 'for all purposes of civil damages' in sections 17708 and 17150 are clear in their meaning and do not require any interpretation at all.

In dealing with section 17150 and its predecessor, section 402, subdivision (a), the courts have been unable to construe it with the ease that appellant suggests. In Bayless v. Mull (1942) 50 Cal.App.2d 66, at page 69, 122 P.2d 608 at page 610, the court stated:

'While the language of the statute seems clear and unambiguous, it will be noted it does not define the phrase 'permission . . . of the owner'; nor does it lay down any formula or test for ascertaining what amounts to a 'permission' within the meaning of the statute. Moreover, the statute does not indicate whether the owner's potential liability runs with the car, so to speak, wherever it may be operated or used by the person who is entrusted with it, or whether the liability runs with the car only when it is operated or used at such times and places as the owner expressly or impliedly designates. The solution of these and other questions arising out of the statute will be aided, we think, by reference to the legal doctrines of tort liability which prevailed prior to the passage of the statute, and the conditions then existing which gave rise to it.' And in Weber v. Pinyan (1937) 9 Cal.2d 226, at page 230, 70 P.2d 183, the Supreme Court noted that section 1714 1/4 of the Civil Code (the forerunner of Veh.Code, § 402, subd. (a) and § 17150) would be easy of interpretation were it not for the confusion over the term negligence.

More specifically the phrase 'for all purposes of civil damages' contained in section 17150 and its predecessor, section 402, subdivision (a), has been the specific target of judicial interpretation. In Milgate v. Wraith (1942) 19 Cal.2d 297, 121 P.2d 10, plaintiff loaned his car to one Cunningham who became involved in a collision with defendant. When plaintiff sued defendant for damages to plaintiff's car, defendant raised the defense of contributory negligence as to Cunningham, the permissive user. The trial court concluded the negligence of the permissive user should be imputed to the owner For all purposes of civil damages. The Supreme Court upheld the lower ...