Southern Railway Company v. Railroad Commission of Indiana

• Decision Date: 07 February 1908
• Docket Number: Railroad Commission 5
• Citation: 83 N.E. 721,42 Ind.App. 90
• Parties: SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF INDIANA
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

83 N.E. 721

42 Ind.App. 90

SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF INDIANA

Railroad Commission No. 5

Court of Appeals of Indiana

February 7, 1908

Rehearing denied June 10, 1908.

From Railroad Commission of Indiana; Union B. Hunt, Chairman Charles V. McAdams and William J. Wood, Commissioners.

Appeal from an order of the Railroad Commission of Indiana, by the Southern Railway Company.

Order confirmed.

Alex. P. Humphrey and John D. Welman, for appellant.

James Bingham, Attorney-General, Merrill Moores and Charles V McAdams, for appellee.

RABB J. Roby, C. J., absent.

OPINION

RABB, J.--

Edward T. Slider, who avers that he is a coal dealer and shipper doing business in the city of New Albany, Indiana, on the appellant's line of railroad, filed his petition with the Railroad Commission of Indiana, alleging that the appellant's freight rates on coal from said city of New Albany to certain named stations on appellant's line of road in this State west of New Albany were excessive and unreasonable, and claiming also that in the fixing of the appellant's schedule of freight rates on coal it had unjustly discriminated against the petitioner and other shippers of coal from New Albany in favor of coal shippers at Oakland City and Boonville, and that it had unjustly discriminated in its said freight rates against the city of New Albany and in favor of said localities of Oakland City and Boonville. Such proceedings were had on such petition as resulted in an order of the commissioners revising the freight rates of appellant on coal between the points named, and establishing a lower rate than that fixed by the appellant.

The case is brought to this court under the provisions of sections six and six and one-half of the act of 1905 (Acts 1905, p. 83, §§ 5405f, 5405g Burns 1905), creating the railroad commission, and a concise statement of appellant's causes of complaint is filed in this court.

The objections urged here against the proceedings of the commission are: (1) That the petition is insufficient to form a basis of any action by the commission; (2) that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the allegation of unjust discrimination contained in the petition; (3) that there is no proof that the existing charges of the appellant were unreasonable, or that the rates ordered by the commission were unreasonable; (4) that the appellant's motion to dismiss the petition should have been sustained, because the evidence shows that the coal shipped by the petitioner was interstate commerce; (5) that the rates fixed by the order of the commission are in perpetuity; (6) that the rates fixed by the commission deprive the appellant of its property without due process of law, in (a) that it denies to the appellant the right to collect the rates fixed by it for transportation of freight, in the absence of a judicial determination that such rates are unreasonable; (b) that the law gives the commission the power to fix rates only in cases where the railroad companies have made unreasonable rates, and that the commission, having no judicial powers, cannot determine the question of reasonable rates; (c) that the remedy afforded by the act, to the party aggrieved by the commission's decision, of appeal to this court is ineffective, for the reason that this court, being a judicial body, cannot exercise legislative power and revise the rates fixed by the commission, as contemplated by the provisions of the act granting the right of appeal to this court; (7) that the act denies to steam roads the equal protection of the law, and grants to interurban roads immunities not permitted to the steam roads.

We will consider these propositions in the order in which they are presented. The petition on which this matter was heard before the railroad commission was in two paragraphs. The first paragraph, after the formal averments regarding the petitioner's business and the location of the appellant's road, avers that the appellant refuses to transport coal for the petitioner from New Albany westward over its road to Georgetown for less than fifty cents per ton, to Corydon for less than seventy cents per ton, to Marengo for less than eighty cents per ton, to English for less than eighty cents per ton, to Huntingburgh for less than $ 1 per ton, to Oakland City for less than $ 1.20 per ton, to Jasper for less than $ 1.10 per ton, to Rockport for less than $ 1.20 per ton, to Boonville for less than $ 1.20 per ton, while it transports coal from the Indiana mines situated around Oakland City and Boonville eastwardly to the city of New Albany, a distance of 100 miles, at a rate of forty cents per ton; that the expense of transporting freight in one direction over appellant's road is substantially the same as in the other; that there is practically no competing lines between the points; that these rates create an unjust discrimination against the city of New Albany and the coal shippers in and near said city, and give to Oakland City and shippers in and near that place an undue preference over shippers of coal in and near New Albany, and particularly the petitioner.

The second paragraph avers substantially the same facts that are set up in the first, and also alleges that the rates charged by appellant upon coal shipments from New Albany to the points named are excessive and unreasonable, and sets out a schedule of rates which it avers are reasonable.

It is contended that the facts set forth in the first paragraph of the petition fail to show an unjust discrimination against the city of New Albany or the petitioner, and that appellant's special objection thereto should have been sustained; that the second paragraph does not state facts showing that the existing rates established by the railroad company are unreasonable, and that the commission was absolutely bound either to accept the rates specified in the petition as being reasonable, or to reject the petition, even though they should find that the rates established by the company were unreasonable.

No strictness of pleading is required in proceedings before the railroad commission, and it is vested with ample power to frame its orders, as the substantial justice of the case may require, irrespective of the relief asked for in the petition. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Com., etc. (1906), 38 Ind.App. 439, 78 N.E. 338.

The finding of the commission was that the established rates of the company for freight on coal from New Albany to the points named in that order were unreasonable, and different rates were established by the commission. If this finding and order were justified, it was immaterial what ruling the commission made on the objections to the first paragraph of the petition, or whether either paragraph stated facts sufficient to show unjust discrimination. The second paragraph in plain terms sets forth what appellee's freight rates on coal were from New Albany to the points named, and charged in concise and unmistakable terms that these rates were unreasonable. This statement fully apprised appellant of what it was required to meet before the commission. It was unnecessary to set out in the petition evidentiary facts by which it was proposed to prove that the rate established by the company was unreasonable. The objections to this paragraph of the petition were properly overruled.

It is contended that the evidence is insufficient to show that the rate established by the company was unreasonable, or that the rates established by the commission were reasonable. There was evidence before the commission as to the rates charged for freight on coal by numerous other railroads in the neighborhood where the conditions, with reference to the character of the country through which the road ran, were similar to the country appellant's road passed through, where the grades must necessarily have been much the same, where the cost of constructing roads and of moving trains could not have been materially different, and where the volume of the traffic must have been about the same, and showing a much lower rate than the rate established by the appellant for a similar haul; and the rate shown in evidence, established by the appellant, for the same character of freight going over its road between the same points in the opposite direction was proper to be considered, the evidence showing that the grades on the road and the expense incidental to moving the trains could not have been essentially different going in one direction from what they were going in the other.

It is true the company is not bound to make the same rate for freight going in either direction between the same points on its road, and there may be many reasons why the railroad company would be justified in making a wide difference in such rates. There may exist reasons that will justify a railroad company in giving rates for the transportation of certain articles over its road for even less than the actual expense of transportation. It is to the interest of the railroad company and of the public at large to encourage the full development of all the natural resources of the country through which a road passes, and the company has a right to adjust its freight rates in such manner as will best promote this end. But the railroad commission and this court are justified, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, in assuming that freight rates fixed by the railroad company are such as will be remunerative to the company, and, where it fixes a rate on coal at fifty cents per ton from Oakland City to New Albany, we have a right to assume, in the absence of a contrary showing, that the company can carry the freight at that rate at a profit. And where there can be no very substantial difference in the cost of moving trains...