Southern Ry. Co. v. Pruitt, 44634
| Decision Date | 05 February 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 44634,No. 3,44634,3 |
| Citation | 121 Ga.App. 530,174 S.E.2d 249 |
| Parties | SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. Willie Mae PRUITT |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
A pending tort action in the City Court of Buford in Gwinnett County against the defendant railroad, substantially identical to the present action, tolled the statute of limitation for personal injuries until that court dismissed the action, and for six months thereafter, thereby preserving a claim for personal injuries at the time the plaintiff renewed her claim within the six month period in the Civil and Criminal Court of Gwinnett County.
Willie Mae Pruitt timely filed an action in the City Court of Buford against Southern Railway Company for personal injuries and property damage resulting from a train-auto collision in Gwinnett County on August 10, 1966. The City Court of Buford by order dated February 1, 1969, dismissed the action on a plea to the jurisdiction. Within six months thereafter and on March 10, 1969, plaintiff Pruitt filed a complaint against the defendant railroad in the Civil and Criminal Court of Gwinnet County based upon the same collision. The railroad company sought by summary judgment to exclude any claim except for property damage, contending that the suit in the City Court of Buford did not toll the 2 year statute with respect to personal injuries. This appeal is from the order of the Civil and Criminal Court of Gwinnett County denying the motion.
Robinson, Thompson, Buice & Harben, Emory F. Robinson, Gainesville, for appellant.
Merritt & Pruitt, Glyndon C. Pruitt, Buford, for appellee.
We affirm. The venue of an action against a railroad company is the 'county in which the cause of action originated.' Code § 94-1101. While the first suit was brought in Gwinnett County where the cause of action originated, it was dismissed by the City Court of Buford on the ground that the collision complained of occurred outside the territorial limits of that court. While we think this was an erroneous conclusion, that order was unappealed from and is not the subject of review here. Even so, under the holdings in Atlanta, Knoxville and Northern Railway Company v. Wilson, 119 Ga. 781, 47 S.E. 366 and Lamb v. Howard, 150 Ga. 12, 102 S.E. 436, the suit, though dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, tolled the statute of limitation during the time the action was there pending and six months thereafter.
The renewal statute (Code § 3-808) is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed. As was pointed out in Atlanta, Knoxville and Northern Railway Company v. Wilson, supra, 119 Ga. at p. 786, 47 S.E. at p. 368, ...
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...47 S.E. 366(5) supra; Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Commercial Transportation, Inc., 224 Ga. 203, 160 S.E.2d 898; Southern R. Co. v. Pruitt, 121 Ga.App. 530, 174 S.E.2d 249; see also Cutliffe v. Pryse, 187 Ga. 51, 200 S.E. 124, supra, and Chance v. Planters &c. Cooperative, Inc., 219 Ga. 1, 4......
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